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IV. 市民社会を比較する

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**15. Which Civil Society Organizations in Which Countries are Enjoying Policy-Making Processes and Why:
Comparing 7 Countries (Japan, South Korea, Germany, China, Turkey, Russia, and the Philippines) in *JIGS* Survey***

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Introduction: Explaining the Differences in Subjective Influence Score in Seven Countries




Figure 1. Subjective Influence Score (mean) by Country

Let us begin by looking at Figure 1. It summarizes the results of a survey question which asks the following: “When policy problems arise in the geographical areas suggested in Question 6 (1. Village, town, or city; 2. Prefecture; 3. A region covering several prefectures; 4. National; 5. Global),

how much influence does your organization have on such problems?"¹ The respondents, civil society organizations (hereafter CSOs) in capital cities in surveyed countries, self-evaluated their influence, and were asked to choose one answer from the following five: extremely influential=4, influential=3, somewhat influential=2, not influential=1, not at all influential=0. (We will refer to country names rather than city names hereafter.) We then compiled these scores, or Subjective Influence Score (SIS), and calculated the mean (or SIS (mean)) for each country.

If Figure 1 actually reflects the reality, then why do CSOs in the Philippines and Russia seem to enjoy policy-making processes by wielding strong influence, while those in Germany, South Korea, and Japan are not as influential and successful in managing the political-process? Moreover, why do CSOs in China and Turkey seem to suffer even more from the lack of influence?

The purpose of this paper is twofold. One is to provide a first cut to understand the realities of CSOs and politics, using the above questions as a starter. There is no doubt that the interactions between the state and society, or the characteristics of political regimes, history, culture, people's awareness, and institutional legacies all affect organizations' self-evaluation regarding influence. Here, however, we attempt to understand such differences among countries by comparing JIGS (Japan Interest Group Survey) survey data.

To be sure, policy influence as referred to here is by no means real or absolute. It is merely a self-evaluation in certain policy issue area in which a certain CSO is active.² However, it might be

¹ Q7 of Japan JIGS (Japan Interest Group Survey) survey (Tsujinaka ed.1999). We have conducted JIGS surveys in 9 countries (Japan, South Korea, the United States, Germany, China, Turkey, Russia, the Philippines, and Brazil) in more than 2 locations each, but in this paper, we focus on 7 countries (capitals). The United States and Brazil are excluded in the analysis because no questions regarding SIS were included in the U.S. survey, and data is currently being analyzed in the Brazil survey. It is important to note that there are slight differences in nuance in the questions asked in each country. The followings are the actual questions used in the survey (translated from the local language):

Japan: "When policy problems arise in the geographical areas categorized in Question 6 (1. Village, town, or city; 2. Prefecture; 3. A region covering several prefectures; 4. National; 5. Global), how much influence does your organization have on such problems?"

South Korea: "When policy problems arise in the geographical areas categorized in Question 6 (1. Village, town, or city; 2. Prefecture; 3. A region covering several prefectures; 4. National; 5. Global), how much influence does your organization have on such problems?"

Germany: "How big do you think is the influence your organization has on the area in which it conducts its activities?"

China: "Overall, how much influence does your organization have on government's policy-making processes in your areas of activities?"

Turkey: "When policy problems arise in the geographical area categorized in Q6 (1. Village, town or city; 2. Prefecture; 3. A region covering several prefectures; 4. National; 5. Global), how much influence does your organization have on such problems?"

Russia: "How much influence does your organization have on solving problems in your geographic area of activities?"

Philippines: "When policy problem occur in the geographical area indicated in Q6, how much influence does your organization have in solving these problems through certain governmental measures (for instance, enactment of laws, etc.)?"

² It is possible to argue that CSOs in some cultures tend to overstate their score (such as influence) than others, but that is beyond the scope of our analysis. This kind of cultural bias can be seen in the comparative social capital studies (see OECD

possible to infer that, in a society where CSOs score high SIS, they are relatively “enjoying” to exert their influence.

Another goal of this paper is to explore the meaning of SIS when we examine the relationships between each country’s SIS and related variables. This attempt makes important theoretical contributions to comparative empirical studies in the future³.

Let us look at some variables related to SIS (SIS (mean) in each country, SIS (mean) rankings, the percentage of organizations that think they have influence, etc.) and the overview of the countries surveyed.

Table 1 clearly shows that economic health (GDP per capita) and the level of political and social freedom (Freedom House ratings) are not reflected in SIS. In other words, while such indicators in Russia (Moscow) and the Philippine (Manila) are lower compared to that of any other developed countries’, the SIS in these countries are higher than that of developed countries’. The levels of political and social freedom are high in developed countries (Germany, South Korea, and Japan), but they are not necessarily reflected in the level of SIS. The rate of volunteer participation and NGO vitality may affect SIS, but the data is only partial, thus not definite.

2002 and Putnam ed. 2002). By using the Japanese and Korean survey data, Choe and Tsujinaka (2004) has conducted a systematic analysis on the factors that influence SIS. The variables used in this paper are based on their analysis. As we see in the chi-square test conducted in the latter section of the paper, SIS and “Policy Influence: Success in Formulating Policy” show statistical significance (level of significance 0.01) in all countries surveyed. As for the relationships between SIS and “Policy Influence: Success in Blocking/Revising Policy,” while the results in the Philippines (significance probability 0.074), China (0.043), and South Korea (0.015) are rather weak, we find it statistically significant (level of significance 0.01) in other countries.

³ How to measure “influence” of groups has been a difficult crux in the interest group studies. Most of the literature adopted case studies, not survey questions (see Baumgartner and Leech 1998:128-139). In this context, we can contribute theoretically by identifying the significance of SIS.

TABLE 1. Overview of Countries Surveyed in JIGS (capital city data*)

	GDP per Capita (n.1)	Freedom House rating (n.1)	CNSP (CSS) (n.2)	Volunteering Workforce (n.2)	NGO Vitality (n.3)	Subjective Influence Score (SIS) (n. 4)	Subjective Influence Score (SIS) ranking (n.4)	% of SIS strong (n.4)
Germany	22,740	1-1	5.9%	10%	-	2.23	3	47.6
Japan	34,010	1-2	4.2%	0.5%	Low	1.52	5	16.0
South Korea	9,930	1-2	2.4%	3%	High	1.74	4	17.4
Turkey	2,490	3-3	-	-	-	0.82	7	8.6
Russia	2,130	6-5	-	-	-	2.60	2	63.3
Philippine	1,030	2-3	1.9%	6%	High	2.74	1	62.3
China	960	7-6	-	-	Low	1.01	6	9.5
U.S.	35,400	1-1	9.8%	22%	-	-	-	
Brazil	2,830	2-3	1.6%	6%	-			
Bangladesh	380	4-4	-	-	High			

(n. 1) *Freedom in the World 2005*; (n.2) Johns Hopkins CNSP Project; (n.3) Shigetomi 2004; (n.4) JIGS1 (Tsujinaka project)

* In each country, the data was collected in the capital and more than one other region. But in this paper, we used the data of the capital only.

I. Methodology and Hypotheses:

Methods, Scope, and the Meaning of JIGS Survey, and Hypotheses Examined in this Paper

Before going into further analyses, let us first explain our survey project, *The International Survey of Civil Society and Interest Groups* (hereafter “JIGS survey,” which originally stands for *Japan Interest Group Survey*) that provides the data for this paper’s analyses⁴.

1) **The main characteristic of the methodology and scope of JIGS** is that it cross-culturally surveys directly the basic core (associations: their resources, attributes, behaviors, relations, etc.) of civil society in 10 countries. Although “associations are an essential part – and perhaps the least controversial part – of civil society” (Schwartz and Pharr 2003: 32), it is quite rare to find researches other than JIGS that systematically and comparatively survey associations exclusively. This may be

⁴ Regarding the methodology and outputs of International JIGS surveys, see Tsujinaka 2003, Tsujinaka ed.2002, Tsujinaka and Yeom eds. 2004, and Kojima and Tsujinaka 2003. See also Table 2 in this paper for other references.

because it is quite daunting to target appropriate research subjects and carry out large-scale surveys in many countries.⁵

Unlike surveys that focus on institutional and economic statistical data like the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project led by Salamon (with Anheier 1997, with Anheier, Regina and Wojciech 1999), or individual survey data like Putnam and OECD Social Capital group,⁶ the JIGS surveys focus exclusively on each country's CSO survey data. This allows us for the first time to comprehensively grasp the quantity, attributes, resources, behavior, and relations of CSOs in the countries surveyed.

There is no doubt that defining and empirically grasping CSOs are difficult. However, it is impossible to understand the characteristics of social capital and civil society without understanding the quantity, attributes, resources, behavior, and relations of CSOs.

Putnam (1993, 2000) uses variety of aggregate data, but does not conduct surveys to the associations (except other objects, like citizens and local governments), therefore, do not have essential data on organizations' behaviors and relations. In Japan, the research headed by Yamauchi (eds. with Ibuki 2005) systematically examines CSOs, but his group's focus is on nonprofit organizations (hereafter NPOs), thus, the scope is limited. Also the data is mainly quantitative.

The JIGS survey, on the other hand, is more comprehensive. Its goal is to cover all associations and unions except the government (the state), private business (the market), and families. More specifically, we focus on all non-governmental, private, independent, and voluntary social organizations that are established enough to have a phone line. (In case where identification of organization by phone book classifications is difficult, we relied on comprehensive lists compiled by a certain sector or by the government. See note 4)

Our definition does not include "non-profit-distributing" element covered in Salamon et al's definition (Salamon and Anheier 1997, e.g.). Cooperative organizations and some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that take the form of a for-profit enterprise are important parts of the entire CSOs. However, if this element is included, they are automatically classified as enterprises. Therefore, we exclude the "non-profit-distributing" element in our definition as well.

Like Salamon, however, we exclude religious worship organizations. We include CSOs that are religious, but not worship. On the other hand, while Salamon includes public enterprises such as hospitals, private schools, and social welfare institutions, we believe that they are more of a public organization, or a hybrid of government and enterprise, rather than a CSO. Thus, we exclude such

⁵ There are several good comparative studies but their methods are more descriptive and their data are rather non-systemic. See Putnam eds. 2002 and Shigetomi ed. 2002.

⁶ They, originally using variety of association data, finally decided to utilize questionnaire opinion surveys targeting individuals not groups like World Value Survey, EuroBarometer and AsiaBarometer. See OECD 2002, Howard 2003, Inoguchi 2002, and Inoguchi et al.eds.2005.

organizations from our definition.

Consequently, Salamon's statistical data grasps civil society by focusing primarily on non-profit sector or service establishment, while the JIGS data puts more weight on associations and unions.

As Table 2 shows, we have surveyed 10 countries in the first round of JIGS, and the data of 8 countries are currently available. Since these countries surveyed are quite diverse in terms of the quantity, attributes, resources, behavior, and relations, our project easily passes one of the criteria, set by the Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project, which is "to select a set of countries that differed enough along key dimensions to allow us to test some of major theories in this field." (Center for Civil Society Studies n.d.)

As also shown in Table 2, survey methods differ slightly in countries to countries, hence, we need to understand that this might somewhat affect the results of the survey. JIGS surveys include many questions and variables. But the 7-country comparison conducted in this paper relies on variables used in detailed Japan-Korea SIS study, which has already been completed (Choe and Tsujinaka 2004).

TABLE 2. Overview of JIGS 10 Country Surveys

Country	Year	Data Source / Survey Method	Population	Sample (a)	Valid Response (b)	Return Rate (%) (b/a)	Regions (Valid Return Sample)	@Principal Survey Researcher /Note/ Codebook References, etc.
1.Japan	'97	classified telephone directory / mail	23,128	4,247	1,635	38.5	Tokyo (1,438) Ibaraki (197)	@ TSUJINAKA, Yutaka / Tsujinaka 1999a; Tsujinaka 2002
2.Korea	'97	classified telephone directory / mail	11,521	3,890	493	12.7	Seoul (371) Kyonggi (110)	@ YEOM, Jaeho / 12 organizations removed since unable to identify regional classifications: 481 organizations / Tsujinaka1999b; Tsujinaka and Yeom 2004.
3.USA	'99	classified telephone directory / mail	7,228	5,089	1,492	29.3	Washington, D.C. (748) North Carolina (752)	@ TSUJINAKA, Yutaka / 8 organizations added from preliminary survey: 1500 organizations / Tsujinaka 2001a
4.Germany	'00	classified telephone directory, organization directory / mail	4,806	3,074	885	28.8	Berlin (643) Halle (154)	@FOLYANTY-JOST, Gesine, TSUBOGO, Minoru / Tsujinaka 2001b
5.China	'01-02, '03-04	"Social Groups" officially registered at the Municipal or District/Country Civil Affairs Bureau / mail	9,536	8,897	2,858	32.1	Beijing (627), Xianju (1,782), Heilongjiang (449)	@LI, Jingpneg, YUAN, Ruijun / Tsujinaka 2005b. Kojima and Tsujinaka 2003,2004.
6.Turkey	'03-04	Regional survey investigation based on telephone directory / interview	15,730	Appr. 1,500	841	-	Ankara (334) Istanbul (507)	@ HIRAI, Yukiko, KANSU, Aykut / telephone directory Ankara (4512)Istanbul (11218)
7.Russia	'03-04	Registered Organization (NGO) Database / mail	2,974	1,500	711	47.4	Moscow (411) Saint Petersburg (300)	@ SMIRNOV, William / Able to contact 1893 organizations out of 2974 / Tsujinaka 2005a
8.Philippine	'04-05	Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Philippine Foundation Center (PFC) / interview	44,051	5,472	1,014	18.5	Manila (855) Cebu (159)	@BALLESCAS, Maria Rosario-Piquero, SHUTO, Motoko / sampled only organizations with a phone number / Ballescas, Shuto, and Tsujinaka 2006
9.Brazil	'05-06	Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) / interview	275,895	3,000 (estimate)	1,500 (estimate)	50 (estimate)	Brasilia,Recife,Belem (Belo Horizonte)	@KONDO, Edson Kenji
10.Bangladesh	06-07	Telephone books, Directories	TBC	1500 (estimate)	800 (estimate)	50 (estimate)	Dhaka, Rajshahi	@TASNIM, Farhat, SHAKIL, Ahmed.

2) Next, we will briefly introduce various hypotheses that will be examined in more details later.⁷

① Civil Society Structure (sector proportion) Hypothesis

The structure of CSOs varies in each country, since it reflects distinctive history, culture, and state-society relations. This hypothesis argues that the structure, or sector proportion of CSOs, explains the differences in SIS in each country. In order to test the hypothesis, we first need to investigate which sector is highly organized by CSOs by comparing four sectors: profit, nonprofit, citizen, and other. This reveals the characteristics and trends of each sector. If the differences in the proportion of sectors explain the differences in SIS, then the implication would be that power or policy influence does not directly affect SIS.

② Resource Hypothesis

This hypothesis states that differences in objective resources such as organizational resources and the year established of CSOs in each country explain the differences in SIS. We compare the basic resources of organizations in four sectors. The reason why we examine the year CSOs are established is because it can be considered as a comprehensive indicator that shows the wealth (durability) of resources. The assumption is that the longer a CSO has existed, the more it is likely to have durable and abundant resources. In other words, unless a CSO has plenty of resources, it could not have existed for a long time.

③ Political Activism Hypothesis

This hypothesis states that SIS is a function of aggressive activities of CSOs. In other words, policy activism determines SIS. If this hypothesis is valid, SIS can be considered as a reflection of CSOs' policy influence.

④ Administration Connection Hypothesis

This hypothesis suggests that SIS is a function of mutual relations between CSOs and administrative actors, or the strength of institutional relations. It overlaps with the above Political Activism Hypothesis, and cannot be clearly separated because both put emphasis on actors' behaviors based on relations. This hypothesis is related to the characteristics of political systems (regimes) such as statism and corporatism.

(Orientation Hypothesis)

⁷ See Muramatsu, Itoh, and Tsujinaka 1986, Tsujinaka 1988 for the author's original ideas. For further theoretical analysis, see Prethsus 1974, Schlozman and Tiemey 1986, Knoke 1990, and Walker 1991.

Differences in subjective orientations such as aims and ideologies of CSOs may explain the differences in SIS. There are other possible hypotheses, but these will be discussed in other paper.

3) Method of Analysis

There are basically three methods:

- ① Examine the relations (whether liner or non-liner) between each country's SIS and related variables after checking scatter diagrams for the variables that show significance. The relationships cannot be considered as causal, but we consider it as an inference.
- ② Examine the relations between selected variables and SIS in cross-tabulation analysis in each country, and find statistical significance through chi-square tests.
- ③ Examine the relations between selected variables and SIS in each sector (profit, nonprofit, citizen, and other) of each country in the cross-tabulation analysis. Find statistical significance through chi-square tests.

Even if we find an inference from test ①, results in ② and ③ are still independent. However, if we could pass all the tests, the inference regarding the relationships between SIS and certain variables may be one step closer to establishing causal relationships.

Although more systematic multivariate analysis is required since SIS in each country is a product of more multidimensional variables, such analysis will not be covered in this paper. (For a detailed comparative analysis of Japan and Korea, see Choe and Tsujinaka 2004.)

We now turn to each hypothesis in more details.

II. Civil Society Structure (sector proportion) Hypothesis

The structure of CSO, or a proportion of various sectors, is affected by each country's distinctive history, institutional legacies, and path dependence. This is why it is difficult to create a common classification for CSOs that can be used in cross-national surveys. In the very first JIGS survey conducted in Japan, we asked the respondents to choose one from ten classifications. In the surveys that followed, we have tailored the question to each country's situations. As a result, the number ranges from 4 in China to 32 in Russia (see Appendix A).

However, we have designed the question in such a way that made it possible to compare classifications among countries. In order to make comparisons easier, we have adopted

4 sector classifications (profit, nonprofit, citizen, and other (N.E.C., or Not Elsewhere Classified) here in this paper.

The “Profit sector” includes economic organizations that have strong ties to agricultural, forestry, fishing, and manufacturing industries, as well as labor and employers organizations. The “Nonprofit sector” includes organizations that provide professional services related to professional, educational, research, welfare, medical, and administrative issues. The “Citizen sector” is composed of organizations that citizens can participate as an individual. They include organizations related to politics, citizens, religion, and sports/hobby. “Other” includes organizations that do not fit into the above three sectors, and also those voluntarily chose to be in this category in the questionnaire⁸. Profit, nonprofit, and citizen sectors very much correspond with the three classifications used in Muramatsu, Itoh, and Tsujinaka (1986; Tsujinaka 1988) which are producer, policy taker, and advocacy.⁹




Figure 2. The Proportion of Four Sectors in Each Country

⁸ Walker 1993. Walker's classifications are based on the types of occupation, while ours are based on the category names from which we asked organizations to choose.

⁹ The Caveat is that in China, we focused on social organizations only, and used classifications that are unique to those Chinese organizations. They are industry, professional, academic/culture, and federation. In this paper, we tried to correspond these categories to profit, nonprofit, citizen, and other, respectively. However, there are no classifications that strictly represent citizen organizations in China. We acknowledge this is a problem. Moreover, since respondents in Russia and Turkey are allowed to choose more than one classifications, we need to be cautious about the results as well.

Figure 2 interestingly shows that there are three distinctive clusters of countries. The first is the Philippines and Russia that have high SIS. The Citizen sector is the largest in these two countries, occupying almost 50 percent of the entire four sectors. The second cluster is Germany and South Korea where more than one third of organizations is nonprofit, which is the largest. The third is Japan and China where more than one third is profit sector organizations. In Turkey, more than half of the organizations are “other” (Most are regional solidarity associations. Turkey’s classification method needs to be reconsidered).

We find a high correlation between the proportion of the citizen sector and SIS (mean) (Figure 3-1). On the other hand, we find a reverse correlation between the profit sector and SIS (mean) (Figure 3-2). (We find no correlations between SIS (mean) and the nonprofit sector or other sector.) The Civil Society Structure (sector proportion) Hypothesis, therefore, may be valid.¹⁰




Figure 3-1. Citizen Sector

¹⁰ We, however, do not infer that there is a causal relationship between these variables. There is no doubt that the structure (sector proportion) may be an indicator to reveal the state-society relations, but it may simply appear so on the surface. But as the following analysis shows, the organizations in the citizen sector are active, and hence, we presume that the relations here are substantial.




Figure 3-2. Profit Sector

Analyzing SIS by sector, SIS (mean) of the citizen sector is the highest among four sectors in South Korea and Japan. In the Philippines and Russia, the order (from high to low) of the SIS (mean) is other, profit, nonprofit, and citizen. In Germany, China, and Turkey, the SIS (mean) of the profit sector was the highest. (See the supplementary summary of country analysis in the end of this paper.)

On the other hand, the SIS (mean) country ranking of the citizen sector is the same as that of the overall SIS ranking. To be more specific, it was 2.65 in the Philippines, 2.57 in Russia, 1.96 in Germany, 1.91 in South Korea, 1.56 in Japan, 0.99 in China, and 0.96 in Turkey. The ranking order of the nonprofit sector is the same. In the profit sector ranking, Germany was ranked number one, and Turkey came in higher than China.

It is clear that SIS of the citizen sector and its proportion determine each country's SIS. However, relatively speaking, organizations in the citizen sector in countries where SIS is high do not necessarily self-evaluate themselves highly, when compared to actors in other sectors. It is interesting to note the possibility that the proportion of the citizen sector in each country (capital) and SIS of the citizen sector determine the overall SIS (mean).

Where does the confidence of citizen sector organizations come from?

III. Resource Hypothesis

1) Resource Hypothesis (A): Year Established

Do CSOs' resources affect SIS?

In previous studies, a hypothesis has been denied that an organization's resources would exert influence *across different sectors* (see Tsujinaka 1988, Muramatsu, Itoh and Tsujinaka 1986. Also see Choe and Tsujinaka 2004). Subjective resources, such as "reputation," however, are an exception because the increase of reputation is proportional to the increase in influence. On the other hand, it has been confirmed that those with many members and financial resources generally have strong influence within a certain sector (Choe and Tsujinaka 2004; Tsujinaka 1998; Muramatsu, Itoh, and Tsujinaka 1986).


Let us examine the relationships between each country's resources and SIS.

Trend in Year Established and SIS

Domestically speaking, unlike reputation, the year established, or the age of an organization when the survey was conducted, has been considered as a variable that may be related to influence. The older age may perhaps help strengthen organizational resources and the relationships between political actors, win trust, and increase influence. This premise is likely to be valid at least within a sector (Tsujinaka 1988: 64; Choe and Tsujinaka 2004). Here, let us consider whether year established correlates with SIS in all the countries surveyed.

Figure 4 shows the percentage, calculated every five years, of all organizations established during the 100-year time (from 1900 to around 2000) in each country. In this figure, which includes the data of 8 countries, we note that Japan and the United States are the exception. In other words, in other 6 countries, most organizations were established in the late 1980 and the 90s.

We need to be careful, however, that there is a 7-year gap between the first survey (1997) and the last one (2004), and that it does not include organizations that dissolved before the survey was conducted. Another limit is that we cannot tell from the data whether the organization is entirely a new or a merged one between existing organizations. This point is particularly important since the change in political system (regime) often cause such realignment of organizations.



* Data available until 1997 in Japan and Korea. Data available until 1999 in U.S.A. and Germany.

Figure 4. Year Established (%)

Due to space limitations, we could not prove our grand hypothesis, but the authors believe that there is a strong relationship between changes in political systems (regimes) and the establishment (or a birth) of organizations (Tsujinaka and Yeom eds. 2004). In this sense, we can understand that postwar reform in Japan and the liberal reform after the Civil Rights Movement, or interest group liberalism in the United States (Lowi 1979), positively affected the number of organizations established.

Major shifts in political systems (regimes) may have also affected the establishment of organizations in other countries. Examples of such major changes are: Postwar reform as well as the 1990 reunification of Germany; the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and liberalization after that in Russia; the reform and liberalization policy/Southern Tour (1992) in China; liberalization and civilianization since 1987 in South Korea; negotiations for EU accession (EC until 1987, and EU after 1993) and liberalization in Turkey; and liberalization after the Aquino regime (1983) in the Philippines.

Again the caveat is that we survey the year established of only existing organizations. Thus, if CSOs are vulnerable and if the cycle of establishment and disestablishment is short, the data would always show that most organizations are established in recent years.

The effects of political system (regime) change aside, we believe that the permanence of organizations is the source, the sum, and at the same time, the result of resources. Hence, if there were more organizations with long history, we would expect them to have a strong influence. Although Japan, Germany, and South Korea have more permanent organizations, why do they have relatively lower SIS than Russia and the Philippines, and higher SIS than Turkey and China? This is a puzzling result from the survey.

Moreover, we analyzed the correlations between SIS and the year established, but could not confirm any relationships. In other words, we infer, as a result of the test of the Resource Hypothesis (A), that, at a national level, there is no relations between SIS and the year established.

Moreover, if we examine the year established in four sectors separately, we can conclude the followings:

- 1) When compared to other sectors, most of the organizations in the Citizen sector were established around the 1990s (Figure 5-1). However, in developed countries like the United States, Germany, and Japan, there are relatively many organizations with a long history, established before and after the war and in the 1960s. There are perhaps mainly two reasons why many organizations emerged around the 1990s: one was a political system (regime) change many countries went through, and the other was the overall vulnerability of CSOs.

2) In the Profit sector, we find large differences among countries as well as in their development paths (Figure 5-2). In developed countries, the majorities of organizations in this sector were created before and after WWII, and have a long history. Many organizations were established in countries that went through political system (regime) changes (including Germany) and in developing countries (and quite many in Germany and South Korea) since the late 1980s.


3) The Nonprofit sector shows a trend that falls somewhere between the Citizen and the Profit sectors. Here, in developing countries, many organizations were also established since the late 1980s. However, in other countries, the number is spread more or less evenly in the postwar era. It then somewhat increases since the late 1980s in countries that went through political systems (regimes) changes.

In terms of the relationships between the year established and SIS (mean), organizations, except for those in the Philippines, established before the war until the mid-1960s tend to show a rather high SIS score.

However, when we examine the Citizen sector, newly emerging organizations established since the late 1980s, except for those in Germany, show higher SIS than the average score in each country. Such trend cannot be found in other sectors. This may mean that the Citizen sector shows high SIS exactly because it is young and energetic.


As discussed in the previous section, the proportion of the Citizen sector positively affect a country's overall SIS, but citizen organizations do not usually have a long history in any country. What the Citizen sector can boast of is not its permanence.

Rather, it is the fact that it is emerging. The SIS of the Citizen sector was not necessarily high in countries that had high country scores. We believe that the young citizen sector is consequently raising the overall score.



*Data available until 1997 in Japan and Korea. Data available until 1999 in U.S.A. and Germany.

Figure 5-1. Year Established: Citizen Sector



*Data available until 1997 in Japan and Korea. Data available until 1999 in U.S.A. and Germany.

Figure 5-2. Year Established: Profit Sector

Table 3 summarizes the result of the cross-tabulation analysis (chi-square test), examining the relationships between the year established and SIS. We find the level of significance of the analysis (0.05) in Russia, Germany, and Japan, but overall weak. Moreover, the coefficient was negative (i.e., newer organizations showed a high level of significance, the opposite result expected from the hypothesis).

TABLE 3. Summary of Cross-Tabulation Analysis: Resource-Year Established

	<i>Country with significance found in cross-tabulation</i>	<i>Country/Sector with significance found in cross-tabulation</i>
Variables:	Country Name (n.1) Ph/R/G/K/J/C/T	CN and Sector (n.2) P,NP,C,O
Year Established:	R*G*J* (n.3)	G:P,c/ J:o/R: C (n.4)

(n.1) Ph: Philippine/ R: Russia /G: Germany/K: Korea/J: Japan/C: China/T: Turkey.

(n.2) P: Profit sector/ NP: Non-profit sector/ C: Citizen sector/ O: Other, Not elsewhere classified.

(n.3) **: under level of significance of 0.01 , * : under level of significance of 0.05.

(n.4) capital letters= under the level of significance of 0.05; small letters=under the level of significance of 0.10.

2) Resource Hypothesis (B): Organizational Resources

Cross-tabulation analysis (countries and sectors) and SIS

To find out the relationships between SIS and organizational resources, we have conducted cross-tabulation analyses for each country and sector. However, we cannot find any relations in any of the resources because the results are either insignificant or confusing.

As Table 4 shows, cross-tabulation analysis of resources (country/sector) and SIS did not yield any significant results. We even found completely opposite results from what the hypothesis predicted. In countries where there are many citizen organizations (Philippines), new organizations with small resources showed high SIS.

In sum, neither comprehensive resources such as the year established nor the organizational resources just examined cannot confirm the significance with SIS.

This result may not be surprising. First of all, the size of resource does not tell us how much of it can actually be mobilized for affecting political processes.

Moreover, since SIS is a self-evaluation of one's own organization in policy making or political processes, it is easy to imagine that the following issues also matter: the context of policy and political process; relative relations and evaluations with other actors; and

institutional context of organization in society. No matter how abundant the resources are, an organization cannot attain high SIS, if the rival organizations or other actors have more resources.

If resources do not affect SIS, then what other factors will?

We will next examine the behavior of CSOs in political processes.

TABLE 4. Summary of Cross-Tabulation Analysis: Organizational Resource

Variables	Country Name (Ph/R/G/K/J/C/Tu)	CN and Sector (P,NP,C,O)
Member (individual)	No significance	No significance
Member (organizational)	No significance	No significance
Personnel	Ph ^{**} , R ^{**} , G ^{**} Significant but not linear (Correlation unclear)	No significance, but higher SIS confirmed Ph: C,O when resources are small
Finance	G ^{**} Tu ^{**} Turkey (and Philippines) Significant but not liner (Correlation unclear)	G: P,O
Nat'l Gov't Subsidy	No significance found	C:NP,O/Tu:O

Notes: same as TABLE 3.

IV. Political Activism Hypothesis

Since we cannot find the relationships between resources and SIS, we will now focus on CSOs' various activities.

As Table 5 shows, 8 activity variables of CSOs are expected to show quite strong correlations with SIS in each country and sector. Among others, these variables include: contact with political parties; support election campaign, influence budget formation; contact mass media, and lobbying (general).

On the other hand, the relationship between country SIS and each variable could be linear or non-linear. We have picked up those that showed linear relations only, or those that are correlated and maybe able to make causal inference. 5 figures (Figure 6-1 to Figure 6-5) are then created.

TABLE 5. Summary of Cross-Tabulation Analysis: Activities and Performance

Variables	Country that showed significance in Cross-Tabulation Name: Ph/R/G/K/J/C/Tu	Sector that showed in significance in respective country Sectors: P,NP,C,O	Linearity
Pol. Lobbying to The Governments	Ph**R**G**K**J**C**Tu**	Ph:P,NP,C,O/G:NP,C,O/J:P,NP,C,O R: P,NP,C/T:O	Linear
Contact National Administration	R**G**K**J**C**	G:P,NP,C,O/J:P,NP,C,O R: P,NP,C/T:P,O	Semi-Linear (Ph out)
Contact Gov. Party (Non-linear Ph4.4%;R17.4%;G15.4%; K23.1%;J17.3%;C33.5%;Tu5.6%)	R**G**K**J**C**	G:C,O/K:NP/J:P,NP,C,O/C:NP,C,O R: NP,C/T:C,O	Non-Linear
Contact Oppo. Party	R**G**K**J**C**	G:C,O/K:NP,C/J:P,NP,C,O/C:P,NP,C,O R: P,NP,C/T:NP,C,O	Non-Linear
Contact Media	R**G**K**J**C**	G:P,C,O/K:P,NP/J:P,NP,C/C:NP R: P,NP,C/T:NP,O	Linear (Ph out)
Campaigning El. (Ph17.8%;R15.1%;G4.4%;K12.8%;J15.8%; Ch10.8%;Tu12.5%)	Ph*J**C**Tu**	G:C/J:P,NP /T:NP,O	Linear (G out)
Lobbying Budget	G**K**J	G:NP,C/K:O/J:P,NP,C/ T:O	Non-Linear
Lobbying Total (Ph15.8%;R68.2%;G62.5%;K35.0%; J30.5%;Ch10.0%;Tu53.9%)	Ph**R**G**K**J**C**Tu**	G:P,C,O/K:NP/J:P,NP,C,O/ R: P,NP,C/T:O	Semi-Linear (T,Ph out)
Policy Formulation Policy Performance	Ph**R**G**K**J**C**Tu**	Ph:C/G:NP,C,O/K:NP/J:P,NP,O/C:C,O R: P,NP,C/T:NP,C	Linear
Policy Bloking/Revising Policy Performance	R**G**K**J**C**Tu**	Ph:C/G:NP,C,O/J:P,NP,O/C:C R: P,NP,C/T:NP,C,O	Semi-Linear (Ph out)

Notes: same as TABLE 3.




Figure 6-1. Relation between Political Lobby and SIS (mean)




Figure 6-2. Relation between Media Lobby and SIS (mean)




Figure 6-3. Relation between Campaign Activities and SIS(mean)




Figure 6-4. Relation between Policy Performance (Formulation) and SIS (mean)




Figure 6-5. Relation between Policy Performance (Blocking/Revising) and SIS (mean)

Let us examine 5 scatter diagrams. These are relatively speaking, strong linear relations that also show significant correlations between SIS (mean) in each country and variables. We do not conduct multivariate analysis here, but the fact that (more than) 3 out of 8 variables (activities) examined, and 2 variables related to policy performance suggest that these variables show strong relationship with SIS.

The first three variables are:

Lobby the Administration through Politicians (Political Lobby)

Provide Information to the Mass Media (Media Lobby)

Participate in Election Campaigns (Campaign Activities) (5 types)

Each variable indicates aggressive activities toward the government, the mass media, and political parties.

As for political lobby (Figure 6-1), China and Turkey are outliers in the lower right. As for the media lobby (Figure 6-2), the Philippines, and in campaign activities (Figure 6-3), Germany are clearly an outlier in the upper left. It is interesting to note that these suggest the characteristics of the relations between CSOs in each country and political actors.

As a result of these aggressive activities, performance variables (policy formulation

and policy blocking/revising) show clear correlations (Figure 6-4 and Figure 6-5). In both instances, the Philippines is somewhat an outlier. Except for the Philippines, we find that the larger the proportion of organizations successful in formulating, revising, and blocking policies, the higher the SIS. SIS in the Philippines is high although there is no evidence of activities or policy performances examined here.

Let us go back to Table 5.

Every country seems to show statistical significance in the chi-square test in each sector, but if we look closer, countries can be divided into two or three groups.

The following is the number of variables that showed significance at a national level:

Japan 10 variables, Germany 9 variables, South Korea 9 variables, China 9 variables, Russia 8 variables, Turkey 5 variables, and the Philippines 4 variables.

As for sectors:

Japan 10 variables, 34 sectors, Germany 10 variables, 25 sectors, Turkey 9 variables, 17 sectors, Russia 8 variables, 23 sectors, South Korea, 6 variables, 8 sectors, China 5 variables, 11 sectors, and the Philippines 3 variables, 6 sectors.

For example, according to the cross-tabulation analysis, the relationships between policy success and SIS are statistically significant, although the level varies according to countries. The relationships were especially clear in the case of Germany, Japan, and China, while slightly weaker in South Korea and the Philippines, and even weaker in Turkey and Russia (significant probability of chi-square test). When each sector is examined, we find statistical significance in Germany and Japan, but the significance is generally lower in other countries.¹¹

As the quantitative summary suggests, in established liberal democratic systems like Japan and Germany, the relationships between lobbying and influence are clear at national and sector levels. In other countries, statistical significance declines especially in sectors. It tendency is found not just in Russia, Turkey, China, and the Philippines, but also in South Korea. The level of the maturity in the political processes, which has liberal democratic characteristics, between developed and developing countries may reflect these differences.

¹¹ In Germany, we find statistical significance in the nonprofit, citizen, and other sectors, and in Japan, profit, nonprofit, and other sectors. On the other hand, statistical significance was confirmed only in two sectors in Russia (profit and citizen), South Korea (nonprofit and others), China (other [federation] and citizen [academic and culture]), and Turkey (nonprofit and citizen).

V. Administration Connection Hypothesis

Organizations' relationships with the administration includes many issues: accrediting, licensing, administrative guidance, policy-formation cooperation, opinion exchange, sending advisory board member, post offering to the ex-bureaucrats, and so on (Table 6).

The relationships between the national administration and SIS in each country suggest that there are no liner relations, and show some negative relations (Figure 7-1). The relations with local autonomies show positive but weak relations (Figure 7-2).

We found weak liner relationships between administrative consultations and SIS, but the Philippine case was an outlier. In other words, we expect that institutional relationships with the administration would be a dilemma for CSOs' influence. The closer a CSO is to the administration, the lower the SIS.

TABLE 6. Summary of Cross-Tabulation Analysis: Relations with Administration

	Country that showed significance in Cross- Tabulation	Sector that showed in significance in respective country	Linearity
Adm. Connection (National)	Ph**,R**,G**,K*,J** (Ph89.1%;R60.0%;G28.9%;K91.7%; J74.9%;Ch94.1%;Tu97.7%)	Ph:C,NP,O/G:NP,C,O/J:P,C,NP/R:NP,C,P	Non-Linear
Adm. Connection (Local)	Ph**,R**,G**,J**	Ph:NP,O/G:NP,C/J:P,C,NP,O/R:NP,C/T:P,NP	
Adm. Consultation	Ph**,R**,G**,K**, J**,C**,Tu** (Ph24.5%;R52.1%;G30.0%;K40.7%; J33.0%;Ch30.3%;Tu14.8%)	G:NP,C,O/K:NP/J:P,NP,C,O/C:P,NP,C,O R: P,NP,C/T:O.	Semi-Linear

Notes: same as TABLE 3.




Figure 7-1. Relation between Administration Connection (national) and SIS (mean)




Figure 7-2. Relation between Administration Connection (local) and SIS (mean)

Conclusion

This paper first of all emphasizes that our international JIGS survey is a very important and rare project because it comprehensively surveys CSOs themselves directly, which is the most essential element of civil society, in 10 countries. This paper uses data from capital cities in 7 countries, and analyzes the Subjective Influence Scores (SIS mean and SIS in each country) in different sectors.

The results of our analysis can be summarized as follows. (See Appendix B for the summary of country analysis.)

First, we argue that the Civil Society Structure Hypothesis is valid. In other words, we can infer that the proportion of the citizen sector may determine each country's SIS. The citizen sector's SIS is not necessarily the highest in every country, but it helps raise the overall country SIS.

Second, we argue that the Resource Hypothesis is invalid. We could not find meaningful relations between organizational resources and SIS. This is because countries where CSOs had not enough resources (the Philippines and Russia) scored higher SIS than countries where the proportion of permanent CSOs is relatively large (Japan, Germany, South Korea). At the same time, SIS is low in countries where most organizations are new, and had not enough resources (China and Turkey). The citizen sector is relatively new in most countries. In particular, organizations established during the transitional period tended to evaluate themselves more positively, and that is why they had higher SIS.

Third, as for the relationship between lobbying and SIS, there is an overall correlation which is a result of activism, and the relationships between policy preference and SIS are also strong. Moreover, we found differences (statistical significance) between mature liberal democracies like Japan and Germany, and others in their relations to SIS. When each sector is analyzed, correlations often become obvious, but no clear significance was found in the cases of South Korea, China, and the Philippines. This may be related to institutional maturity of liberal democracy.¹²

Fourth, administrative connections, like activism, showed some correlations with SIS. However, in terms of liner relations with SIS in each country, we were able to find such relations, although weak, with local autonomy and administrative consultation, but not with the state (national government). We assume that there is a complex relationship among the state, CSOs, and SIS.

Theoretically speaking, each country's SIS, which maybe determined by the number

¹² More puzzles can be found here. For example, why did we find higher level of significance than expected in Turkey and Russia?

of citizen sector's proportion to other sectors, can be considered as an indicator of civil society's influence. This indicator can also be considered to show aggressiveness of civil society as it affects (or is affected by) CSO activism and performance.

The remaining tasks are the following. First, we need to take into consideration the relative strength of other actors surrounding CSOs such as the state, enterprises, family, and religious organizations (See Tsujinaka ed.2002, and Shigetomi 2004). We were not able to analyze these in our study, but we surmise that in a society where the citizen sector is relatively dominant, the strength of the state and the government may be weak. On the other hand, in a society where for-profit sector organizations are relatively dominant, the state and the government may be strong. This may explain why SIS in the Philippines and Russia are higher than that of Germany, South Korea, and Japan's. It may also explain why SIS in Turkey and China are low. There is no denying that SIS is an indicator of state determinism and the relative relations with the state (similarly firms, family, religious organizations.) As for Russia, Turkey, and China, we need to explore these issues further in the future.

As mentioned above, the analysis of year established reflects the changes in political systems (regimes). Moreover, SIS may be high if newly emerging organizations feel a strong sense of historical accomplishment in affecting state-society relationships.

New organizations do not have enough resources and that may be a negative factor for their activities, but their aspirations to become more influential could work as a plus. Such dynamism of newly emerging organizations need to be examined in relations to other actors as well. This will be our future research topic.

Appendix A. Classification of Four Sectors

	Philippine			Russia		
Profit Sector	1 Agriculture organization	8	0.9%	1 Agricultural organization	4	0.4%
	2 Farmer's union	0	0.0%	2 Economic organization	25	2.6%
	3 Economic, business, commercial or employers organization	30	3.5%	3 Labor organization	44	4.6%
	4 Trade (labor) union or federation	5	0.6%	13 Trade union	31	3.3%
Non-profit	5 Educational organization	44	5.2%	4 Educational organization	103	10.8%
	6 Academic or research organization	6	0.7%	5 Government related organization	102	10.7%
	8 Governmental or administration-related organization	16	1.9%	6 Welfare organization	99	10.4%
	9 Welfare organization	60	7.1%	7 Professional organization	52	5.5%
	10 Philanthropy organization	7	0.8%	17 Organization on health care issues	11	1.2%
	11 Professional organization (health, medical, legal, etc.)	34	4.0%	20 Publishing activities	0	0.0%
				22 Organization on legal education	0	0.0%
Citizen				23 Organization on science development	0	0.0%
	7 Cultural organization	4	0.5%	8 Political organization	12	1.3%
	12 Political or public affairs organization	9	1.1%	9 Civic organization	61	6.4%
	13 People's organization or NGO	230	27.1%	10 Ecological organization	22	2.3%
	15 Religious organization	131	15.4%	11 Female organization	32	3.4%
	16 Recreational or hobby or sport organization	21	2.5%	12 NGO for protecting right of different social groups	132	13.9%
				14 Local self-governing	8	0.8%
				15 Special interest groups, hobbies	21	2.2%
				16 Charity organization	132	13.9%
				18 Organization on consumers rights	0	0.0%
				19 Organization on cultural questions	31	3.3%
				21 Organization on children rights	21	2.2%
				24 Peace organization	2	0.2%
				28 Organization on sport and cultural events	0	0.0%
				29 Organization on human protection	0	0.0%
				30 Organization on spiritual development	0	0.0%
				31 Religious organization	2	0.2%
Other(NEC)	14 Foreign or international organization	1	0.1%	25 Organization on national/ ethnic issues	2	0.2%
	96 Other, (SPECIFY)	242	28.5%	26 Organization on migration policy and migrants	1	0.1%
				27 Organization on international cooperation	3	0.3%
				98 Other	0	0.0%

	Germany				Korea				Japan			
Profit Sector	1 Agriculture	2	0.3%		1 Agricultural	13	3.7%		1 Agricultural	35	2.5%	
	2 Economic organization	37	6.2%		2 Economic	39	11.0%		2 Economic	273	19.5%	
	3 Union	8	1.3%		3 Labor	14	4.0%		3 Labor	110	7.8%	
									16 Agri, Fishery, Forestry-related	11	0.8%	
									17 Commerce & Industry-related	68	4.8%	
Non-profit	4 Educational organization	68	11.4%		4 Educational	30	8.5%		4 Educational	123	8.8%	
	5 Social welfare	88	14.7%		5 Administration	17	4.8%		5 Administration	136	9.7%	
	6 Professional organization	63	10.6%		6 Social Welfare	51	14.4%		6 Social Welfare	85	6.1%	
					7 Professional	48	13.6%		7 Professional	135	9.6%	
									18 Public Welfare	26	1.9%	
Citizen	7 Political organization	27	4.5%		8 Political	9	2.5%		8 Political	29	2.1%	
	8 Sport, hobby, recreation	140	23.5%		9 Citizen	28	7.9%		9 Citizen	60	4.3%	
					10 Religious	35	9.9%		11 Sports	40	2.9%	
									14 Convivial	17	1.2%	
									15 Religious	12	0.9%	
									19 NGO	25	1.8%	
Other (NEC)	9 Other	164	27.5%		11 Other	69	19.5%		10 Nonprofit	147	10.5%	
									12 Academic/Research/Art/Cultural	40	2.9%	
									13 International Exchange	16	1.1%	
									20 Foreign Government	4	0.3%	
									21 Science	8	0.6%	
									22 Taxation	3	0.2%	

	China			Turkey			U.S.A.		
Profit Sector	2 Industry	225	38.2%	1 Agricultural 2 Economic 3 Labor 7 Professional	1 2 1 27	0.3% 0.6% 0.3% 7.5%	2 Agricultural 9 Labor Union or Federati 14 Trade or Business or Commercial	11 28 125	1.5% 3.9% 17.5%
Non-profit	3 Professional	134	22.8%	4 Educational 5 Administration 6 Social Wealfare	44 1 48	12.2% 0.3% 13.3%	1 Academic or Research 4 Educational 7 Govermental or Public Administration 8 Health or Medical 13 Social Welfare	59 131 14 48 37	8.3% 18.3% 2.0% 6.7% 5.2%
Citizen	1 Academic/ Culture	135	22.9%	8 Political 9 Citizen 10 Religious	1 15 10	0.3% 4.2% 2.8%	3 Cultural 5 Environmental 10 Political or PublicAffairs 11 Recreational or Hobby or Sports 12 Religious	11 15 47 8 30	1.5% 2.1% 6.6% 1.1% 4.2%
Other (NEC)	4 Federation	95	16.1%	11 Other	211	58.4%	6 Foreign Interest or Ethnic 15 Other	10 141	1.4% 19.7%

Appendix B. The Supplementary Summary of Country Analysis

The following is a brief summary of each country's characteristics in the JIGS survey. We will start from a country that scored the highest SIS (mean).

1) **The Philippines**: The Philippines scores highest in SIS (mean) than any other countries.

About 50 percent of all the organizations are in the citizen sector as in the case of Russia. SIS of the citizen sector is the lowest of all the four sectors examined in the Philippines. However, when it is compared to that of other countries, the citizen sector SIS is the highest. The proportion of the profit sector is the smallest in all the countries surveyed. Some organizations in the profit sector were established in the late 1980s. Organizations in the citizen sector, on the other hand, were mostly established in recent years. We find that some new and small citizen sector organizations had high SIS. Relations were confirmed between SIS on the one hand and political activities such as election campaigns, lobbying, and policy performance on the other. However, when these relations are compared to that of other countries', SIS and those activities do not show strong relations. Moreover, while the relationships between organizations and the administrations seem to be expanding, consultations have not increased. We infer that the organizations in the citizen sector, especially newly emerging ones, feel that they are influential because of the momentum and vigor they have. But generally speaking, we find weak relations between the amount of activities and SIS. The subjective foundation of their influence is also weak. The reasons may be weak relations with other actors, and especially Philippine's "weak state (government)."

2) **Russia**: Russia scores the second highest SIS (mean). The citizen sector covers 50 percent, nonprofit 40 percent, and the profit sector, only 10 percent of all the organizations. Domestically, SIS of the citizen sector ranks bottom among the four, but internationally, the score is the second highest. In general, many organizations, including profit and citizen, were established in the 1990s, and we assume that the impact of the political system (regime) change was quite significant. We find some new citizen organizations that have a high SIS. **In terms of the relationships between SIS and organizations' activities, lobbying, and policy performance, we find that Russia's score was about the same as that of Japan and Germany's. The relationship between activities and SIS, hence, is much higher than we had expected.** Organizations' relationships with the administrations have expanded to some extent, and their activities concerning consultation is the most active of all the

countries surveyed. We infer that the newly emerging organizations in the citizen and nonprofit sectors are very active, and feel that they are influential. Institutionalization is also progressing to some extent. **The pattern of CSO influence in Russia turned out to be very similar to that of the developed countries' than we had expected.** (However, the caveat is that in this particular survey, the population was relatively small, and it is possible that the data of only **elite-type powerful organizations** were captured.)

- 3) **Germany**: Germany scores the third highest SIS (mean). The nonprofit sector was the largest and covers one third, and the citizen and other sectors cover less than 30 percent of the organizations. The size of the profit sector is less than 10 percent, but the SIS is the highest both domestically and internationally. The SIS of the citizen sector is unexpectedly the lowest. In terms of the year established, many organizations in the profit sector were created right after the Second World War, and as for the citizen sector, in the 1990s. We find two peak waves, reflecting two political system (regime) changes in the postwar and when the unification took place. Many organizations established after WWII have a high SIS. Except for campaign activities, we find clear relations between SIS and activities, lobbying, and policy performance, and strong relations between activities and SIS. Organizations' relations with the administration (national) were the weakest. Instead, the relations with local autonomy and the administration (policy consultations) are somewhat more pervasive. Overall, the relationships between the amount of activities and SIS are strong and clear, and Germany's country SIS is high among developed states. We infer that various organization in all 4 sectors, especially those in the profit sector, are feeling their influence through vigorous activities. Moreover, German organizations are not active in elections campaigns and have weak relations with the state. We surmise that **German CSOs are independent from political parties and the administration, and that there is a dividing line between civil society and political society.**

- 4) **South Korea**: South Korea has the fourth highest SIS (mean), but the score was below 2.0, which is equivalent to "Somewhat Influential." The proportion of the nonprofit sector was the largest with 40 percent, and the rest was 20 percent each. SIS of the citizen sector was the highest in South Korea. Many organizations were established after the 1980s, but as for the profit sector, there is another peak in the 1960s. Overall, this shows that the 1987 liberalization had quite dynamic effects. Except for election campaigning, SIS and activities, lobbying, and policy blocking show clear relations in South Korea. However, when examined sector by sector, the relations

generally become extremely ambiguous. (For example, the relationships between SIS and the following variables are unclear: lobbying the administration through politicians, contacting the administration, election campaign, and policy blocking). On the other hand, the relations between organizations and the administration both at national and local levels as well as consultations with these administrations have been quite strong. Overall, **the amount of activities and SIS do not show clear relations**. We infer that SIS in South Korea is about average. The data suggests strong relations between SIS and the administration, but not so between SIS and various sectors. This precarious pattern is similar to that of China's.

- 5) **Japan**: Japan ranks fifth, and has a rather low SIS (mean). The profit sector has the largest proportion (one third) and this is the largest among the developed countries. The citizen sector, however, is the smallest with 13 percent. Although the citizen sector is the smallest, SIS is the highest among all the sectors in Japan. Japan shows a unique pattern because many organizations were established since the end of WWII war until the 1960s. Many profit organizations were established right after the war until the 1960s, and citizen organizations between the 1970 and 80s. These trends clearly suggest political system (regime) change in the postwar Japan. We find that many organizations established within 10 years since the end of WWII show high SIS. Also we find very clear relations between all activities, lobbying, and policy performance on the one hand, and SIS (both national and sector levels) on the other, thus strong relations between activities and SIS. The relationships between SIS and the administration are confirmed but only to some extent both at national and local levels. Consultations with the administration are also increasing to some extent. Overall, **the relationships between the level of activities and SIS are strong and clear, but at the same time, it is low compared to other developed countries**. We conclude that active organizations in the four sectors feel they are influential, but when the level of activities is low, they do not feel so. One important characteristic in the Japanese case is that the relationships between activism and SIS are evident in all sectors.
- 6) **China**: China ranks sixth in SIS (mean) and scored 1.0 which suggests, "Not (or hardly) Influential." The target in the China survey was "social organizations" and the profit sector (or "Industry" because sector classifications are different in China,) was the largest with 40 percent, and the rest ("Professional," "Academic/Culture," and "Federations") constitutes 20 percent each. The profit sector has the higher SIS in China. As for the year established, the trend is generally similar to that of Russia and the Philippines' where many were established since the 1990s. Academic

organizations (C) have been increasing since the 1970s. Except for budget activities, the relations between activities, lobbying, policy performance, and SIS are very much clear. However, when each sector is examined, relations become quite ambiguous (for example, in “lobby the administration through politicians,” “contact the administration,” “election campaign,” and “budget lobbying”). As for the relations with the administration (national and local), consultations have very much advanced. Overall, **the relationships between the amount of activities and SIS are not quite clear (This result is similar to the South Korean case).** We conclude that SIS is low, but show strong relations with the administration. Moreover, we could not find clear relationship between activities and sectors. We also need to note that China was not once an outlier in various analyses (However, we targeted social organizations, hence, it is possible that **only organizations that have a strong relations with the administration have answered.**)

- 7) **Turkey:** Turkey has the lowest SIS (mean) among all the countries surveyed. “Other” turned out to be the largest sector, occupying nearly 60 percent (many are regional solidarity associations). Both profit and citizen sectors are smaller than 10 percent. SIS of the profit sector is the highest of all the sectors in Turkey. Many are established since the latter half of the 1980s. As for profit organizations, many are established in the 1980s, but generally scattered evenly throughout the postwar era, and organizations in the citizen sector are mostly established in recent years. The relationships between activities (lobby the administration through politicians, election campaign, and lobbying, policy blocking) and SIS in Turkey are weak. However, when each sector is examined, we can confirm relations in almost all variables, as was the case in Japan and Germany. As for the relationships with the administration, Turkish organizations have quite strong connections, while consultations with the administration have not progressed. Generally speaking, **the relationships between the amount of activities and SIS are quite strong.** We conclude that although the overall SIS is low, the relations between SIS and the administration are strong. We also found that the relations between activities and performances and SIS in sectors are as clear as the cases in Germany and Japan. Moreover, it is interesting to note that Turkey was never an outlier in any of the cross-tabulation analyses conducted.

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16. Social Business Model for Sustainable Societies: Lessons from Communities in Brazil and Japan Part II*¹

Case Studies in Brazil and Japan²

Edson Kenji Kondo³

Abstract

This second part of the two-part article presents the results of field studies of social movements and community initiatives in Brazil and Japan. The initiatives in the two countries are significantly different in their origins, but both are directly linked to new and more socially relevant ways of producing goods. The SBMSS framework showed that it can be useful in understanding how some factors can work in favor or against the struggle toward sustainability. While in Japan, the external factors showed the need for change and helped the process, in Brazil, these same factors worked in different ways for the traditional people of the Amazon and for the landless people from Southern Brazil. For the former, the combination of a long struggle, low population density, and the national and international concern for the Amazon produced a defining change in the institutional background granting them key rights to self rule. For the latter, the landless people, the extremely slow pace of change in the external factors forced the movement to rely on a strong internal organization that helped many settlements to make progress towards sustainability.

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² The data and photos used in this article were collected during field visits carried out during short visits between March and November 2004 in Brazil and Japan. During the first mission to Brazil, this author was accompanied by Mr. Nobumitsu Doi, an environmental consultant, Ms. Maria Majella Rio, at the time a master student at the University of Tsukuba, and Mr. Yoshisuke Akimoto, at the time a master student at the University of Tokyo. The visits in Japan were carried out by the author and Mr. Nobumitsu Doi.

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1. The Movement of the Landless Rural Workers in Brazil⁴

1.1. Introduction

The Movement of the Landless Rural Workers (MST) originated as the result of severe social and economic conditions that required some outlet for landless peasants to act and attempt to escape from their deprived state. The MST was preceded by several peasant movements since the 1950s, and a series of events that took place in the late 1970s led to its creation on January 21, 1984.

Brazil's agriculture started a process of export oriented agricultural production in the 1970s. The introduction of soybean increased mechanization, which was already affecting cotton and coffee production, and as a result caused many small farmers to lose their jobs. Also, the large producers expanded by displacing peasants from traditional areas of family farming. Displaced peasants had two options: either go to urban slums or go to agricultural frontiers deep in the Brazilian hinterlands. This second option was encouraged by the Brazilian government keen to exploit wood, metals and precious stones with the added strategic aim of populating Brazil's international frontiers. (Harnecker, 27-9).

In the late 1970s, the petroleum boycott and other causes led to industrial crisis and unemployment grew in the cities. At the same time, the colonization programs in the Amazon were showing the first signs of failure due to lack of infrastructure, poor soil, diseases, and a new wave of land purchases by businessmen and multinational corporations. Displaced from their small properties, and back from failed colonization programs in the tropical hinterlands, a large number of landless peasants had nowhere to go. (Harnecker, 28-9).

Some of the displaced peasants in the state of Rio Grande do Sul invaded the Nonoai Indian reservation located in northern Rio Grande do Sul, near the border with Santa Catarina State. The Kaingang Indians, justifiably concerned with the situation, decided to take action and in May of 1978 expelled the 1200 peasant families. The desperate families once again had nowhere to go and camped by the roadside in Ronda Alta. Following a series of tense negotiations with the government, 118 families decided to settle in Bage, in Southern Rio Grande do Sul near the border of Argentina. Another 500 families decided to settle in Mato Grosso, a remote area about 1500 km north of Ronda Alta. On September 7, about 110 of the remaining 500 families who did not accept the previous offers (arguing that these locations were improper for agriculture) invaded the Sarandi Fazenda, a large allegedly unproductive private property. In spite of police pressure, they resisted eviction and after tense negotiations, the Governor finally authorized them to stay in the land. This historic victory sparked several other successful invasions, which led to the creation of the MST on January 21st, 1984. (Harnecker 31-38).

⁴ Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra (MST).




Figure 1 - Views of the *Eldorado do Sul Camp*⁵ in Arroyo dos Ratos, in the state of Rio Grande do Sul.

In two decades of existence, MST has settled 1.3 million people, which has dramatically changed the life prospects of otherwise hopeless, exploited, and landless peasants of Brazil.

1.2. A Typical Settlement: The Assentamento Trinta de Maio

A typical settlement is comprised of about 30 to 50 families. Generally, these families already share some common bond built during the period of camping⁶ and are the result of affinities such as common geographic origin, shared cultures and values, or similar expectations on how they want to organize their future settlements.

The size of the plot each family receives varies from about 8 to 25 hectares depending on the

⁵ The camp is the first stage when landless people occupy unused private or public land to apply pressure on the government and request the distribution of land to them.

⁶ The camping is the initial stage, when the landless invade an unproductive private property or public land to pressure the government to solve their plight. This is a period in which they stay under makeshift plastic tents, under severe conditions of survival and the constant threat of eviction from police or hired gunmen. Due to such threats, it is rare for a camp to stay long in one geographical location, moving from place to place depending on the circumstances. This camping stage usually lasts about 2 to 3 years, but there are cases in which this stage has continued for longer periods of five years or more. For instance, a young member of MST from Sergipe state mentioned that they were entering the seventh year of camping.

region and the quality of the land. According to active members of the movement, there is a minimum size below which a family cannot be sustained. According to their past experience, plots that are too small have led settlements to fail.

Several settlements were visited in Brazil but due to the restricted scope of this article we will focus on the case of the *Assentamento*⁷ *Trinta de Maio* (hereinafter referred to as Trinta de Maio). The Trinta de Maio is located in the municipality of Charqueadas, about 50 km west from Porto Alegre, the capital city of the Rio Grande do Sul state. The settlement can be reached after traveling the final 9 km on a dirt road.

The fight for the settlement started 18 years ago, in 1987. Brazil was still fresh out of the military government, and the Minister of the Agrarian Reform at the time was the notorious politician Jader Barbalho. The President at the time, José Sarney, had promised the settlement of 1 million landless families, and expectations were high.

During the initial three years, the people who came to form the Trinta de Maio were part of a group of about 700 families fighting for the right to live and work. Over the course of several years, they occupied 15 different areas and built temporary camps every time. Given that these occupations of private or public land were done without the agreement of the property owners or local authorities, the families were expelled either by the police, by the gunmen hired by the property owners, or both. In May 1989, the camp they had invaded suffered the toughest police siege which lasted 30 days. According to Leonir, who participated in these occupations, some of their friends were killed and mothers lost their unborn babies due to attacks by poisonous products sprayed by airplanes and helicopters. Leonir, who treated us with a healthy dinner during our stay in their settlement, could barely recall these episodes because they caused him so much pain. In memory of one of the toughest moments of their struggle for land, they named the land they finally conquered as "Assentamento Trinta de Maio."⁸

The Trinta de Maio came to life in 1990, and 46 families were granted the opportunity to work 850 hectares of land. As they settled in the land they realized that nobody knew anything about management or had any other necessary skills for such a large undertaking. Few, if any, had had more than five years of formal education. The settlers decided then to organize what they called a field laboratory (*laboratório de campo*), a kind of a workshop, for the initial period of 30 days. Seventeen courses were carried out during these initial 30 days. The courses dealt with practical techniques related to the economic needs of the settlement but also included activities related to the dreams that individual settlers had nurtured for a

⁷ The Portuguese word *assentamento* means settlement.

⁸ *Trinta de Maio* means "thirty of May."

long time. As a result, a few of these dream-related courses such as sewing, chess, journalism, management, and guitar were also carried out, and at the end of the 30-day-period, the Farming and Cattle Raising Cooperative of Settlers of Charqueadas (COPAC)⁹ was founded.

Although they had received permission to use the land, the land was bare and their possessions were limited to little more than the black plastic sheet brought from the camp for shelter. Since no trees were available, the settlers began by planting a number of eucalyptus trees to be used later as raw material for building their houses. It took them about a year to leave their black plastic sheet tents and move into their barebones house made from the eucalyptus trees. Every now and then they improved their homes, and in 2004, after 14 years, they were installed in very clean and comfortable houses.

The history of the rise of MST is a history of struggle, adaptation, and evolution for survival. It is the history of people who were largely abandoned by the state. Because the open channels with the government available in Brazilian society were either too narrow or too restricted for them to enter, they found themselves completely out of the existing legal space, and the only way for them to get out of that situation was to “forcibly” claim their fair share of resources for survival. For those living in the rural areas, the way out was to obtain land to work and produce.

1.3. Relation with SBMSS




Figure 2 – The Social Business Model for Sustainable Societies

In some ways, the MST has partially inspired the SBMSS framework. Fighting against a system that left or pushed millions of peasants into poverty and despair, the real challenge faced

⁹ Cooperativa de Produção Agropecuária dos Assentados de Charqueadas

by the MST was to prove that they had a viable “business model” to succeed once their demands for land were met. In this regard, the movement faced a gigantic challenge when not so fertile land in remote areas were granted during the military rule, when there was a strategic interest in promoting migration to the Amazon region to secure it against invasion by migrants or settlers from neighboring countries.

While the SBMSS framework has taken some inspiration from the MST, its theoretical underpinnings are based on the broader discussions of sustainability, where preservation or recovery of current ecosystems are balanced with the need of human societies to use some of nature’s outputs to improve their material quality of life. Furthermore, the term human society means all members, particularly the poorest and the weakest, and not only the wealthy who are consuming much more and having a disproportionate impact on the earth’s ecosystems as shown by indicators like the ecological footprint.¹⁰

It is interesting to see that MST members act and behave in a way different from that predicted by the current and dominant neoliberal economic thinking. Given that they had been displaced and marginalized by the workings of the neoliberal system, it seems natural to expect that they would try to create an alternative system. However, how could they be part of the market system, largely functioning based on the tenets of the neoliberal thinking, and at the same time act differently? Certainly, MST’s attempt to function differently from traditional economic actors is a continuous struggle alternating advances and setbacks, but persistently searching for a system that might not discriminate against the weakest members of society.

The SBMSS framework is an attempt to create a tool that can, on one hand, describe the functioning of organizations that care about people and, on the other, provide a general guide that can identify the most fundamental areas in traditional organizations where change is needed. In concrete terms, it is hoped that the SBMSS framework might be useful in showing how communities and organizations can fulfill human needs while simultaneously improving the environment and the lives of the most disadvantaged people.

¹⁰ See Kraft (2004), Wackernagel and Rees (1996), or Venetoulis, Chazan, and Gaudet (2004) for explanations and illustrations on the ecological footprint.

1.4. External Factors in MST




Figure 3 – The External Factors in the SBMSS framework.

When a business leader uses a business model to establish a strategy, she always has the option of pulling out or avoiding entering a market if she sees that these factors cannot be used to her advantage. The Landless Rural Workers, of course, did not have such a choice. As a result, the reader will notice a radical difference between typical business models used by firms and how the SBMSS described here can be used. It can certainly be used by a firm that wants to overhaul its procedures and become a truly socially responsible firm. However, when analyzing the plight of disadvantaged groups in society, the framework is more of a tool to help the external observer understand the huge barriers created by “society” against these groups. If any group is fighting for a space under the sun, they are doing so because they are either disadvantaged or marginalized in society, and this means that in all likelihood the external environment (or external factors) affecting their life are clearly stacked against them.

The same applies for the industry and government related factors. Social movements arise because the government, due to several reasons, has failed to provide adequate opportunities to these segments, either by inaction or by purposely creating exclusionary rules. The social movements, therefore, are just trying to change the rules that are unfavorable to them. For instance, Nina, a resident of Trinta de Maio, mentioned about the barriers that certain standards required for commercialization of food products represent to small (formerly landless or otherwise) farmers. Many products, such as milk, need to be processed and industrialized to obtain license for commercialization. Such rules (which could be improved with the addition of simple conditional exceptions) make small producers dependent on large industrial corporations, reducing their margins of return to the bare minimum.

Through the 1970s, failed settlements in the Amazon region showed the hopeful peasants that the promising of huge tracts of land were not appropriate for agriculture, and even when some initial production was possible, markets were so far away that they could not take advantage of any surplus production. As a result, they started demanding land in less remote

areas and more appropriate to agriculture. However, through their struggle to have a piece of land to cultivate, whenever the government was willing to negotiate, they would first offer land in remote areas, and only those who persisted for several years would finally obtain land in places with a decent chance for agricultural production. Therefore, while an entrepreneur looking for land to start or expand his or her business in agricultural production could choose land that fulfilled what he/she thought were the necessary conditions for success such as fertility, availability of sources of water, quality of water, average amount of rain per year, average temperature and humidity, etc., the landless would have to choose among the few poor choices, and often with the soil that had been already exhausted by intense use of chemical fertilizers, pesticides and the like.

With the field already so slanted against them, these landless peasants needed to find an effective alternative to overcome all these challenges and enable themselves to minimally participate as equally deserving members of society.

In spite of all such challenges, the movement has successfully grown to house approximately 1.3 million people in Brazil. It is uncertain as to whether their success can be credited to a unique organizational structure they have created, but it is clear that their organization has given strong emphasis to productive activities, which is the basis of their very survival. At the same time, themes such as cooperation, solidarity, gender equality and providing opportunities to all have become integral part of their organizational ethos, unlike their absence in traditional market driven firms.

1.5. Organizational Structure in MST

There are two types of organization in the Trinta de Maio settlement. One is the group of 27 families who decided to work collectively, sharing everything related to productive activities. With regard to the more personal options, such as their own house, each family is free to choose and build its own. The other, is the group of 19 families who work individually, cooperating with each other in a less systematic way. For instance, each person has their own plot of about 18 hectares, and they individually decide what activities to carry out in the plot. They also cooperate by lending each other the necessary agricultural equipments, or organizing some activities together. In this document, we will focus on the organization of the collective group of 27 families organized under the Farming and Cattle Raising Cooperative of Settlers of Charqueadas¹¹ (COPAC).

¹¹ Cooperativa de Produção Agropecuária dos Assentados de Charqueadas




Figure 4 – Organizational Structure in the SBMSS framework.

The COPAC has the structure of a cooperative with directors in five sectors:

1. Animal production (Gilberto Picoloto) – milk production, hog farm, chicken farm, and fish farm.
2. Agriculture (Pedro Wathier) – rice and orange are the main cultures. Corn and *feijão*, the Brazilian bean, are produced in smaller quantities for internal consumption.
3. Vegetable gardens (Leocir Cazaroto, aka Loa) – a variety of vegetables are produced for consumption and sale.
4. Social and Agro-industry (Gorete Cazaroto) – this sector is mainly concerned with people management and commercialization.
5. Supermarket (Lademir Trombeta) – this sector runs the supermarket located in the city of Charqueadas.

The directors of each of the above five sectors have a mandate of one year, and while some may become directors more than once, they usually do not stay for continuous mandates to give opportunity to other members of the cooperative to learn from the experience of being a director.

The revenue from the productive activities is divided proportionally to the time dedicated by each family, with part of the proceeds being saved for reinvestment in production facilities. In terms of hierarchy, Brazilian law establishes that a cooperative needs to have a board of directors with at least three positions: president, treasurer, and secretary. For the MST, however, the concept of one head (president) does not exist and although they have an official list of these officers, the decisions are actually made collectively by the whole group of individuals involved with the cooperative.

The supermarket, as explained above, is one of the five sectors in which the COPAC is divided. The supermarket is currently under the responsibility of Lademir Trombeta. Today, the supermarket is the most profitable unit of the cooperative. Pedro explained that in the beginning, everybody wanted to work in the supermarket, because the work seemed much lighter than work in the agricultural fields, and they could be out in the city which was seen as a neater place. With time, however, people learned that work in the supermarket was actually more restrictive because one had to rigorously follow time, leave at seven o'clock in the morning and return home only at eight thirty in the evening. In the fields, there are no customers waiting for you, so they could work with flexible hours.

It is interesting to note that, in addition to each community member's role as part of the workforce, each member is expected to play a role also in any of the following eleven sectors of general (public) interest:

1. Production, cooperation and environment
2. Education
3. Health
4. Policy and politics
5. Communications
6. Culture
7. Human rights
8. Gender
9. Projects and finance
10. International relations
11. Support for new camps¹²

Once a week, settlers meet in groups of 8 to 10 families and each person presents his or her reflections, news, ideas, and proposals in one of these sectors. Following these talks, each issue is discussed, and later presented in a larger forum of the entire settlement.

As already explained elsewhere in this text, the MST sees education as one of its most fundamental pillars. While the MST usually succeeds in having their children during the first four years of education to study in the on-site school, the municipal government requires, due to cost considerations, that higher grades be studied in the city. Although this option reduces the cost of education to the public coffers, Pedro explained that it has the negative effect of having the children lose contact with their own rural culture. The children can also be drawn by more materialistic and urban values. In order to avoid the cultural gap that can occur as well as other undesirable effects, the settlement organizes groups of "sem

terrinhas," or landless children, who discuss the problems of the children in the settlements and camps and propose solutions.

The equal participation of the peasant women in the movement is pursued with determination and great care. The Movement understands that just encouraging women to participate in all activities and roles of the movement is not enough to bring about change in the conservative and male dominated rural environment. As a result, the MST encourages men to go one step further by taking the initiative in cleaning the house, taking care of the children, cooking, and the like. While there are individual and regional differences, and there is room for further progress, the movement has achieved respectable results in creating an environment where humanity takes precedence over traditional gender discriminatory views.

Notwithstanding those principles, the important thing for the MST is that each settlement finds the best way to relieve women from disadvantageous or subordinate roles and have opportunities to try new responsibilities if wished.

For instance, at Trinta de Maio, a daycare center was created by COPAC. Two of their members care for five children ages 1 to 5. In the area of preparing lunch, the families had decided to prepare lunch collectively in the central kitchen of COPAC, which reduced the burden of cooking generally done by women. With the inauguration of the supermarket, half the people went to work in the city, and then it became less practical to prepare a collective lunch. Therefore, the collective lunch moved to the supermarket, where division of work was more meaningful, and in the settlement, each family's cook, went home earlier to prepare lunch. As a matter of fact, the cooks were generally women, although in some cases there were also men.

One of the most interesting aspects of the Movement is the degree of flexibility that is given to each settlement, and to all levels of the organizations. At the grassroots level, and in a process that starts from the moment the landless person is discussing whether or not to join the movement, families are organized in the *core group of families (núcleos de base)*, which are groups of 8 to 10 families with affinities to each other. At the next level, camps and settlements are found. The number of people in a camp or settlement varies depending on the size of the land, but typically the size is from 100 to 200 people. The next level of agglutination is the state level, which ranges from a few thousands to about three hundred thousand. Larger states, such as Bahia, have an intermediate regional level with few hundred to few thousand people. Finally, at the national level, there are about 1.3 million people already settled, and between 500,000 to 1 million people in camps. Each level has a significant degree of freedom to organize themselves depending on their unique characteristics and needs.

¹² Called *Frente de Massa* in Portuguese.

The decision making is always done collectively with issues being discussed within each layer but also across layers down and back up, in a system that tries to get as close as possible to a consensual process. The levels are shown as “bubbles” because they represent levels of coordination only, and are not hierarchical levels. These bubbles always reach down to the grassroots, implying that the higher the level in which one is acting, the larger should the effort be to reach deep down and remain connected with the grassroots. At each level there is a large number of representatives, first to ensure wide participation, and second to ensure that the diversity of the people and their functions are properly reflected at each level. The criteria for choosing these representatives and coordinators vary depending on the state, but the size is generally proportional to the size of people represented. At the settlement level, the representatives are comprised by the coordinators of the core group of families and the directors of the cooperative(s) in the settlement. At all levels there is a great effort to maintain the gender balance at close to 50-50.




Figure 5 – Level of Organization at MST

Source: Personal interviews with Geraldo Forte, Ciro Correa, and representatives in visited settlements.

Many organizations talk about cooperation, but the extent to which the concept has been internalized by its members became very clear to me during the course of a conversation with Ciro Correa. Ciro was explaining how the MST had started in the business of organic seed

production. Inexperienced, but observing that most seed production companies carried out the production of seeds in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, MST negotiated with a few seed companies to have some settlers from that state to be contracted for seed production in their new land. After a year, some were more successful than others and the seed company decided to renew the contracts only with the most successful ones. MST did not agree with this very reasonable “economic” criterion. According to Ciro, “the less successful seed producers were the ones who needed more help, how could we abandon them?” As a result, the MST decided to start its own seed production business based on the concepts of cooperation rather than competition.

Finally, Figure 6 shows a comparison between the organizational ethos of a “normal” firm and MST, the main values driving the organization, and the effects produced in each case. At the least, the organization structure of MST has the human being at the center, while the “normal” firm has the profit interest as the core concern.




Figure 6 – Comparison between traditional organizational structure and MST's.

1.6. Technology in MST

The main productive activities of the settlement are rice production, milk production, and vegetables. Pedro Wathier, one of the current directors of COPAC guided us through the

productive activities of the settlement. He explained how the members of Trinta de Maio had initially wanted to become rich quickly like large landowners they have seen their entire lives. They decided to emulate the production methods of these large landowners and adopted technology intensive agriculture with the use of chemicals, herbicides and pesticides. After five years, however, they discovered that soil fertility was decreasing and it was necessary to increase use of fertilizers. As a result, costs went up for the farmers, while yields remained the same. In addition they found out that with large-scale monoculture, the soil was becoming compacted and salinized. After a period of discussion and reevaluation, the settlers decided to produce mainly vegetables, adopt a more earth-friendly technology based on organic agriculture, and practice of traditional techniques. Today natural insect repellents are used in the vegetable gardens and chemical pesticides are used only when absolutely needed. For soil management, they have adopted green manure crops as part of crop rotations (Figure 8), and the production of high quality humus using earthworms as composting agents, and bio-fertilizers (Figure 9). In the initial stages of transition, yields decreased significantly, but with learning it slowly grew to previous levels with the advantage of reduced costs, improved quality of products, and increased food security in the settlement.

Most of Trinta de Maio's production today is organic, but certification is still a process in the working. According to Leocyr, their rice production was certified by a private company in 2003. In 2004, the company wanted to buy all the rice production and when refused by Trinta de Maio, the company decided to withhold certification. Now certification is being sought from a state organization.¹³

The refusal to use genetically modified organisms (GMO) or transgenic seeds is another central technological choice made by the Trinta de Maio. As explained in Part I, GMOs are the prime representative of the large scale monoculture technology with unresolved uncertainties regarding consumer safety and with the possibility of posing threats to food security by reducing the robustness of the more natural system made up of a large variety of species.

¹³ Apparently MST had their reasons for not having sought state certification from the beginning, but that was not made clear at the opportunity.




Figure 7 – Technology in the SBMSS framework




Figure 8 – Use of green manure crops for crop rotation.



Figure 9 – Humus produced with the use of earthworms

For their dairy operations (70 of a total of 300 are currently producing milk) they use the low-input Voisin Rational Grazing Management system.¹⁴ The idea of the Voisin method is that plants and animals depend on each other and, by dividing the land in small paddocks that are grazed for only half a day, and then put to rest for about a month, the pastures are always in good condition and animals can feed on greener pastures. At the settlement there are about 207 paddocks, each 40 by 40 meters in size. According to Pedro Wathier, about 10 animals are left for about 4 hours in each paddock, and they will come back to the same place only after 45 to 60 days when the field has fully recovered (longer in summer, shorter during spring). In addition to the advantages mentioned above, Pedro explained that, by moving the herds daily, the cows do not spend much time with their dung, and even if they

¹⁴ The method was developed by Andre Voisin, a teacher at the Institute of Veterinary Medicine in Paris, and it first became popular in New Zealand. See Krieger (1994) for details.

are sick with worms, the worms will not be able to complete their cycle and will die. Apparently, the same seems to happen with the cattle tick who became much less of a problem after the adoption of the Voisin method.




Figure 10 – Confinement spaces using the low-input Voisin method

The hog farm and the chicken farm also follow similar principles and they stay in open fields (as opposed to confinement) for a good part of their lives. As a result, unlike the products from the big firms such as Sadia and Perdigão, the settlement's production is free of hormones, and their pork and chicken have a strong demand in the market.



Figure 11 – Hogs and poultry raised on the field.



Figure 12 – Convivial production.




Figure 13 – Ideal and actual path of technological choice by Trinta de Maio

It can be observed that the technological choices made by Trinta de Maio improve the environment (avoidance of chemicals, respecting nature's cycle to recover, etc.), enhance the human contribution to output (labor intensive, rather than too much mechanization that

replaces humans), and stimulates conviviality with a participatory and consensual decision making process. In addition, the choice of producing a large variety of vegetables enhances their self-sufficiency, and provides opportunities to all members of the community to learn a variety of skills in many fields.

As illustrated in Figure 13, the issue of appropriate technological choice is one that MST has struggled as an organization too, but it shows clear results in increasing benefits to the less privileged segments of society by increasing public goods in the community. The actual path followed by Trinta de Maio is illustrated by the circled numbers from ① to ⑥. Large agricultural enterprises are mostly using the technology choices ①, ②, and ③, and staying there. It is interesting to see that for small producers, like COPAC, it was very difficult to continue in this path, and the shift to ④, ⑤, and ⑥ turned out to be a better choice both for the environment and for the farmers themselves. The ideal path would have been 1, 2, and 3, i.e., adopting organic farming right away. The ① to ⑥ route involved a detour, but allowed them to reach a deeper understanding of the limitations of the green revolution technology.

1.7. Positioning




Figure 14 – Positioning in the SBMSS framework.

As explained earlier in Part I of this study,¹⁵ the SBMSS does not only have the responsibility of truthfully advertising the contribution of their product to the public good. Organizations accepting the challenge of adopting the SBMSS framework needs to go one step further and work towards a proactive “education of socially responsible behavior” with potential and actual consumers, in a way that the act of purchasing the product is not

¹⁵ See Area Studies Tsukuba 25:66.

driven purely by their utilitarian need, but by their understanding that the act is a choice of principles by which a healthier and more dignified society can be built for all its members. In different words, we can say that the conscious purchasing choices by “educated” consumers will enhance the public good in the concerned community.

Therefore, the MST actively makes demonstrations, or stage activities such as “GMO labeling” day, to raise the awareness of the population with regard to socially irresponsible attitudes of certain companies.

Even though they work hard in trying to position themselves as producers of healthy and environmentally friendly food products, the Trinta de Maio faces its own contradictions.

According to Nina, eighty percent of the soybean production in Rio Grande do Sul is either GMO or it is contaminated by GMOs. Many products derived from soybean, such as soybean oil, are contaminated by GMOs. Greenpeace has tested a large number of products in Brazil and released a list of those containing GMOs. According to the list, chocolates, such as LACTA, are GMO tainted.¹⁶

The main problem in Brazil is that society has lost control of the process, and is unable to distinguish products “contaminated” with GMOs from those that are not. If labeling were actively pursued by the government, producers would have an incentive to distinguish between GMO containing inputs and non-GMO containing inputs, because then consumers would be able to choose between GMOs and non-GMOs.¹⁷

Although the Trinta de Maio strives to produce goods without GMOs, and without chemical inputs, their supermarket sells a diverse line of products that are demanded by the community, although not directly produced by the Trinta de Maio settlement. Many of the popular industrialized food products are believed to be tainted with GMOs, and even though COPAC sees a contradiction in the fact that they fight against GMOs but they are themselves selling GMOs, they cannot see a way out unless the government implements strict labeling so that consumers and suppliers like their supermarket can choose between GMO and non-GMO products.¹⁸

Governmental action or lack of action is a big factor affecting the welfare of small producers like COPAC. Unlike the above case that illustrates government’s lack of action,

¹⁶ Interview with Nina, one of the leaders of Trinta de Maio, on March 14, 2004.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Ibid.

the requirement that some goods can only be commercialized if they are industrialized is another measure that significantly harms small producers without necessarily protecting the consumers. For instance, in the case of milk, which can only be sold if industrialized, COPAC cannot sell directly to retailers or consumers, but needs to sell to Nestle,¹⁹ a large multinational company, which then industrializes and retails it.

1.8. Social and Private Profitability




Figure 15 – Public goods, private goods, and social profitability in the SBMSS framework

It can be speculated that the particularly harsh external factors against the Landless Rural Workers stimulated MST to develop a cohesive organizational structure, with decisions always strongly based on the grassroots. At the same time, their technological choices made sense as those choices enhanced their role as central actors in the production process. The activities of the MST have in most places improved the availability of key public goods without neglecting the production of private goods necessary for survival and improved quality of life.

Some examples of improved public goods and benefits are:

1. Increase in biodiversity as trees were planted to provide shade, agricultural production brought insects and birds, and use of compost instead of chemical fertilizers recovered the topsoil.
2. Reduction in the use of chemical fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides, reduced the contamination of soil and water tables.
3. Recovery of members' self-esteem thanks to the opportunity to play a role within MST.

¹⁹ According to Leocy, milk processing and distribution in Brazil is largely controlled by two large companies, Nestle and Parmalat. There are other small ones, but most of them are controlled by these two giants. Personal communication, March 14, 2004.

4. Significant opportunities for everyone to learn either in the form of courses, or in the form of taking responsibility in any of the eleven sectors of MST.
5. Recovery of the sense of citizenship of rural women, by helping them obtain identification documents and become less dependent on man.
6. New dynamism in the local market driven by the involvement, and mutual knowledge between producers and consumers that make local transactions more reliable.

At the side of the private goods, the only thing needed by the settlement was the production of enough to survive and continue making progress toward self-reliance:

1. Enough production to feed all members of the settlement with healthy and varied diet.
2. High demand for surplus production perceived as healthy by neighboring communities, bringing higher income to the settlement.

2. The Tapajós-Arapiuns Extractivist Reservation in the Brazilian Amazon

2.1. Introduction

The extractivist reservations were the result of long standing demands by rubber tappers who lived from sustainable extraction of forest products, particularly the rubber trees known as *seringueira*. According to Mr. Antonio de Oliveira, aka Seu Mucura, rubber tappers had struggled for a long time in this Northeastern part of Para state. During the mid 20th century a group of businessmen were active in the town of Boim which had existed for about 250 years. These businessmen provided local rubber tappers with food staples, guns, ammunition and basic equipment in their search for new *seringueiras*. This time honored way to finance workers and lead them to an unpayable circle of debt would force rubber trappers to sell the trails they had opened to these businessmen. In the tradition of the region, those who open the trails become the owners of the rubber trees identified through this trail. Soon the businessmen became the owners of the land, and in the 1970s, after passing through the hands of few others, the land was bought by Amazonex and Santa Isabel, two large lumber companies.

In 1975, local inhabitants met employees from these companies cutting trees. They claimed that the forest belonged to these companies. For the local residents, such arguments came as a shock. According to local tradition, people could be owners of trails to tap rubber from the trees, but they would do this in a way that would not damage the trees, and rubber could be tapped as long as the tree lived. To own a trail meant protecting the trees. Exactly the opposite of what the lumber companies were doing: destroying the forest. According to Seu Mucura, the extent of

destruction was hard to imagine without actually seeing it. Because those huge trees have to be taken out from the forest, huge tractors destroyed large swaths of forest to create a road to take the woods. Destroying those enormous trees was bad in itself, but so much more was being destroyed to take the trees out of the forest.

This irresponsible and destructive action sparked their resolve to resist against the destruction and the assault on their land. They formed groups of about 100 people, armed with scythes and rifles. Actually, according to Seu Mucura, they had only two rifles, but they had to make it look like they had many more. In one of the first encounters, when they found a team felling trees, they encircled them, and two leaders of the locals who carried rifles approached them with an ultimatum to leave everything behind. Seeing a group of almost hundred “armed” people encircling them, the employees fled as quickly as they could. They would never realize that those a far had only pieces of wood in the shape and colors of a rifle. Over the course of the more than two decades of resistance, even the federal police harassed them, but finally on November 6, 1998, a federal government decree created the Tapajos-Arapiuns Extractivist Reservation (RESEX) with 647,610 hectares (Ministerio do Meio Ambiente, 2000).

2.2. Relation with SBMSS

The case of the Amazon Region and the traditional communities living there is a very special one. They are different from MST settlements in Southern Brazil where people want to become wealthier by increasing the production of private goods, and selling the surplus in the market. They are also different from MST settlements in the semi-arid region of the Northeastern Brazil, where the priority is to have enough to eat. To a certain extent, the people of the Amazon have some similarities with the Landless Rural Workers from the Northeast. They both rely on traditional wisdom to understand the natural environment and survive. In the Northeast, they survive by planting crops that can survive lack of rain, and in the Amazon, they only need to understand the large variety of sources of food, herbs, fish and animals.

In terms of the bounty provided by nature, the particular region of the RESEX is a prime example of a place in which free public goods are widely available. All those things are available for free to the population, as long as outsiders do not destroy the ecosystem. It is a case in which the concern for private goods is reduced due to wide availability of free public goods. As a result, the SBMSS takes a unique form, in which the external environmental factors are relatively more important in determining the quality of their lives, and the internal factors have a less prominent role when compared to the case of MST described earlier.

Another important distinction and a clear advantage that the people from this RESEX have over social movements such as the MST is that they are considered the “residents” of this region, while the lumber companies are viewed as the “invaders.” As a result, the government gave them the privilege to define the bylaws of the RESEX, which is equivalent to shaping the industry and government factors to their liking.

2.3. External factors: Change in the Environment and Other External Factors




Figure 15 – Social and Environmental Factors in the SBMSS framework.

The creation of the “extractivist reservations” was one of the most innovative in recent years that provided a legal framework to protect the tropical forest and the people living in those areas. According to David Bornstein (2004, 150), this is one of the new approaches that moves away from bureaucratic “command and control” approaches to a more decentralized bottom-up approach promoting innovation by those directly involved.

It is possible to see that such a life style will bring very positive results for the local environment. In the few years since the creation of the reservation, the local inhabitants say that the fish population, as well as game population has clearly increased. With the organization of the RESEX and related local associations (which are responsible for local governance) a more structured relationship with the government became possible, and the government’s support for education has improved. Where some teachers were almost illiterate before the establishment of RESEX, today they are all high-school graduates at the least. Teaching materials are based on Paulo Freire’s pedagogy, focusing on the reality of their lives. Textbooks have also been modernized. For instance, old textbooks that featured foreign animals such as lions, elephants, giraffes, zebras, and the like, now show alligators, anacondas, armadillos, and other animals from the Amazon.

2.4. The Industry and Government Related Factors AND Technology




Figure 16 – Industry and government related factors AND technology in the SBMSS framework.

An important set of rules strongly restricts the industry factors and protects the environment. These rules are defined in the “Utilization Plan of the Tapajos-Arapiuns Extractivist Reservation.”²⁰ The plan was created by a participatory process carried out by the community with the help of the National Council of Rubber-Tappers, NGOs and local government agencies.

Some selected rules of the Plan are the following:

1. Raising water buffalos in the reservation is not allowed.
2. The extraction of oils, sap, seeds, leaves, crust, or fruits from the trees should be done through appropriate techniques that do not affect the health of the trees.
3. The use of woods from the forest is allowed only when it is for the benefit of the family, such as the construction of houses, canoes, or boats.
4. Fishing is only allowed through traditional methods such as bow and arrow, traditional fishing net, and the like, and only for subsistence.
5. Hunting is only allowed for subsistence.

Most of these rules are directed to outsiders, and they represent the result of learning from past sufferings inflicted by outsiders on the local population. In fishing, for instance, outsiders using fishing nets several miles long killed all sorts of living beings in the river. Even the mighty Tapajós, 19 km wide in certain places, had become fishless after years of predatory fishing. Fish had almost disappeared even from small rivers inside the reservation. Fish hunting with harpoons and masks brought by tourists was quickly adopted by the locals who saw how fun and easy was to hunt with this method, and nearly drove the fish to extinction. Some other predatory methods rooted in their own tradition, such as using the *timbó* poison taken from a wild vine to

²⁰ Plano de Utilização da Reserva Extrativista Tapajós-Arapiuns.

kill the fish, has also been forbidden.

The plan also defines much of their technological choices. The plan directs residents to rely on traditional knowledge of how to utilize nature's resources in a sustainable way. As the name of the reservation itself indicates, "Extractivist" means a reservation that extracts from the forest without destroying it. Figure 17 below presents some of the technologies used in the RESEX.

Agriculture is also practiced by most of the residents, but they try to preserve as much of the forest as possible planting several species of trees in patches of light forest.




Figure 17 – Local technology (clockwise starting at the bottom left): Local man knitting a fish net; local house featuring roof made of palm leaves; classroom in nature; “live” music; washing without a machine; local women knitting a roof decoration; local girl knitting a basket.

2.5. Organizational Structure

Some communities are formally organized in associations. In 2001 there were 22 associations and 64 communities. Associations are formally recognized by the government and can therefore propose projects and receive support for improvements of their communities.




Figure 18 – Organizational structure in the SBMSS framework.

These associations are organized in the traditional way with a board of directors with functions such as president, treasurer, and secretary, among others. In general, the organizational structure cannot be said to be innovative, but locals reported that there was an effort to encourage women to participate actively as directors to the extent possible. While the proportion is still smaller than that of men, I had the opportunity to meet several women directors and one president of the association, during my first visit in 2001. In 2004, it was possible to see that women continued active, but the rise in participation is still a work in progress.

Participation in the board of directors is not the only way to see the empowerment of women. For instance, in 1990, the community of Muratuba was debating whether *pinga*, an alcoholic beverage produced from distilled sugarcane, should be forbidden. The proposal had come from the women, and since consensus could not be reached, the decision was made by vote, and *pinga* was banned from the community.

2.6. Activities




Figure 19 – Activities in the SBMSS framework.

The interaction of the external factors (particularly represented by the Utilization Plan of the Extractivist Reservation) and the Internal Factors (internal organization and traditional knowledge) produce a unique set of activities based on local tradition and knowledge of nature.

Traditional methods are used for agricultural production. There is no large scale production, and many cultures share the same piece of land. For instance, rubber tree, banana, mango, cupuaçu, carambola, açaí, all share the same sparse area of forest. However, Seu Mucura explained that experience has shown that orange trees and macaxeira plants need plenty of sunshine, so they cannot be planted together with other cultures in the forest. Macaxeira is a typical aboriginal culture and is processed into tapioca, macaxeira flour,²¹ and a popular sauce that before being cured under the sunlight can also be used as a powerful insecticide.

In recent years, honey production and fish cultures has been started for more stable consumption and commercialization.

²¹ For the locals, macaxeira flour is almost as popular as rice is for the Japanese, being one of the main food staples at the table.

2.7. Social and Private Profitability




Figure 20 – Public goods, private goods, and social profitability in the SBMSS framework

According to community members, the establishment of the RESEX followed by the internal rules defined by the local population has allowed nature to recover. Fish that had been literally wiped out from the Tapajós River due to over fishing by private fishing boats is now recovering, and game for hunt has also recovered.

3. Community Revitalization Initiatives Driven by Organic Waste Recycling in Japan²²

3.1. Introduction

When Japanese people talk about sustainability, they will generally refer to self reliance for food supply. The thought of depending on imports to fulfill its food needs is a major strategic concern manifested in many industrialized countries, and it is no exception in Japan.

Japan currently imports huge amounts of food, and as an affluent society generates a significant amount of organic waste.

This section talks about community building initiatives that have sprang up in Japan driven by what many people perceive as the wastefulness of modern life style. As Japan became an affluent society, the amount of waste became voluminous, and given that space availability for landfills is limited in Japan, all burnable waste is burnt. Burning waste, although reduces the volume of waste, still produces a significant amount of ashes that has to be appropriately disposed. Also, it discharges pollutants into the atmosphere, and it is costly because it requires appropriate facilities and fuel to burn waste. Finally, much nutrients contained in the organic garbage could be reused, but are simply wasted in the costly

²² See also Doi for a more detailed description of each initiative.

process of burning.

Three community initiatives in Mie, Saga, and Tochigi prefectures were studied. All three initiatives have in common the establishment of a composting facility with the objective of reusing waste as organic fertilizers in agriculture. The founders of these local movements all belong to the food industry; though in different stages of the food processing chain as listed below (See also Figure 21 and 22):

1. Waste collection: Konosuke Katano, president of Sanko, a waste processing company located in the City of Hisai (~42,000 inhabitants), Mie Prefecture.
2. Farming: Yukio Kokubo, director of the Agricultural Producers' Cooperative Corporation Donkame, located in the City of Haga (~17,000 inhabitants), Tochigi Prefecture.
3. Consumption: Toshiaki Fukuda, owner of the restaurant Steak Salon, located in the City of Imari (~60,000 inhabitants), Saga Prefecture.




Figure 21 – Life cycle of agricultural produce without and with composting.




Figure 22 – Geographic location of cases studied in Japan.
Source: Reproduced from Doi, 43.

Mr. Katano from Mie Prefecture, as the owner of a waste collection company, started wondering about how to better dispose waste around 1987, when the Ministry of Welfare discussed the problem in their White Paper. Mr. Katano looked for partners to work together but since nobody came forward he decided, in 1988, to start working alone on the problem. In the first five years he improved his company's ability to recycle Styrofoam and pet bottles, and in 1993, he started working with organic garbage. After many years of trial and error, and the cooperation from researchers and professionals, he was able to transform organic waste into quality compost in 1995. At that time, however, farmers looked with significant skepticism at the use of "garbage" as fertilizers. This difficulty was a common barrier faced by all the above mentioned social entrepreneurs as they tried to bring a new activity driven by the sense of social responsibility in a milieu driven by the primacy of market forces. For the farmers, the concern was that they did not have anything to gain by taking the risk of using compost, while the risk of losing trust (by using dirty garbage in their cultures) from clients in a society where accountability is taken extremely seriously was enormous.

A small group of farmers, however, started trying the compost on small experimental fields and their feedback allowed Mr. Katano to fine tune the quality of his compost. In the process, he realized that he needed a deeper understanding of agriculture to produce high quality compost,

and decided to start his own small experimental field. In 1998, he expanded the fields and started his own farming business.

In November 2000, Mr. Katano and his associates formed a network of farmers called Kosonosato, a group of 13 farmers using compost produced by Mr. Katano. At the same time, he built a direct sales point to distribute their products directly to the consumers, and established exclusive sales outlets inside local supermarkets.

Mr. Katano's efforts brought an unexpected windfall as those who started testing his compost and increasingly adopted it hit an emerging consumer demand for healthier produce. Generally the average farmer family income in this area is in the range of 300,000 yens (about 2,600 dollars) a month, which in Japan leaves such businesses in the brink of closure. His farmer associates today make an average of about 500,000 yens, and some have expanded their businesses to a volume of 1 million yens per month. Mr. Katano's farm sale is in the range of 4.8 million yens a year, and for 2005 he is projecting an annual sales volume of 7 million yens or more.

In the case of Mr. Kokubo from Tochigi Prefecture, the initiative was motivated by their heightened conscience that the soil was increasingly losing fertility. "There was the reality of moving away from the cycle of nature, and accepting the use of large amounts of chemical fertilizers and pesticides as the unavoidable path of agricultural production." He started studying how he could recover the topsoil. Talking about the time when he made that decision in September 1995 he mentioned that

"If organic garbage and other related waste can be turned into compost and be recycled into the local soil, the fertility of the soil will be recovered and the produce will become more energized. What was lacking was the conscience to recycle, and the gratefulness toward the fields, food, and life derived from nature. I learned the obvious lesson that if we can be in sync with the natural cycles, we can achieve sustainable agriculture."

As he studied the issues regarding the fertility of soil, he noticed that many recyclable resources in his community were being wasted, often burnt in the public incinerators as nuisance. Therefore, he systematically identified all resources that could become part of this community resource recycling system and presented a proposal to the government authorities of the City of Haga. The project, however, was not approved.

Convinced that recycling was the answer to the problem of loss of soil fertility, he established an agricultural cooperative in September 1995. Eighteen months later, in March 1997, with the support of an industrial machine producer, Mr. Kokubo started the operations of his recycling plant at a corner of his agricultural field. In the beginning he offered to recycle the organic garbage of the city's commercial district for free, and all initial investments in machines and equipment were made at his own personal risk.

At the time of the interviews in July 2004, his network of suppliers of organic garbage was comprised by 15 public facilities such as schools and daycare centers, 15 stores selling food products, and 6 large firms from the industrial district of Haga, totalling about 2 tons of garbage a day. The compost produced in his facility is in turn used by 50 farmers, members of the agricultural cooperative he initiated in 1995.

In September 2000, Mr. Kokubo started with four farmers from the neighborhood, a network called "Study Group on Recycling" and created a seal identifying their products as part of a recycling initiative in town. The Study Group is comprised by a group of farmers committed to supporting the community recycling initiative and has currently a membership of 25 farmers. The Group has a sales corner in the producer's direct sale market built by the city of Haga.

As a restaurant owner, Mr. Fukuda, from Saga Prefecture, felt bad every time he disposed of organic waste, wondering whether there was any way to reuse such garbage. His initial proposal to start recycling organic garbage was approved by the Association of Restaurant Owners of Imari and the Association of Hotel Owners in 1992, but nothing happened until 1998 when he decided to start experimenting with organic garbage recycling himself. He started his tests at the back of his restaurant but when the number of flies and bad smell increased he decided to relocate his experimental composting plant to a remote rural area.

Although he had to spend his own money for several years, Mr. Fukuda steadily involved housewives and local businesses, and as of 2004 he had built a large network involving recycling organic garbage, energy saving initiative using oil from rape flower seeds to fuel diesel engine cars, environmentally friendly farming, environmental education, and local business network supporting the use of local currency to strengthen community ties.

3.2. Relation with SBMSS




Figure 23 – The SBMSS framework.

3.2.1. External Factors

Social and Environmental Factors – In these three cases in Japan, the entrepreneurs understood that there was an important environmental issue to be addressed; the problem of burning valuable organic waste which contributed to pollution and was costly to the local government and local community that paid the taxes.

Industry and Government Related Factors – Given that the government, through the white papers published annually by concerned ministries, was signaling changes required in the field of organic garbage recycling, the three social entrepreneurs correctly interpreted the future trends and tried to take appropriate advantage of moving into these new and needed areas of activity. However, each entrepreneur found a different level of support by the local government, and unlike the behavior of average private firms, decided to insist on the merit of their activities despite skepticism and lack of initial support by peers, local community, or the local government.

The average business would not have pursued to do business without the support of local governments and would probably have looked either for an environment with more favorable local governments or wait until the position became more favorable. Those dedicated to social enterprises, however, are generally aware that their role is to open new path as pioneers and need to fight against either the lack of perception or misperceptions by government officials as well as the community and consumer themselves. The social entrepreneurs described here never took no for a response, and always persisted in seeking the understanding of the government or the community regarding an actual or potential social issue that has not yet been comprehended by them.

3.2.2. Internal Factors

Technology – The fermentation technology is the mainstay in all three cases. This choice of technology transforms what was previously an open ended system – which had seeds and chemical fertilizers as inputs, and ashes and gaseous pollutant emissions as outputs – into a closed loop system in which organic garbage is composted, reused in the fields as fertilizers to grow plants and vegetables, consumed by the community, brought to processing centers and then transformed into compost again.

Organizational structure – The three cases are organized differently, but none of them is hierarchic. The first initiated by Mr. Katano is a loose network of 13 farmers under the denomination of Kosonosato. The second, founded by Mr. Kokubo is again a network of public facilities, traders, and farmers, all joined by the benefits of working on a commercialization scheme that stresses the opportunities to all parties to participate, collaborate, and profit from it. The third, founded by Mr. Fukuda, is a network of networks involving volunteer housewives, farmers, and local businesses. The housewives bring garbage to collection centers distributed around the town, they also clean and maintain these stations. The farmers plant rape seed flowers to produce vegetable oil for use in schools. The used oil is later collected and processed to be used as fuel by the farmers in their own tilling machines. Local business owners participate

as bona fide service providers to help revive the community through the issuance of a community currency, called *Hattchi* led by Mr. Fukuda. In all these cases, there is no hierarchical relationship but just the desire of everyone to help each other.

3.2.3. The Output of public and private goods




Figure 24 – The outputs in the SBMSS framework.

These initiatives can be all seen as examples in which concerns with the public good guided the choice of organizational structure and technology, and such choices shaped by social, environmental, and government factors became the engine to activities that brought about both private and public benefits to the community.

These initiatives were able to generate the following public goods or benefits:

1. Reduction of air pollutants resulting from reduction of garbage being burned in the incinerators.
2. Reduction in the use of chemical fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides, thus reducing the level of chemical poisoning from the consumption of vegetables, increasing the sense of food safety in the community involved, and reducing the level of chemical poisoning of farm laborers.
3. Increase in community linkages driven by the need for voluntary and cooperative work in order to make a beneficial but uneconomical activity succeed.
4. New dynamism in the local market driven by the involvement, and mutual knowledge between producers and consumers that make local transactions more reliable.
5. Reduce outlays of local tax resources, making them available for other community needs.

The initiatives also generated the following private goods and benefits:

1. Increase in the income of local farmers who were able to position themselves as

producers of healthy vegetables, create personal linkages with local consumers and obtain premium prices as a result.

2. Increase in local employment, as even these nonprofit initiatives need regular staff to ensure the conduct of core operations.

4. Conclusion

As we reflect about the strategies adopted by economic and social actors from distinct communities tackling the same issue of sustainable life styles from different perspectives, there is perhaps a common lesson.

Both in the Landless Rural Workers's Movement in Brazil as well as in the communities in Japan, people were either struggling to survive or feeling the contradictions of the current production and commercialization system.

The logic driving the economic system is based on competition and profit. In order to be the most competitive and/or the most profitable firm, firms generally adopt business models such as the one shown in Fig 25 below. According to such business models, the most competitive firms are the ones that can best ensure the control of key resources, understand the main competitive factors relevant in its industry, use them to its own advantage, make technology choices and shape organizational structures that can reduce cost and ensure maximum quality, and position its products in an advantageous manner in the market so as to deliver the highest customer value (used strictly in the sense of willingness to pay for the product).

It is easy to understand that the system filters and rewards the best performers, leaving very little if any to the worst performers. In many cases, just having been borne poor, having had fewer opportunities for education, and having had difficulties in finding a job seem to be a crime, because "average" or "successful" people will shun you as if you have "bad character" or you are "dirty" or you are afflicted by a "contagious disease." Being poor does not means just the inability to afford the material goods, which is already a strain, but it often represents being unable to access the rights to be respectfully treated as a citizen.

The question left to the poor and weakest is whether there is a place for those at the bottom? Why those who are weak, poor, and less talented cannot have a place to live and grow decently, without being dominated or oppressed by those who can perform better in economic activities?

As discussed in the case studies of Japan, the initiatives for recycling waste were driven by the sense that the affluent Japanese society was being too wasteful, and something should be made to recycle organic garbage to take advantage of the nutrients contained in it. These people were not driven by commercial or profit motives, but by the desire to do something good for society as a whole. The dominant neoliberal economic thought reflected in business models such

as described in Figure 25 below does not include a concern with the public good. Even the recent movement within companies for corporate social responsibility is rationalized as something that creates a positive image for the company and therefore increases its profitability.

What the cases described above have in common is that they are not driven by short, medium or long term profit expectations. They are driven by REAL commitments with the public good. They are also concerned with the private good, and with profits, but only to the extent that such goods and profits enable them to have a decent and fulfilling life, a life in which they can pursue their dreams and talents as unique human beings.

Any person, groups of persons, or organizations willing to apply the SBMSS framework will not only produce private goods, but will also produce essential public goods as described in Figure 26 below.

In the BM based on the neoliberal thought, the firm will make choices in each of the major factors in a way that it will foster maximum profit because that is what the firm WANTS, that is what the BOARD WANTS, and that is what the department heads WANT, and so on until the last man. Many people working in private firms are under much stress because not everybody WANTS what the firm and each of its divisions believe the employees SHOULD WANT. However, as an employee, anything you want to do must necessarily lead to the final WANT of the firm, or the maximization of the profit, if you want to be heard.

Similarly, we can argue that the SBMSS that follows a thought with the humans at the center will want to maximize the social benefit by contributing to the growth of public goods and private goods. The main difference with the BM, however, is that the SBMSS, even when it is dealing with the production of private goods, is driven not by the profit maximization goal, but by the opportunity to have everyone working on their self realization, their self fulfillment, and trying to be everything each of them can be.




Figure 25: Components of a Business Model

Source: Modified from Afuah Figure 1.2, p.10.




Figure 26: Components of an SBMSS

This self interest should not be more or less than his or her commitment to his or her peers, as human beings. This commitment is represented by the respect for public goods, goods that are available to everyone free of charge. One especially important example is the natural ecosystems, and when these ecosystems are functioning well they purify water and air, they serve as habitats for thousands of species of animals and fish, and millions of species of plants, insects and microorganisms. Collectively, and including the topsoil, they are part of a living nature that produces food free of charge for all human beings rich or poor.

Therefore, the SBMSS can serve as a guide to all human beings who feel stressed within firms and organizations, because the predominant drive in companies following a BM is not directed to nurturing all human beings (inside and outside the organization), but only to those who can be the winners within the system.

If you feel stressed out in your firm, it is perhaps time to start testing SBMSS principles in the area under your responsibility. If there is no space for such an initiative, perhaps it is time to look for a different company that may be closer to the SBMSS principles.

The age old question, however, is “can firms driven by true altruistic values survive?” Can such a firm ever exist?

Social movements, and people who the humanitarian side has spoken louder, are actually building such new kinds of “firms” even though “firm” is not the name given to such initiatives. They are called nonprofit organizations, NGOs, associations, voluntary groups, etc. These organizations are generally concerned with the rights of certain groups, or monitor the activities of firms that are damaging the environment or exploiting illegal migrants or children. Few of these public goods and rights oriented groups are involved in the production of goods and services for the market.

At the other extreme, the firms that produce goods and services are increasingly incorporating symbolic activities of “corporate social responsibility” such as the protection of the environment or addressing social needs of the local community where the company is located. Usually, however, the “social” activities of these firms are more symbolic than substantive, and they generally do not criticize any other company or organization even if they are harming the public good or they are not doing enough for the common good of the local community. Their agenda is driven less by the concern to improve the world, than to avoid criticism that may hurt their corporate image.

On the other hand, those who pursue life in a nonprofit organization or in voluntary groups to help the poor²³ often find themselves using strategies that are closer to BM than SBMSS, and find themselves twice frustrated.

The central research question is how people can be gainfully employed in productive activities, avoid damaging the environment, avoid exploiting other people, and find enough opportunities to develop his/her skills and talents? This is certainly a long process in construction, where the SBMSS is the first draft of the type of firms (or a hybrid between firms and nonprofits) that may arise and help move sustainable development closer to a real possibility.

²³ Comment from one participant in the “solidarity economy” panel at the 2005 World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil.

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17. New Geographies and Regionalism in Education in Asia: In comparison to the European context*

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Introduction

This paper explores the assumptions and implications of educational policy for drawing a new geography of 'Asia'. It also attempts to offer some comparative analysis with the European context. The vigour of cross-national educational interaction in the past few decades, as argued in this paper, has been a powerful actor for the formation of new identities of individual nations and for the promotion of new aspirations for regional alliances. To counter other regions, policy makers attempt to consolidate the region politically, economically and culturally through educational exchange. The paper will look at a number of problems specific to Asia in this attempt. In this regard, foreign policy, culture and colonial legacies in the region capture a special attention.

1. The basic idea of regionalism

The movement of regional unity is a kind of the merger of plural politico-economic units into a single body. In this movement, rules by law and organisational cohesiveness based on shared values and identity as 'citizen' are often regarded as prerequisite within the politico-economic body. Members of the body are to be bound politically, economically, culturally and linguistically.¹ In this sense, the idea of regional integration is akin to an idea of nation building. This is a reason that, for some authors, regionalism functions as a political ideology for creating unified bodies parallel to 'imagined communities'.² Indeed, despite advocacy for the creation of supra-national and supra-state bodies, nation-states are the principal actors in the processes of, and after, the creation of bodies for regional cooperation.

Larner and Walters argue that regionalism is a political plot 'to de-naturalize the national' in political-economic space.³ Regionalism also refashions economies, institutions

¹ Joseph S. Nye Jr., *Peace in Parts: Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization* (Boston: Little Brown, 1971).

² Arif Dirlik (ed.) *What Is in a Rim?: Critical perspectives on the Pacific Region idea* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993); Iver B. Neumann, "A Region-Building Approach to Northern Europe", in: *Review of International Studies* 20 (1994), pp. 53-74.

³ Wendy Larner & William Walters, "The Political rationality of 'New Regionalism': Toward a genealogy of

and identities at the level of the supra-national region.⁴ In all these passages, geographic proximity is crucial.⁵ In fact, free trade blocs are formed by agreements among 'neighbours', sharing economic advantage and the quality of basic values such as 'democracy' and 'human rights'. 'Freedom', for instance, is no longer an abstract belief, but shapes the principles of governing rule by assuring political rationalities.⁶ Shared values play a powerful role in the redefinition of 'us' and the legitimisation of regional societies. The traffic of people, commodities and information is blocked less and less by the barriers of older political ideologies, and has begun to hinge on the new notions of boundaries.

In this context, impulses for, and the objectives of, international educational traffic are increasingly complex. Cross-national educational interaction has become a key issue in international relations. In the post-World War II period, the organisation of firstly commerce and security and later government and culture on a regional basis had been reinforced. This movement was strongly present in Europe immediately after WWII, whereas it had not been openly witnessed in East and South-East Asia at least until the 1990s.⁷

2. Europe as a domain

Commonly, regional organisations, such as the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), would have wider social assumptions and implications than mere economic ones, their initial interest in trade control notwithstanding.⁸ These organisations normally advance issues like human capital formation. International cooperation in education and training is believed to lead to a large vision of human resource development on the principle of enrich thy neighbours.

A fine example is the EU educational scheme. From the infantile step through the adult stage, and from time-honoured civilisational gifts to the up-to-the-minute knowledge of technology, the people of EU are entitled to the enjoyment of human wisdom afforded by

the region", in: *Theory and Society* 31 (2002), pp. 391-432.

⁴ Bob Jessop, "Reflections on Globalisation and its (ul)logic(s)", in: *Globalisation and the Asia-Pacific: Contested Territories*, ed. by Kris Olds (London: Routledge, 1999).

⁵ Edward D. Mansfield & Helen V. Milner, "The New Wave of Regionalism", in: *International Organization* 53 (1999) 3, pp. 589-627.

⁶ Bjorn Wittrock, Peter Wagner & Hellmut Wollman, "Social Science and the Modern State, policy knowledge, and political institutions in Western Europe and the United States", in: *Social Sciences and Modern States: National experiences and theoretical crossroads*, ed. by Peter Wagner, Carol H. Weiss, Bjorn Wittrock & Hellmut Wollman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 28-55.

⁷ Barry Buzan, "Economic Structure and International Security: The Limits of the Liberal Case", in: *International Organization* 38 (1984) 4, pp. 597-624.

⁸ Roger Dale & Susan L. Robertson, "The Varying Effects of Regional Organizations as Subjects of Globalization of Education", in: *Comparative Education Review* 46 (2002) 1, pp. 10-36.

Comenius, Minerva, Lingua, Erasmus and all that. The *Mundus* version operates even outside EU. In each of the member states, the youth and adults are educated as 'EU citizens'. A variety of programmes open up chances for the citizens to seek what is attractive and useful for their study and research throughout the world. Global academic exchange is now not merely an idea but has become a strong reality. Indeed, certain advantages lie in Europe for such development of educational networks. The use of the Latin-base languages helps lower linguistic hurdles. The well-established system is built upon ample funds. But these conditions are in fact available elsewhere. Nonetheless Europe has some particular strength.

In practice, 'Europe' is to be treated not as a simple construct. Its shape has constantly changed, often depending on the politicised notions of inclusion and exclusion.⁹ Europe cannot be simply defined also because of its multiple features in race, national history, etc. However, EU maintains a kind of 'unity in diversity' which has sprung from the extensive efforts of 'Europeans'.¹⁰

Renaissance scholars assumed a passionate commitment to tracing a European identity. The intellectual expedition of Czech-born Comenius is a legacy of a project for European unity. Before these pioneer projects, 'European men' had identified themselves as such naturally in their civilising process by sharing the manner and behaviour evolved at the Court.¹¹ In the continent, the idea of a common culture and civilisation developed beyond the elite reservation and has attracted wider public interest.¹² Even an earlier root of shared scholarship can be found in the ancient enquiry into the nature of the world, the meaning of life and the notions of knowledge. Later *Universitas* literally began to bond the intellects under the papal authority in Bologna, Salerno, Oxford, Paris and elsewhere in his domain. Afterwards, *Studium Generale* endorsed by the Holy Roman Emperor had spread in Christendom. The Reformation overwhelmed European medieval scholasticism. The Age of Reason demonstrated 'progress' in line with the development of 'science'. As well, notions of humanity, justice and common good have been put forward in the aftermath of recurrent international wars across the continent.

Modern warfare ushered in the decline of the West.¹³ After the two great wars,

⁹ David Coulby & Crispin Jones, "Post-modernity, Education and European Identities", in: *Comparative Education* 32 (1996) 2, pp. 171-184.

¹⁰ Raymond Ryba, "Unity in Diversity: the enigma of the European dimension in education", in: *Oxford Review of Education* 21 (1995) 1, pp. 25-36.

¹¹ Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: The History of Manners* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994 [1939]).

¹² John Lowe, "Education and European Integration", in: *International Review of Education* 38 (1992) 6, pp. 587.

¹³ Oswald Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes: Umriss einer Morphologie der Weltgeschichte* (München: C. H. Beck, 1963 [1922-1923]).

European leaders recognised that building a peaceful neighbourhood was prerequisite for the further evolution of the Occident. During WWII, the Education Ministers of the Allies gathered to start the peaceful corporation of the member states. In 1949, the Council of Europe declared its aim as “to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress”.¹⁴ The German Problem was central to discussions on the reconstruction of Europe. Its recovery was contingent upon her moderate revival in the European politics and the economy and sincere reconciliation with her neighbours. The serious effort of the Western German government and the people for national redefinition built a valuable foundation for the unity of Europe after 1945. The reduction of national-stereotype has also been endeavoured in Western Europe.¹⁵ There, WWII and its settlement induced the people to re-inscribe their civilisational heritage upon a new definition of Europe. Even though the wars in the first part of the last century brought about the overall dominance of the US politics, economy, military and culture in the world, Europe has remained as ‘a continent of democracy, human rights and good education’, having the US as a good specimen of European civilisation.¹⁶

Certainly, EU still has many problems yet to be solved. ‘Naturalising’ the people of the former communist states is among the vital ones. The gaps arisen in the last few decades are to be bridged. But even during the Cold War, Western and Eastern scholars had maintained constant interaction.¹⁷ On top of such effort, after having the new members, EU has deliberately devised programmes for Eastern Europeans to appreciate what the Council of Europe called ‘the ideals and principles’, which are by any means reminiscent of their older civilisation. It is also notable that all these efforts for a harmonious unification of Europe and European education have been demonstrated not only on the governmental level but also in the movement of individuals and voluntary associations.¹⁸

3. The intricacies of Asia

The picture of Asia is different. There is no such a mega-dimensional, monolithic body in

¹⁴ “Council of Europe”, in: *International Organization* 3 (1949) 3, p. 551.

¹⁵ Du Bois-Reymond, Manuela, “European Identity in the Young and Dutch Students’ Images of Germany and the Germans”, in: *Comparative Education* 34 (1998) 1, pp. 27-40.


¹⁶ Sven E. Nordenbo, “What is Implied by a ‘European Curriculum?’ Issues of Eurocentrism, Rationality and Education”, in: *Oxford Review of Education* 21 (1995) 1, p. 38. See also: Audrey Osler & Hugh Starkey, “Rights, Identities and Inclusion: European action programmes as political education [1]”, in: *Oxford Review of Education* 25 (1999), pp. 1-2: 199-215.

¹⁷ Lowe, “Education and European Integration”, op. cit. (note 12).

¹⁸ Ryba, “Unity in Diversity: the enigma of the European dimension in education”, op. cit. (note 10).

Asia. In fact, there are many of smaller sizes entangled with each other:

Figure: The Framework of Regional Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Area



Source: Kennichiro Hirano, "Asia ni okeru chiiki-sei no sousei - sono genin wo motomete", in: *Chiiki-shugi no kokusai-hikaku: Asia-Taiheiyo, Europe, nishi-hankyu wo chushin ni shit*, ed. by Takehiko Yamamoto (Tokyo: Waseda Daigaku Shuppanbu, 2005), p. 52. (The situation is of 2003. The original figure is reshaped by Shibata.)

APEC: Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation

ARF: ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN: Association of South-East Asian Nations

PIF: Pacific Islands Forum

PMC: ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference

The political, economic and cultural concerns of each body are intertwined with great complexity. Each of them is 'weak' as an organisation. Indeed, many studies, for example

done by Dale and Robertson, treat APEC as equivalent to EU and NAFTA.¹⁹ However, as seen, the number of regional organisations is also great in Asia. APEC itself is, generally speaking, a 'weak' organisation in terms of the solidarity of its membership.

There are a number of aspects which explain the specific difficulties of Asia in developing the idea and the practices of regional cooperation. Firstly, it is broadly recognised that this is because of great diversity in political traditions, economies and culture. In terms of the size of national economies, the gap in member countries is massive: ranging from the smallest GNP of 4 billion US dollar (Papua New Guinea) to the largest one of nearly 8,000 billion (the US).²⁰ Culturally, too, language also varies widely. Unlike former colonies in Africa, those in Asia have maintained their indigenous languages as the official language. Similarly, religious diversity is wide. For example, Islam is the religion for 90% of the population in Indonesia, the largest Muslim country in the world. Within the membership of APEC, the similar figure can be applied to Buddhism in Thailand and Viet Nam, and Christianity in the Philippines and Chile. There are also Hindu, Taoism and many other faiths within the APEC region. Although some authors believe that societies in Asia share so-called Asian Values,²¹ there is actually no such a single set of ethos as Asian Values which is universally appreciated in Asia. In reality, even in East Asia alone, Confucianism, Buddhism, Islam and Christianity, to name a few, are all mingled into the minds of people and societies. Confucianism itself has diverse interpretations and applications within Asia. In addition, there are a number of indigenous religions which permeate the worldview and the conduct of behaviour of peoples in Asia, e.g. *Shinto* in Japan. Thus, APEC would be capable neither of representing the political, economic and educational interest of its member nations nor of exerting great influence upon other blocs.²²

Secondly, apart from these diversities in Asia, the background that APEC or any other organisation in Asia has not develop as a mega-regional organisation like EU is to be explained by the long-standing political tradition of preference for the cultivation of 'informal', instead of 'formal', ties based on 'negotiation', instead of 'statutes', among countries.²³ This preference is demonstrated in a commitment shown by some Asian countries

¹⁹ Dale & Robertson, "The Varying Effects of Regional Organizations as Subjects of Globalization of Education", op. cit. (note 8).

²⁰ The World Bank, "Development Education Program, Economic Data Table, GNP per Capita" (<http://www.worldbank.org/depweb/english/modules/economic/gnp/data.html>, accessed on 8 January 2006)

²¹ Benedict Anderson, "Western Nationalism and Eastern Nationalism, Is there a difference that matters?", in: *New Left Review* 9 (2001), pp. 31-42.

²² Dale & Robertson, "The Varying Effects of Regional Organizations as Subjects of Globalization of Education", op. cit. (note 8).

²³ Peter A. Petri, "The East Asian Trading Bloc: An analytical history", in: *Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan*

to so-called 'Open Regionalism'. It implies a preference for non-discriminatory economic interactions and the loose definition of the membership, to the stringent selection of member states based on distinct criteria, like the case of EU. The so-called Asia-Pacific Approach appreciates the initiative of the individual member states and exempts them from complex regulations for the promotion of free trade.²⁴ The idea of open regionalism was confirmed by APEC as its basic principle in the 1991 joint communiqué and the Bogor Declaration of 1994.

The third background for the Asian difficulty for 'integration' is the overpowering influence of the political, economic and military presence of the United State on the development of foreign relations in Asia.²⁵ For example, when the Malaysian Prime Minister proposed a vision for the East Asian Economic Group (EAEG), which implied the exclusion of Western states – Australia, New Zealand and the United States – from APEC, the US government enunciated fierce criticisms to the vision.

The US interference of this kind powerfully influenced Japan's foreign policy, which also assisted the tardy harmonisation of Asian countries. Japan has been deliberately reluctant to bear responsibility for the unification of Asia. From the immediate post-WWII period, the Japanese government has adopted a diplomatic stance of treasuring the relationship with the US most, recognising that the US would treat Japan as the most promising ally in Asia. The government of Japan, unlike that of West Germany, believed that the country's revival in the international politics and the economy would mainly rest upon the relationship with the US, and far less on Japan's attempt to reconcile herself with her neighbours. As will be shown later, the Japanese government took a careful stance to the Malaysian scheme of the consolidation of Asia in order not to offend the United States. Japan has remained careful not to link herself too closely to Asian countries. Some Asian leaders regarded this Japanese approach toward Asian cooperation as indecisive and disappointing.²⁶ At the same time, neither Japan nor her immediate neighbours, at least officially, has ever anticipated the creation of a unified Asia under her leadership after 1945.

and the United States in Pacific Asia, ed. by Feffrey A. Frankel & Miles Kahler (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 21-48.

²⁴ Stephan Haggard, "Regionalism in Asia and the Americas", in *The Political Economy of Regionalism*, ed. by Edward D. Mansfield & Helen V. Milner (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), pp. 20-49; Akio Hosono, "APEC to NAFTA - Asia-Taiheiyo to beishu ni okeru regionalism to globalism", in: *Kokusai chiiki tougo no frontier*, ed. by Harald Kleinschmidt & Sumio Hatano. (Tokyo: Sairyusha, 1997), pp. 145-174.

²⁵ Mansfield & Milner, "The New Wave of Regionalism", op. cit. (note 5).

²⁶ Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Comparative Perspective", in: *Network Power: Japan and Asia*, ed. by Peter J. Katzenstein & Takashi Shiraiishi (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 1-44.

The other explanation for the 'underdevelopment' of regionalism in Asia is the continuously developing sense of nationalism of the countries in the region. Due to their colonial history, the political and economic aspiration for 'nation building' and national consolidation still outstrips the formation of a solid regional organisation.²⁷ Lastly, in relation to the previous reason, Asian countries had barely experienced close political and military interaction among themselves, while they had been ruled by dominant Western powers. For example, an Asian delegate in the 1947 Pan-Asiatic Conference in New Delhi confessed that there he encountered 'other Asians' for the first time in his life.²⁸ This situation is definitively different from Europe, where international wars have always been recurrent for centuries. Overall in Asia, a sense of regional identity is very weak, compared to that in Europe. Therefore, political, economic and educational cooperation takes place in Asia more on a bilateral basis rather than a regional one.

3. The idea of the East Asian Community

An idea for the creation of an East Asian Community is a characteristic example for this Asian model of regional cooperation. The idea was initially advocated by the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad in the early 1980s. His argument was that the Malaysian people should share the qualities of industrious work ethics, a strong sense of public commitment and respect for social order from Japan, as features that are generally said to be based on the Confucian moral code. The Prime Minister argued that the startling development of East Asian countries was brought about by their appreciation of these qualities – what is often called Asian Values – and Malaysia should follow these exemplars. The Premier also suggested that while 'European values were European values, Asian Values are universal' and could be adopted in societies of various religions, structures and histories.²⁹ Also, Mahathir did not believe that Asian Values were indigenous to Japanese mentality but were cultivated through schooling.³⁰ Thus, in his argument, Asian Values were transferable to elsewhere. He took a deliberate anti-West stance and denounced Western cynicism about the Japanese as

²⁷ Takehiko Yamamoto, "Regionalism no shosou to kokusai riron", in: *Chiiki-shugi no kokusai hikaku: Asia-Taiheiyo/Europe/nishi-hankyu wo chushin ni shite*, ed. by Takehiko Yamamoto (Tokyo: Waseda Daigaku Shuppankai, 2005), pp. 1-28.

²⁸ Sumio Hatano, "Asia-Taiheiyou no 'chiiki-shugi' to Nihon", in: *Kokusai-chiiki-tougou no frontia*, ed. By Harold Kleinschmidt & Sumio Hatano (Tokyo: Sairyusha, 1997), pp. 175-208.

²⁹ Mohamad Mahathir & Shintaro Ishihara, *The Voice of Asia, Two leaders discuss the coming century* (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1995).

³⁰ Kit G. Machado, "Malaysian Cultural Relations with Japan and South Korea in the 1980s", in: *Asian Survey* 27 (1987) 6, pp. 628-660.

being ‘workaholic’, and encouraged Malaysians rather to become so.³¹ For Mahathir, all of these changes would create the responsible, efficient and trustworthy government, industries and workers that would eventually lead to self-sustainable economic growth in the country. Now the people were told to Look East. Indeed, during his administration, what Malaysia had achieved economically is striking. In the 21 years, per capita income increased by about 330% (from 4,022 Malaysian Ringgits (RM) in 1981 to 13,272 RM in 2002), and its annual average growth of GDP was 9.6%.³²

Thus, the metaphor of Look East Policy (LEP) was a useful means of railing against the prestige of Western countries and of echoing the sentiment of pan-Malay nationalism. The metaphor was easier for people to understand the goals they had to pursue than the abstract notions of political ideas or ideology. From the outset, this LEP has long been regarded as a relatively successful case of international educational cooperation in Asia. Indeed, under LEP, educational interaction between Malaysia and East Asian countries has been expanded. In this process, however, the aspects of ‘culture’ and ‘values’ have become less prominent than the initial advocacy for LEP. Instead, Look East and learning from Japan and Korea have worked as powerful metaphors for political aspirations for Asian regionalism. In this context, the idea of an East Asian Community has been developed as a kind of the political, economic and cultural consortium in the region. In the face of the political, economic and educational consolidation within free trade blocs in Europe and elsewhere, it was suggested that countries in East and South-East Asian should be more cohesive and unified so that they could play a role in the mainstream of the global economy.³³

Although Asians have the APEC, Mahathir’s idea did not fit within its parameters. Its formation was rather his disappointment, because it seemed to him to be overpowered by the US and her Western allies in any event. Mahathir’s idea was the formation of ‘ASEAN + 3’, an enlargement of ASEAN with the inclusion of Japan, South Korea and China. As mentioned earlier, his idea of EAEG faced corrosive criticism from the US. However, it was also necessary for Mahathir to stage a counterattack against Western intervention into domestic problems in Asian countries in the name of human rights protection, especially after the end of the Cold War.³⁴ For him, Asian countries should restore their cultural sovereignty that for a

³¹ Diane K. Mauzy & R. S. Milne, “The Mahathir Administration in Malaysia: Discipline through Islam”, in: *Pacific Affairs* 56 (1983) 4, pp. 617-648.

³² “The Legacy of Dr. Mahathir”, in: *New Straits Times*, 16 July 2002.

³³ “PMs Agree East Asian Nations Should be More Cohesive”, in: *New Straits Times*, 11 January 2002.

³⁴ Sanae Suzuki, “Mahathir seiken-ki ni okeru gaikou no nisokumen - kison kenkyu wo chushin ni”, in: *Mahathir seiken no 22-nen - bunken review to kiso-shiryō*, ed. By Asia Keizai Kenkyusho (Tokyo: Asia Keizai Kenkyusho, 2005).

long time had been encroached upon by Western powers. Mahathir's idea eventually evolved into the creation of an East Asian citizenship and the formation of an East Asian Community. Efforts have been made for the cultivation of a worldview of East Asian citizenry.³⁵ The development of an East Asian Community mindset and the fostering of the 'enlightened East Asian Community elites' were encouraged in Malaysian universities. In line with this policy, the dean of the Universiti Tun Abdul Razak called for the establishment of the ASEAN and East Asian Community Credit Transfer System, similar to the one developed by Europeans.

4. The old and new politics of regionalism in Asia

Malaysian enthusiasm notwithstanding, Japan's initial response to the policy disappointed Mahathir.³⁶ Japan's relationship with Malaysia has never been the prime concern of the foreign policy of the Japanese government. Though lopsided, cooperation between Malaysia and Japan has gradually developed along with the bilateral interest within LEP in the field of education.

Commensurate with its rise in the world economy, Japan began to perceive a growing desire and demand that the country should take an active role in the international community apart from the economic arena. However in education, Japan was much behind the US and some Western European countries in terms of the number that accepted those foreign people. For instance, there were only 8,116 foreign students in Japanese universities in 1982, whereas there were 19,336 in France in the same year and 311,882 in the US in 1980.³⁷ Thus the period of the 1980s was time for Japan to 'internationalise' her education. In 1983, the Ministry of Education set forth a 'Plan for Accepting 100,000 International Students by 2000'. Until and after the goal was actually achieved in 2004, the government has made steady progress in the plan by welcoming students from abroad. The start of LEP coincided with that of the Ministry of Education's plan. For Malaysian students, the Japanese government has been annually providing scholarships of 1 billion yen (33 million RM) on average since LEP was initiated. In line with the policy, the government has provided a variety of programmes for Malaysians studying in Japan with different qualifications and for different purposes.

The effectiveness of LEP in Japan-Malaysian educational interaction was also elucidated during the Asian Monetary Crisis, which started in July 1997 in Thailand. The

³⁵ "Create a Worldview for East Asian Citizenry", in: *New Straits Times*, 17 August 2003.

³⁶ Machado, "Malaysian Cultural Relations with Japan and South Korea in the 1980s", op. cit. (note 30).

³⁷ The Report of the Central Council for Education, 18 December 2003

(http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/shingi/chukyo/chukyo0/toushin/03121801/009.pdf, accessed on 8 January 2006).

Japanese government responded favourably to Malaysian requests for safeguarding further extending the scholarships.³⁸ In February 1998, Japan provided 465.7 million yen (14.6 million RM) for 250 Malaysian students to start their studies in Japan. In the following month, the government extended a grant of 510.4 million yen (16 million RM) to Malaysia to enable 260 students to continue their studies in Japan and allow another 260 to begin preparatory courses in Malaysia.³⁹ Through Official Development Assistance (ODA) Yen Loans as well, a disbursement of 49 billion yen (1.6 billion RM) was made in December 1998 for scholarship supporting the LEP programmes as well as for the construction of a new campus at the University of Malaysia Sarawak.⁴⁰ As noted by the Japanese Ambassador to Malaysia, Japan would not have made such special efforts for maintaining assistance to Malaysia, if the two countries had not been cherishing the ideas of LEP. Certainly, the educational interaction between Japan and Malaysia has brought about 'a growing Asian consensus' on the efficacy of many features of the Asian approach to human resource development.⁴¹ Furthermore, the Japanese government could expect to benefit from educating and training Malaysians – who would become experts on Japan, if not necessarily Japanophiles – within the government, the civil bureaucracy, the armed forces and industries in Malaysia. Apart from these benefits, however, the mixture of Japan's 'throwing money' into the region and the relatively tangible economic gains from this operation was sometimes seen as a 'puzzling behaviour'.⁴²

There has been a slow genesis of Japan's interest in the regions of East and South-East Asia. From the early part of the last century, Japan has long looked southeast in seeking control of natural and human resources and overall political, economic and cultural hegemony in the region. Through the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Japan attempted to replace Western colonial powers with herself in various areas, including in the field of education. In 1942, the Japanese Headquarters of the Southern Expeditionary Forces announced the 'Fundamental Policy Concerning Education in the Southern-Sphere', and ordered that the Japanese sense of what constitutes an industrious mindset must be emphasised in all aspects of schooling. Instruction in English was forbidden by the directive 'Matter Relating to Reopening of Primary Schools', and only the Japanese and Malay languages were permitted. Although, in reality, the Japanese language did not

³⁸ "RM14.6m Sought For Students To Study In Japan", in: *New Straits Times*, 21 February 1998.

³⁹ "Grant For 260 Students To Continue Studies in Japan", in: *New Straits Times*, 7 March 1998.

⁴⁰ "Japanese Loan For Six Projects", in: *New Straits Times*, 19 December 1998.

⁴¹ William K. Cummings, "The Asian Human Resource Approach in Global Perspective", in: *Oxford Review of Education* 21 (1995) 1, pp. 67-81.

⁴² Ming Wan, "Japan and the Asian Development Bank", in: *Pacific Affairs* 68 (1995) 4, pp. 509-528.

become the practical medium of instruction⁴³ and rather such oppressive policy of the Japanese military government awakened a sense of Malay ethnic identity, the ideology of the Japanese government was to create a dutiful subject of the Japanese emperor state in Malaysia.⁴⁴ Also, during this wartime period, a number of elite students of South-East Asia studying in Japan were regarded as a kind of hostage by the Japanese government for its easy rule in South-East Asia.⁴⁵

This historically contingent relationship between Japan and the South-East Asian region was revitalised in the 1970s when Japanese industries grew again on capitalist lines and began to seek economic ties in the region. It was also a period of decline for American influence and monetary power vacuum in the region, partly due to Nixon Shock and the fall of Saigon.⁴⁶ In 1977, the Japanese Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda pronounced an epoch-making declaration in the Fukuda Doctrine, which demonstrated Japan's 'heart-to-heart diplomacy' for Asian countries. This idea set out the basis of Japan's ODA policy. In the 1980s, while US leaders were experiencing their *Nation at Risk*, Japan began to achieve a major position in the world economy. In due course, Japan established a stable trading and production bloc in Asia. Ironically, the pre-war idea of the Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere virtually came true after, and arguably because of, her defeat in the war.⁴⁷ This time, unlike in the pre-war period, the government's nationalist policy surfaced along with its awareness that Japan should stand on a more friendly footing in the international community than it had during the war time.

Through ODA, Japan has provided a large amount of financial aid for countries in East and South-East Asia through international agencies such as the Asian Development Bank. For instance, between 1987 and 1993, Japan loaned 30.4% of the total lending capacity of the bank, while the total figure for all European members was 39.8% and that for the US was 11.7%.⁴⁸ As the major donor, Japan has exercised a dominant influence on the operation of the bank. During the Asian Monetary Crisis, the Japanese government announced that it had

⁴³ Hitoshi Sugimoto, *Malaysia ni okeru kokusai kyoiku kankei, Kyoiku heno global impact* (Tokyo: Toshindo, 2005); Hiroshi Tawada, "Gendai Malaysia ni okeru Islamu-ka no tenkai", in: *Bulletin of the Faculty of Liberal Arts, Nagasaki University* 37 (1996) 1, pp. 103-126.

⁴⁴ Cf. Noriko Matsunaga, *Nihon gunsei-ka no Malaya ni okeru nihon-go kyoiku* (Tokyo: Kazamashobo, 2002).

⁴⁵ Sugimoto, *Malaysia ni okeru kokusai kyoiku kankei, Kyoiku heno global impact*, op. cit. (note 43).

⁴⁶ Tadahiro Yoshida, "East Asian Regionalism and Japan", in: *JETRO Working Paper Series 03/04 No. 9* (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies in APEC Study Center, JETRO, 2004).

⁴⁷ Walter Hatch & Kozo Yamamura, *Asia in Japan's Embrace: Building a regional production alliance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Roy Hofheinz Jr., & Kent E. Calder, *The Eastasia Edge* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1982).

⁴⁸ Wan, "Japan and the Asian Development Bank", op. cit. (note 42).

decided to make one-fourth of the entire IMF aid amount available to ASEAN countries.⁴⁹ In the following month, the Japanese Ministry of Finance announced the concept of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF), a fund of 10 billion US dollar for the countries suffering from the crisis. In 1999, the Japanese government credited around 120 billion yen (3.76 billion RM) to Malaysia, a record-high figure for yen loans.⁵⁰ In education, as shown earlier, a large number of scholarships had been provided to Malaysians during the crisis. These aids had been made despite American intervention. The US government observed Japan's growing influence in Asia unfavourably and noted the concept of an AMF as a 'moral hazard'.⁵¹ The US tried to redirect the Japanese yen to Brazil whose treasury had similarly fallen in crisis. In order to maintain support for Asia, the Japanese Ministry of Finance made a deal with its US counterpart that Japan would raise her emergency support to Brazil from the initial amount of 1 billion US dollar to 1.25 billion, in exchange for the US no longer imposing arbitrary pressure upon Japan's ODA in the Asian region.⁵²

These acts of the Japanese government demonstrated Japan's strategy to appeal her strong political and economic presence in Asia, although there was criticism from Asian countries concerning Japan's insufficient role in resolving the crisis.⁵³ Assuring her power in Asia has been increasingly crucial for Japan, as new geographies have been developing since the end of the Cold War. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US Secretary of State proclaimed the creation of a new community, ranging 'from Vancouver to Vladivostok', with Japan being outside these leading economies. It should also be noted that this situation has gradually been changed with the rapid rise of China in the politics, economy and military in Asia. From the early 2000s, China has begun acting as one of the most enthusiastic countries in the Pacific Rim for the development of the 'East Asian Community'.⁵⁴

5. Conclusion

The assumptions and implications of educational interaction have been explored by looking at the specificities of Asia in comparison to those of Europe. The union of European countries has been united stunningly beautifully within the last few decades, a number of awaiting

⁴⁹ Yoshida, "East Asian Regionalism and Japan", op. cit. (note 46).

⁵⁰ Ministry of Education, Japan, *Higashi-Asia shokoku ni taisuru kokusai-senryaku no arikata ni kansuru chosa* (Tokyo: Ministry of Education, 2005).

⁵¹ Yoshida, "East Asian Regionalism and Japan", op. cit. (note 46).

⁵² "Yuragu Toho-seisaku, Saidai-kibo no Yen-shakkan wo ukeru Malaysia", *Asahi Shinbun*, 31 May 1999.

⁵³ "In Defense of 'Asian Values'", in: *Time*, 16 March 1998.

⁵⁴ Kazuko Mouri, "'Higashi Asia Kyodotai' to chugoku no chiiki-gaiko", in: *Chiiki-shugi no kokusai hikaku: Asia-Taiheiyo/Europe/nishi-hankyu wo chushin ni shite*, ed. by Takehiko Yamamoto (Tokyo: Waseda Daigaku Shuppankai, 2005), pp. 65-82; Yoshida, "East Asian Regionalism and Japan", op. cit. (note 46).

solutions notwithstanding. Europe has demonstrated a number of accounts of particular 'strength' that lack in Asia. What is unique about Europe and new to its history is the establishment of a mega supra-national society within which transnational values are appreciated. And what is so remarkable of Europeans is the resourceful use of their long-established, historical-cultural relations for their own society and beyond.

The effects of educational transfer have entailed political and economic assumptions in global politics and economic relations. A policy for educational interaction can work for the direction of foreign policy. In Europe, with new notions of communal boundaries, the vigour of educational interaction has consolidated political interest, economic advantage and cultural qualities of the membership of regional societies. International cooperation in education is both the basis for, and the effect of, national definition and re-definition.

What makes so difficult for Asia to reach the same level of unification are the absence of historical-cultural relations which would bridge national gaps, the strong presence of external intrusion, the insufficient sense of responsibility of the leadership, the underdevelopment of a clear vision of Asia in the post-colonial era and, on the whole, a lack of political will. In sum, drawing a new geography of 'Asia' seems to be a very ambitious undertaking. In Asia, the 'modernity project' is still underway. Aspirations for nation building yet overwhelm the public will for regional unification. On the other hand, apparently there is a political and educational motivation for the creation of a powerful regional society. The foundation of UMAP (University Mobility in Asia and the Pacific) in 1991 is an example of such a will. Its performance, however, illustrates another example of tardy progress or even malfunction in forming reciprocal agreements, not to speak of the credit transfer system, among the member countries. If Asian countries wish to follow the path of EU, there seems to be a long way to go for them to create their society capable of representing the political, economic and educational interest of its members and completing with that of other blocs.

*2006 年 ヨーロッパ比較教育学会 紀要 掲載予定

18. 大乘仏教の誕生とキリスト教*

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はじめに

第1節 大乘仏教の形成過程

第2節 自己犠牲的利他主義とアミダ仏

第3節 イエス・トマス双子説と阿弥陀三尊

おわりに

参考文献

はじめに

大乘仏教は西暦紀元前後に起こり、1世紀末にはほぼその姿がはっきりとしていたことや、阿弥陀仏をはじめとする大乘仏教のいくつかの要素が西方から西北インドに伝えられたものに由来することは、今日通説となっている（静谷 [1974] 273-4 頁、平川 [1974] 315 頁、奈良 [1979] 351 頁、杉山 [1984] を参照）。

インド文明への西方文明の影響は、そのはじまりを告げたインダス文明以来連綿と続いてきた。アレクサンダー大王東征のころ西北インドはアケメネス朝ペルシアの支配下にあつて大王と戦っており、西暦紀元前 317 年にマウリヤ王朝の始祖チャンドラグプタがセレウコス王からパンジャーブ四州を譲渡されて以降も、西北インドには多くのギリシア人が住みついている。このように、西北インドはペルシア・ギリシアといった西方の影響が極めて強い地域であり、マトゥラーからガンダーラ・カシミールにかけて、上座部系の説一切有部を中心とする仏教が教線を拡大したのはマウリヤ朝のアショカ王（阿育王 前 268～232）の前後ころからである（奈良 [1979] 178 頁を参照）。仏教の法（ダルマ）による統治の理念を記したアショカ王法勅碑文のうち、アフガニスタンやガンダーラのタキシラ¹で発見されたものはアケメネス朝の公用語であつたアラム語で記され、アショカ王碑文の

*『筑波大学 経済学論集』第 57 号 2007 年 3 月

¹ タキシラは「ガンダーラ地方とはインダス河を挟んで相対し、一部の仏典にはガンダーラ国の都市とするものもあるが、地域としてはガンダーラとタキシラとは本来別個であつたもので、法顕や玄奘の記事でも、別個の国として説かれている」（高田 [1967] 71 頁）。しかし、「西北インド（今の西パキスタン [バングラデシュ独立後のパキスタン——引用者注記]）及びアフガニスタンの一部にわたるガンダーラ美術圏」（同、72 頁）という場合はタキシラも含む広い範囲をガンダーラと呼ぶ用法に従っていることになる。現在の日本における通念では、ガンダーラと言えば美術圏としてのガンダーラがまず意識されるが、アフガニスタンまで含むと広すぎると思われる。

スタイルそのものもアケメネス朝のものを模倣している（岩本〔1965〕115頁を参照）。

前180年ころマウリヤ朝を放伐してシュンガ朝を開いたプシュヤミトラがバラモン教に帰依して一部の仏教徒を弾圧したため、仏教徒のなかには西北インド方面に移住した者もいたはずであり、彼らは総じて、インドの正統思想たるバラモン教と折り合いが悪く²、逆に西方思想・宗教との融合に積極的だったと思われる。つまり、西北インドについていえば、ペルシア・ギリシア文明の要素がむしろ基層にあり、仏教がその上に広まったとみるべきであろう。前2世紀後半に西北インドを支配していたギリシア人のバクトリア王メナンドロス（インド名ミリンダ）と学僧ナーガセーナ（那先）が交わした問答『ミリンダパンハ』のような状況は、外来支配者とインド土着の仏教との関係というよりも、外来的要素が強い西北インドへの、インド正統思想にとって異端的な仏教伝道の一齣とみるべきであろう。

以上のように考えれば、『異部宗輪論』によると仏滅二百年初（前186頃。平川〔1974〕152頁を参照）に上座部から派生したとされる、西北インドで最も有力な仏教部派であった説一世有部が説く、三世実有・法体恒有・我空法有・法体恒有といった思想も、西方の哲学思想の影響を受けたもので、イデア論や概念実在論のような傾向の西方哲学になじんだ人々に受け入れられやすい仏教教理の理論化の試みであったとみることができるのではなかろうか。

前3世紀半ば以降、仏教の西北インドへの教線拡大とともに、西方諸宗教・哲学・思想の影響による仏教の変容は、さまざまな面で起こったはずである。そのなかで、なぜ西暦紀元前後に興ったもののみが、大乘仏教の誕生という仏教史上最大の革命を引き起こしたのか、という問題を立てなければならないだろう。

さらに言えば、新宗教の創始と言ってもよいほどの革命であるにもかかわらず、大乘経典は全て数百年前に生きた釈迦が説いたこととされ、真の創始者の姿が隠されていることも、説明を要するように思われる。紀元前後に西方から新たな教えが到来し、その教えと仏教が接触・融合することによって大乘仏教が形成されたが、その教主や伝道者の名は何らかの事情があつて隠されて釈迦の説に仮託され、仏典として編纂されたという仮説が、これらの問題に対して最もすっきりした回答を与えるものであろう。そして、紀元前後ころ西方から西北インドに伝えられた革命的な教えとしてまず候補に挙がるのは、キリスト教であろう。

西北インドにおいて、インド・ギリシア人時代（前180頃以降）と比べて、次のサカ族時代（前90頃―後20頃）には、ヘレニスティック美術の制作技術が下降し、むしろ土着のインド的な造形基盤が主となっていた（高田〔1967〕186頁を参照）。このような美術史

² 仏教の伝説ではプシュヤミトラはマウリヤ王朝最後の王で、アショーカ王の名声に嫉妬してバラモンの助言によって首都パータリプトラで仏僧を殺すなど仏教を迫害したため、軍隊もろとも大山の下敷きになって滅んだと誤って伝えている。プシュヤミトラは、アショーカ王が禁じた動物犠牲を伴う帝王の大供犠アシュヴァメーダ（馬祀祭）を二度行うなど、仏教に帰依したアショーカ王の施策を否定してバラモン教祭祀を復活させたものの、シュンガ朝時代にサーンチやバールフートの仏塔が建立・拡張されているので、仏教迫害は一時的なものとされている（山崎〔1997〕174-5頁、山崎・辛島〔2004〕78-9頁を参照）。しかし、仏教徒たちの間で事実を誤り伝えるほどのプシュヤミトラやバラモン教への被害者意識や憎悪が残された点に、その後の仏教とバラモン教との間の溝の深さが示されていると言えよう。

上の傾向から推して、大乘仏教への西方からの影響も、インド・ギリシア人時代以来の西方文化の伝統、すなわち、ギリシアやペルシアから西北インドにもたらされたものがいったん衰退し、インド土着の文化が盛り返してきたサカ族時代が終わり、インド・パルティア王国時代となった紀元 20 年代半ば以降、新たに西方からもたらされたものであろう。紀元 30 年ころイエスが処刑された後、12 使徒によるキリスト教の伝道がはじまったことは、インド・ギリシア人時代のものとは異なる、インドへの西方からの新たな影響を想定しえる時期とぴったり符合する。

このように、大乘仏教誕生に決定的な役割を果たしたのはキリスト教であり、大乘仏教には隠れキリスト教という側面があるという仮説は非常に有望なものと思われるので、さらに検討してみることにしたい。

第 1 節 大乘仏教の形成過程

大乘仏教の形成時期やその過程を復元するための基礎資料となるのは、最初期の漢訳大乘仏典であり、その内容と訳出年代に基づいて、多くは西北インドのガンダーラ語で書かれていたと思われるその原典の成立時期や、そこで言及されている最古の大乘經典の成立時期が推測されている。それらと仏像・金石文などとを総合することによって、「はじめに」で述べたような通説が導かれるのである。ここではまず、漢訳資料から大乘經典の成立過程を精緻に検討した平川 [1989] の説をとりあげて検討してみることにしたい。

般若經系統については、『道行般若經』が西紀 100 年に存在したことから、その出現は西紀前後に想定でき、『阿閼佉国經』の起源もそのころと考えられるが、『道行般若經』が阿閼佉の信仰を知っていたことから、般若經関係の經典のなかでは阿閼佉に関する經典が最も古いと推定できる (198-201 頁)。

阿弥陀仏に言及した『般舟三昧經』は 1 世紀—2 世紀前半の成立であり、その説く観仏三昧 (般舟三昧) は本来阿弥陀仏に限られたものではないので、阿弥陀仏信仰は観仏三昧とは別のところで 1 世紀中葉かそれ以前に起こり、徐々に大乘の教理と結合・融合して大乘仏教としての阿弥陀仏の教理が形成されたと考えられる (210-3 頁)。

これら最古の漢訳經典に引用されている『菩薩藏』『三品經』『六波羅蜜經』などは西紀前に成立したと考えられる (225-6 頁)。

以上の平川 [1989] 説に照らし、年代的にみて、キリスト教の影響を想定しえるのはまず、1 世紀中葉かそれ以前ころに起こったらしい阿弥陀仏信仰である。西紀前に置かれる『菩薩藏』など最古の大乘經典が、キリスト教のインド伝来以前に成立していたことは間違いなく、般若經系統やそこで説かれる阿閼佉信仰もおそらくキリスト教の影響がありえる時期より前に生まれていたものであろう。

最古の大乘經典の一つである『六波羅蜜經』は、布施・持戒・忍辱・精進・禪讓・智慧 (般若) の六波羅蜜を平等に説くものであると思われ、六波羅蜜のうち般若波羅蜜を選び出してその優位を説くという般若經の思想が成立する以前に成ったものであろう (平川 [1989] 225 頁を参照)。仏伝において、声聞や独覚と異なる、成仏のための独自の修行として六波羅蜜が説かれていたものが大乘仏教に取り入れられた (平川 [1974] 338 頁を参照)。したがって、六波羅蜜は大乘仏教独自のものではない。

成仏を目指す菩薩としての宗教的自己規定は、大乘仏教の特色の一つであるとされるこ

とが多い。多数の菩薩が同時に修行し、それが実を結ぶとすれば、この世には同時に多数の仏が出現しえるはずであり、現に多数の仏が存在してよいはずである。このような、同時に多仏が存在するということが教理的に正当化されてはじめて、大乘仏教が存立しえることになったと思われる。しかしその教理も、六波羅蜜と同様、大乘仏教独自のものではなかった。

部派仏教には一世界すなわち一仏国土に同時に如来が二人出現することはありえないという原則があったが、多世界のおのおのについてこの原則を適用し、十方にある多数の世界に同時に多数の如来が出現しえるとする十方世界多仏説もすでに部派仏教において知られ、有部とパーリ上座部はそれに反対したが、大乘仏教において重要な思想になった（平川〔1989〕295頁を参照）。有部とパーリ上座部においては他世界に如来が出現する可能性が否定されるので、釈迦の次の如来たる弥勒までの間は如来不在の世であり、どんなに修行しても如来には及ばないとされてきた。大衆部の伝説である『大事』³は他部派のものも含む諸資料の寄せ集めという感じがするもので、必ずしも大衆部固有の思想を反映したものではない（平川〔1989〕270、292頁を参照）が、菩薩の十地の第六地「妙相具足」で多くの仏国土に同時に多くの仏陀が現存すると説いている（Jones tr.〔1949〕pp.97f, 久野〔1930〕105頁、平川〔1989〕292頁を参照）。このように、多仏同時出世を説く思想はすでに部派のなかにあらわれており、阿閼仏は大乘仏教のオリジナルかもしれないが、部派がすでに同様な他世界現在仏を具体的に説いていたことも『大事』から知られる。また、十方世界多仏説は一人の仏の下で多数の菩薩が修行することを認めるために生まれたので、それを説く部派と成仏を目指す菩薩たるべきことを説く大乘仏教との差異は不分明である。

『阿閼仏国経』には、声聞と独覚の二乗に批判的な思想が現れてきているが、声聞乗を求める人たちが『阿閼仏徳号法経』を受持・読誦すれば阿羅漢果を得るとも説かれているように、二乗に否定的ともいえない（静谷〔1974〕271頁を参照）。十方世界多仏を説き、一仏に多数の菩薩が従うことが認められれば、現在他方仏への信仰は成仏を目指す菩薩たることを推奨するものになるので、声聞がワンランク下に位置付けられるのは論理的に必然であると思われる。したがって、阿閼仏信仰の古い形態は、部派仏教を超えるものではなかったであろう。

このように見てくると、思想ないし教理として萌芽期の大乗仏教と部派仏教とを明確に区別することは困難である。それが大乘仏教と自己規定しつつ、残余の部派を小乗と貶めるようになることは、『道行般若経』にはじまるようだ（平川〔1989〕153頁を参照）が、それ以前においては、従来の部派と明確な一線を画すものに発展しそうもなく、せいぜい、一つないいくつかの新興部派といった程度のものであり、それらが自己を他部派とは異質なものとみなすことによって、大乘仏教が誕生したとみるべきであろう。

般若経が強調する般若波羅蜜とは、法を固定的・実体的に掴まない空観（無自性説）に即して自性清浄心を発見することであるが、無自性の教理や自性清浄心を説く部派もあり、説一切有部はそれらに反対していた⁴。むしろそのような説一切有部との対決のなかで、論

³ 久野〔1930〕「二、『大事』(Mahāvastu)の十地」に『大事』の十地の全訳と解説がある。

⁴ 教量部や譬喩者は大乘と同様無自性を説き、後者はその他にも大乘との共通点が多い（宮本〔1929〕、平川〔1989〕17頁を参照）。自性清浄心は大衆部以外の部派にも見られ、パーリの阿含経ですでに説かれていた（赤沼〔1939〕210-3頁、平川〔1989〕18、313-8頁を参照）。

敵が批判していた諸部派のいくつかの説を積極的に取り上げ、般若波羅蜜を核として高く掲げることによって、大乘仏教の旗幟が鮮明になっていったと見るべきではなかろうか。

最古の漢訳大乘經典には、般若經系統と阿彌陀仏信仰系統とがあるが、前者が部派に批判的であるのに対し、後者が部派への批判を全く欠いていることは、どう理解したらよいものであろうか。従来、両系統はもともと担い手が別だったため、部派に対する態度も異なると解釈されてきたが、果たしてそうであろうか？ 十方世界多仏説を前提とする阿彌陀仏信仰は説一切有部と相容れないのであるから、両者が対立関係にないということはいえない。

般若經系統の思想は、阿閼仏信仰も含めて、既存の諸部派の思想のうち、西北インドで最有力であった説一切有部と対立する諸要素を取り上げて整合化・尖鋭化したという性格が濃厚である。すなわち、般若經における説一切有部の思想に対する批判は、仏教内にすでに存在した論点を使った、仏教内在的なものであると言えよう。それに対して阿彌陀信仰は仏教外に由来するものであるから、その形成期において阿彌陀系經典のなかで仏教のある派を批判すれば、仏教に対する外部からの批判という意味合いを帯びることになるので、阿彌陀信仰を仏教と融合させるという方針と相容れないことになろう。したがって、西北インドで最有力であった仏教部派である説一切有部と対抗しつつ、阿彌陀信仰を自らの内に取り入れるという仏教内の立場にとって、一方で説一切有部に対する批判は仏教内在的なものととどめるべく般若系經典で行いつつ、他方で阿彌陀信仰を仏教の教理に適合させるべく阿彌陀系經典を発展させるというやり方が合理的であろう。

だとすれば、同じ一人の思想家ないし同じ思想グループが、一方では般若系の思想を展開して説一切有部をはじめとする部派と対決しつつ、他方では部派との対立が表面に出ないよう配慮しつつ阿彌陀仏信仰の教理化を推進するということがあったとしても不思議ではない。そして、阿彌陀信仰が仏教外から起こったものであったとすれば、彼らが説一切有部との対決姿勢を強めた原因は、仏教外にあった阿彌陀信仰を阿彌陀仏信仰として仏教化することを通じて、在来の仏教との差異を強く意識するようになり、主要な論敵であった説一切有部も、それと対立する説を唱えて般若經系思想の素材を提供した諸部派もひっくり返して、旧来の仏教全体に小乗仏教という蔑称を与え、自らを大乘と意識したということになるのではなかろうか。諸部派を超えるという自己規定は、外部の異質なものを自らだけが取り込むことによって、はじめて可能になったのではなかろうか。

大乘經典にはしばしば「如来滅後後五百歳、正法欲滅」「後五百年」という表現が登場し、正法の栄える時である仏滅五百年までの「前五百年」の次の五百年が「後五百年」で、「五百年のすんだあと」のことであり、正法が滅する時という含意がある（平川〔1989〕158-62頁を参照）。大乘仏教は「後五百年」の末法思想によって旧来の部派仏教全般を批判しつつ形成されたのである。阿彌陀仏など釈迦以外の仏が他世界で現在も正法を説いているという現在他方仏の観念は、釈迦の説いた正法が滅するところという時代意識とともに昂揚したと思われる。それは、現実に旧来の仏教の外から新たな教説・福音が到来し、それを現在他方仏の説く正法として受け入れた結果であり、新たな正法を拠り所とすることによって、はじめて、釈迦の説いた正法が滅する時であるという風に、旧来の部派仏教全体を正法から逸脱したものとして批判することも可能になったのではなかろうか。

般若經関係の經典のうち最初に成立したのは東方世界の現在仏である阿閼仏に関する經

典と推定でき、西紀前後のことと思われる。したがって大乘仏教の原点はインド文明圏からみてはるか東方の世界に阿閼という仏が存在するという信仰であり、インドに劣らない高度な文明がはるか東方に存在するという知識がそのもとになったと思われる。『大事』が第六地で十方世界多仏を説き、続く第七地「難勝」では、不退の菩薩の学ぶことのなかに中国語や匈奴の言葉などを挙げている（Jones tr. [1949] p.107, 久野 [1930] 112 頁、平川 [1989] 292 頁を参照）ことも、十方世界多仏説と東方・中国文明を評価する姿勢との結びつきを示唆している。

紀元前 110 年代には、烏孫に使した張騫の副使が身毒（インド）にも分遣されて（『史記』「大宛伝」）、ガンダーラに至っており、その後前漢の使者がしばしば西北インドを訪れるようになった。烏壘城（チャディル）に西域都護が置かれた紀元前 60 年以後 50～60 年間は、シルクロードが最も栄えた時代の一つであり、ガンダーラやアショカ王碑文が出土したアフガニスタンのカンダハルまで前漢の使者がしばしば往来したので中国人が紀元前 1 世紀に仏教の存在を知ったことは間違いない（長澤 [1983] 1 巻 205 頁、2 巻 240 頁、同 [1993] 132-3、207 頁を参照）。したがって儒教をはじめとする高度な宗教・思想が中国に存在するという知識も前漢の使者などによってインドの仏教徒に伝わらなかったはずがない。十方世界多仏説やそれをふまえた阿閼仏信仰はこのような紀元前 2 世紀末～1 世紀における前漢の西域外交に刺激されて生まれたと思われる。

阿閼の原義は「振動せられざる」の意味であり、瞋恚の心を起こさないと誓って菩提心をおこしたのち、瞋恚の心がなかったことに因む名であるから、中国の理想的人間像（聖人君子）が阿閼仏の原型ではなかろうか。中国文明にも如来に相当するような存在を認める発想が、シルクロード貿易にかかわる王侯貴族や大商人など在家仏教信者を中心に成立したと考えることができる。自足的な固定を否定して相互依存性を説く般若経の空思想も、自己を相対化して他者との関係・交流のなかでとらえる発想に支えられたものであり、自文明中心主義からの脱却の表現でもあっただろう。とはいえ、儒教など中国の宗教・思想が実際に取り入れられた形跡はない。しかし異質な外部の思想を積極的に取り入れるための用意ができたといった程度の意義を阿閼仏信仰のような現在他方仏信仰に見出すことはできよう。

このように考えれば、十方世界多仏・現在他方仏・阿閼仏信仰や般若経も中国文明と直接した西北インドの起源と推定できる。「一切諸仏の供養のために」という奉獻銘が前 1 世紀から後 1 世紀にかけてのナガラハーラ（燃灯授記の霊場、現アフガニスタンのジェラバード附近）からマトゥラーを結ぶ地域に出土することも、大乘仏教形成期の西北インドにおける十方世界多仏に対する信仰の成立と昂揚を示唆しており（静谷 [1974] 275 頁を参照）、西北インドにおいて前 1 世紀に東方中国文明との接触を契機に阿閼仏など他方仏が考え出され、それをふまえて 1 世紀半ばごろに阿弥陀仏信仰が形成されたことと符合する。

『大事』の第六地で具体的に言及されている仏国土は、東方 5、南方 3、西方北方上方下方各 1 であり、この方位観は、『大品』『小品』の般若経において仏滅後に般若波羅蜜が東方より南方→西方→北方に至るとされていることを、龍樹が『大智度論』で注釈して、天体が東南西北の方向に回ることに類比し、また礼拝供養右繞の礼が右回りであるのに比

較して説明している（平川〔1989〕201頁を参照⁵）こととつながり、東＞南＞西＞北という方位に関する価値序列が仏教において伝統的にあったと言えよう。萌芽期大乘仏教が東方の阿閼仏を特に取り上げて信仰し、東方起源の般若波羅蜜が東方→南方→西方→北方に至ったとするのも、そのような方位観に基づくと言える。在来からあった東方優位の価値観のもとで現実に中国文明と接触した結果、遠方で軍事的脅威とならないこともあって、中国を理想視する発想が生まれるのは不可避である。逆に言えば、西方阿弥陀仏が東方阿閼仏を圧倒するに至るのは、仏教の伝統的方位価値観を覆す革命であり、インド文明圏ないし仏教にとって革命的な思想が西方からもたらされた結果としか説明の仕様がなかろう。そのような方位価値観の革命を許容するほどの柔軟性を持つ人々が、十方世界多仏説を説く部派からも一線を画して大乘仏教を自称することになったのではなかろうか。

西北インドは他文明に由来する異質な思想に対して著しく開かれた特質を有していたため、遙か西方から伝来したキリスト教との接触を契機として、東方の阿閼仏と対になる西方の阿弥陀仏が説かれたとしても唐突ではなく、とりわけ大乘仏教を名乗ることになった人々はキリスト教が伝来すれば、それとの接触・交流に積極的でありえたと思われる。そして、現実に伝来したキリスト教思想を取り込み、外部の異質なものを内部化するとともに、それまで自己が属してきた仏教の旧来のあり方を、菩薩乗よりも劣った小乗で、しかも釈迦滅後五百年を過ぎて摩耗・陳腐化していると、全面批判するようになったのではなかろうか。

第2節 自己犠牲的利他主義とアミダ仏

前節でみたように、1世紀半ばころに、仏教の外部ないし周縁に由来する西方阿弥陀信仰が仏教と融合しはじめたことによって、十方世界多仏説を支持し、従来からの東方阿閼仏信仰を知っていた人たちが自らを大乘と規定して旧来の仏教からの革命的な変化を意識するようになったという筋書きを想定すれば、初期漢訳經典を巡る諸事実やそれらから推測される諸仮説を整合的に位置付けることができる。次には、他の資料によってもこの筋書きを裏付けることができるかどうか問題となろう。

「一切衆生の利益安樂のために」という碑銘の最も古い例はガンダーラのパージャー村から出土した西紀54年頃の石刻碑文であり、ガンダーラに隣接するスワートのカールダラ出土石刻碑文には「一切衆生への供養として」という語句やギリシア名の寄進者が西紀56年頃刻まれているように、これらの普遍主義的利他表現が西北インドでギリシア系など西方出自の人々を含めて1世紀中葉ころ使用されはじめ、インド各地に広まった（静谷〔1974〕241-3頁を参照）。また、マトゥラー西郊プーテーサル出土の欄楯柱（1世紀後半～2世紀前半）に描かれている、釈迦の前世における利他献身（投身飢虎など）の聖地も全て西北インドである（同、281頁、285頁注31を参照）。

「一切衆生の利益安樂のために」という語句は説一切有部をはじめとする諸部派やジャイナ教の銘文のなかにもあらわれ、大乘仏教だけに限られたものでないが、それがあらわれはじめた時期が1世紀中葉であることは、そのころ阿弥陀信仰が仏教化しはじめ、大乘の自己規定が生まれはじめたという仮説を支持する材料になろう。なぜなら、西紀30年こ

⁵ 平川によれば、従来、般若経南インド起源説がしばしば唱えられてきたが、その根拠は薄弱である。本文での考察もこの平川の指摘を前提としている。

ろのイエス磔刑以後、自己の身命を犠牲にして人々を遍く救う救済者を説く福音が西北インドにまで伝わったとすれば、それが仏教に取り入れられはじめる時期として1世紀中葉は妥当なものである。つまり、自己犠牲的利他主義を实践する救済者イエス・キリストが西北インドにおいても強いインパクトを及ぼし、その地において1世紀中葉ころから諸宗教宗派のあいだに利他の思想が行き渡り、釈迦も前世においてイエスに劣らぬ自己犠牲的利他行為を实践したという本生譚が創作されたと考えることができる。

そのなかでも、もっともキリスト教がもたらした利他主義の受容に積極的であったのが、菩薩の理想像に自己犠牲的利他精神を取り入れた大乘仏教であったと思われる。菩薩の自己犠牲的利他と対比して、自らの精神的安定をまず求めるような旧来の仏教の自己本位的修行を声聞乗や独覚乗として批判しはじめると同時に、それら二乗を小乗として劣位に置く大乘・菩薩乗という自己規定が生まれたとみるべきであろう。そして、部派仏教や他宗教も、自己犠牲的利他主義を高く掲げる大乘と対抗するために、自らも利他の教義を強調するようになっていった、といったことを、「一切衆生の利益安樂のために」という語句の普及は意味しているのであろう。

このことは、自己犠牲的利他精神だけでは、大乘仏教を旧来の仏教から差異化するには不十分であったことを示していると思われる。諸部派にとって、釈迦が前世においてイエスのごとき自己犠牲的利他行為を行ったということは同意しえるものであるし、十方世界多仏を認める部派においては、一つの世界で同時に多数の菩薩が修行するということが説かれていたはずなので、声聞・独覚より優れた菩薩乗という発想もすでに実質的に見られたはずである。もっとも、西北インドで最有力であった説一切有部は十方世界多仏説を採らなかったもので、それと対抗するためには菩薩乗を高く掲げることに意味がなかったわけではない。

また、自己犠牲的利他行為の实践が困難であるため、自分は菩薩たりえないのではないかという、凡夫の自覚が、菩薩の理想を高く掲げるほどに深まっただろうことも想像に難くない。その場合、原罪を前提し、イエスの死が人々の罪を贖うと説くキリスト教の論理は非常に説得力を持ったと思われる。罪深く自らの力では菩薩たりえないと自覚した凡夫をも救う能力を烈しい自己犠牲的修行の果てに獲得してついに転生・成仏した、凡夫を遍く救う救済者としての仏が、イエスの贖罪死と復活をモデルとして説かれるようにならないはずがなかろう。かくして西方浄土の阿弥陀仏が誕生したのではなかろうか。

西方浄土の阿弥陀仏がユダヤ・キリスト教起源であるという仮説に関しては、かなり直接的な証拠が挙げられている。「極楽」と鳩摩羅什が漢訳した阿弥陀仏国土名のサンスクリット「スカーヴァティー」（ただし、「須摩提」など漢字音訳の原語はガンダーラ語「スハマディ」）は、『創世記』に登場する「エデンの園」の「エデン」（快樂を意味するアラム語）の訳語ないしそれにヒントを得たものであるとの説である（岩本[1965] 111-9頁を参照）。

また、「阿弥陀」という仏名も、キリスト教に由来する可能性を指摘できる。「阿弥陀」は西北インドのガンダーラ語で無限を意味する「アミダ」の音写であり（奈良[1979] 343頁を参照）、サンスクリットでは「アミタ(Amitā)」となるが、阿弥陀信仰は西方諸宗教の影響を受けて西北インドで形成されたと考えられる（同、藤田[1970] 222-57頁を参照）

ので、「アミタ」ではなく「アミダ」が本来の音であろうとされている⁶。

「阿弥陀」は、「無限の寿命（無量寿）」を意味する *Amitāyus* や「無限の光明（無量光）」を意味する *Amitābha* のガンダーラ語からの音訳であり、「阿弥陀」の原語として *Amitā* ないし *アミダ* そのものを想定することは困難である（藤田 [1970] 287-99 頁を参照）。しかし、なぜ *Amitāyus*（無量寿）と *Amitābha*（無量光）という、*Amitā*（無量）を共有する二つの名が阿弥陀仏にはあるのかという問題がある。阿弥陀仏の起源をペルシアのゾロアスター教やインドの太陽神崇拝に求める説は *Amitābha* に着目するが *Amitāyus* を説明できず（同、269 頁を参照）、ペルシアのズルヴァン・アカラナ（無限の時間）に求める説は *Amitābha* を説明できない（同、275 頁を参照）という難点がある。外来の「アミダ」という語の音が「無限」を意味するガンダーラ語とたまたま同じであったために、それを生かして *Amitāyus*（無量寿）と *Amitābha*（無量光）の二つの仏名が作られたと考えれば、この難点を回避できる。しかも、別個の2仏ではなく同じ1仏の名とされたのは、「アミダ」の原語がその仏のモデルとなった人物と結び付く意味を持っていたからと考えるしかなかろう。

「阿弥陀」は、古代エジプトにおいて死者が赴く西方の不死の国「アメンテ(*Amente*)」と音が似ており、「アメンテ」に由来するという説がある。しかし、提唱者自ら「私は *Amente* が *Amita* の語源となったという想定は否定されてもよいと思う。しかし、少なくとも *Amente* の観念 (*Ēlysion* や *Makarōn Nēsoi* の観念⁷ とともに) が *アミダ* 思想の根源になったということは捨てがたい想定であると思う」（定方 [1971] 63 頁）と述べている。西方から伝わったエジプトやギリシアの理想郷の観念が『創世記』のエデンの園とともに阿弥陀浄土のものになっているということはありえるが、「エデン」と「スカーヴァティー」の関係が翻訳と言えるほど強い、言い換えれば、阿弥陀信仰はユダヤ・キリスト教に由来するとすれば、やはりエジプトやギリシアの理想郷の観念の影響は「エデンの園」と比べて副次的なものとしか言えないのではなかろうか。また、「アメンテ」と「アミダ」の音が多少類似していることから前者を語源とする説は、もっと音が似ている語が語源の有力候補としてみつかれば、棄却されよう。

したがって、ユダヤ・キリスト教と関係があり、「アメンテ」よりも「アミダ」に音が近い語があれば、それが「阿弥陀」の語源として最有力であると言えよう。そのような候補としては、ティグリス河遡航終点の西岸に位置する、トルコ東部の都市ディアルバクル（図1を参照）のローマ時代の呼称「アミダ」(*Amida*) を挙げることができる。この都市は前9世紀初めには西セム語（アラム語等）で *‘āmid* と呼ばれた、*Bēt-Zammāni* というアラム人王国の首都で、*‘āmid* の意味 “standing” は要害の地であることを示唆している（Lipiński [2000] pp. 136&153 を参照）。

⁶ 「阿弥陀」を「アミダ」ではなく「アムリダ」の音写とする説が、岩松 [1977] [1995] で説かれているが、前者に対する詳細な批判が藤田 [1979] にあり、後者はそれに答える内容になっていない。

⁷ いずれもギリシア神話に出てくる西方の理想郷である（引用者注記）。

The City of Diyarbakir




図1 アルメニア人虐殺前のディアルバクル(アミダ)の地図© [http://www.armenica.org Armenica.org
出所: http://www.armeniapedia.org/index.php?title=Diyarbakir

ディアルバクルの大モスク (Ulu Jami 図1の中央やや上方) は聖トマス教会のあった場所に作られた (Williams [1972] p.157, 神谷[2004]を参照)。Pétridès [1907]や Paassen [1967]によれば、St. John 教会が現在大モスクになっているが、それは城郭 (citadel) のなかにあるので、Kale ('Citadel') Mosque (図1の右上) のことである。しかし、"The Kale Cami, or Mosque of the Citadel"に St. George 教会とそのゲストハウスの遺跡があると Williams [1972] (p.158)は述べており、St. George は軍人・騎士の守護聖人、キリスト教軍の総帥として信仰されていた (ヤコブス [1984] 75-88 頁を参照) ので、間違いなかろう。Pétridès [1907]や Paassen [1967]は大モスクと Kale モスクを混同しているように正確さを欠いており、英語で John と Geroge の音が似ているために教会名も誤ったものと思われる。聖ジョージ信仰はアミダがローマ・ビザンツ帝国の東方との戦いにおいて最前線の要塞都市であったことによるものであり、ローマ帝国がアミダを戦略上重要視しはじめたのは、コンスタンティウス2世が東方カエサルであった324-7年ころである (Harper [1976]を参照)。したがって、都市の中央部にあった教会が大モスクになったトマスこそが、アミダのキリスト教にとって本来最も重要な使徒かつ聖人であったと思われる。





図2 アミダ（現ディアルバクル）の聖トマス教会跡地（大モスク）

出所：http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/e/ee/Great_Mosque_Diyabakir.jpg

アミダにある最古の教会は、西紀前からある異教寺院に由来する聖母マリア教会（Meryem Ana Kilesesi = Syrian Orthodox Church of the Virgin 図1の左下）であり、そこにはトマスの遺骨がある（<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diyarbakir> を参照）。聖トマス教会を継承した大モスクと聖母マリア教会のある、紀元1世紀にアミダと呼ばれていたこの都市は、トマスと縁が深いと考えることができる。『トマス行伝』（日本聖書学研究所編〔1976〕所収、荒井献・柴田善家訳）によれば、トマスはイエスと双子の兄弟で、インドにキリスト教を伝えたとされている。トマスによってアミダとインドとの間に関係が作られ、この都市名がインドに伝えられ、西方阿弥陀仏の名に用いられたのではなかろうか。






図3 アミダ（現ディアルバクル）の聖母マリア教会

出所：上 <http://members.virtualltourist.com/m/p/m/2fe898/>

下 <http://members.virtualltourist.com/m/p/m/2fe89a/>

『トマス行伝』によれば、トマスはインドで殉教し、遺骨が西方（メソポタミア⁸）に還された。西方（メソポタミア）は、トマスがエデッサ（Edessa 現トルコ領シャンル・ウルファ）伝道に関与したとされ、骨が4世紀以降そこに祀られたため、エデッサとされることが多い（日本聖書学研究所編 [1976] 497頁訳注一七〇の14、森安 [1978] 227頁を参照）。しかし、トマスが生きていたころ、キリスト教はまだエデッサに伝わっておらず、トマス自身はエデッサと縁もゆかりもない人であった⁹。また、カラカラ帝（位211-7）のローマに服属するまでのエデッサはパルティアと結んでローマと対抗することが多かった。

⁸ Bonnet ed. [1959] p.286, 荒井編 [1976] 所収の「ユダ・トマス行伝」（荒井訳）408頁。

⁹ 3世紀にシリアで成立した『アッダイの教え』によれば、エデッサの王アブガル5世が書状でイエスに往診を乞い、持病の痛風を治してもらおうとしたが、死期が近いことを意識していたイエスは自分の死後弟子のひとり派遣すると約束し、ユダ・トマスによって遣わされた使徒アッダイ（タダイ）に病を癒された王をはじめ、廷臣や市民の大多数がキリスト教に帰依したとされる（村岡 [1982] 180頁を参照）が、王家がキリスト教に改宗したのはアブガル9世（位177-214）のときである（荒井 [2001] 23頁を参照）。132-5年の第二次反ローマ抵抗運動鎮圧後、ユダヤ人がパレスチナから追放され、ギリシア文化の浸透度の希薄な東方への宣教がいつそう活発になったと考えられることから、エデッサにキリスト教が伝わったのは150年頃と推測され（村岡 [1982] 179-80頁を参照）、179年にエデッサでキリスト教に改宗したとされるパルダイサンの著作活動や、160年頃エデッサをはじめとするシリア教会のために『ディアテッサロン（調和福音書）』が作成されたことから推して、遅くとも2世紀前半には混淆宗教的・ユダヤ人キリスト教的・グノーシス主義的・禁欲主義的キリスト教がエデッサに伝えられていたと想定される（荒井 [2001] 24頁を参照）。




図4 中央アジアおよび南アジアの地図

出所：森安〔1978〕16-7頁の地図をもとに著者作成

それに対して、ティグリス河上流域は、前69年にルクルスがアルメニアのティグラネス大王（位前95-55）を破って以来ローマが押さえており、ルクルスの後任ポンペイウスはさらに南進して、前63年エルサレムに入城し、ローマのユダヤ支配がはじまった（図5を参照）。アミダとエルサレムはポンペイウスによって直結されたことになる。後述するように、1世紀半ばころ、パルティア領通過を避け、紅海ーアラビア海を通過してローマ帝国領とインド西岸とを直接結ぶ航路による交易が栄えて、西方文物が西北インドに大量にもたらされたが、そのなかに、船でインドに渡ったとされるトマスの伝道も位置付けられる。したがって、トマスと縁の深い西方メソポタミアの都市は反ローマ親パルティアのエデッサではなくローマの支配下にあつてエルサレムと直結していたアミダと考えるのが妥当であろう。



図5 ポンペイウスがエルサレムに入城した紀元前 63 年の近東
出所：Shepherd [1976] p.33, Asia Minor III 図をもとに著者作成（「アミダ→○」を付加）

170-80 年ころに書かれたヘラクレオンの文章を引用したアレクサンドリアのクレメント (220 年頃没) の著作 *Stromata* によれば、220 年代より前においてトマスは殉教者のなかに数えられていないので、自然死したとされていたことがわかる (Philipps [1903] pp.9f を参照)。したがて、トマスは『トマス行伝』の描くように殉教したわけではないが、インドで死んで遺骨がアミダに還ったか、あるいは死後アミダに葬られたという情報がインドに伝えられたか、いずれかであったとすれば、「阿弥陀」の名の起源がティグリス河上流の都市アミダであることをうまく説明できる。

伝承によればアルメニアには 12 使徒のうちの 2 人、聖パルトロメウスと聖トマス・タデウスが訪れたという (和田 [1982] 200 頁を参照)。パルトノメウス (パルトロマイ) はエウセビオス『教会史』によるとインドに布教した使徒であり、一説によればバル・トマスの誤記である (森安 [1978] 228 頁を参照)。また、トマス・タデウスは 12 使徒の聖トマスと聖ユダ・タダイの二人を合体させたもののようだが、「イスカリオテでないユダ」 (『ヨハネ福音書』14:22) がシリア語本文の一部では「トマス」または「ユダ・トマス」となっており、シリア起源の外典や文献ではトマスが「ユダ・トマス」と呼ばれることが多い (荒井 [2001] 20 頁を参照) ように、東方では聖トマスと聖ユダ・タダイは混同されている。エデッサに聖トマスが聖タダイを遣わしたという説 (注9を参照) も、混同されていた 2 人を強いて区別したものであろう。したがって、アルメニアを訪れたとされる聖パルトロメウスと聖トマス・タデウスのいずれもがトマスである可能性がある。少なくとも、インドを訪れた使徒がアルメニアも訪れたという伝承があったことは間違いなからう。

アルメニアのティグラネス大王は、シリアの首都アンティオキアの住民に推戴されて紀元前 83 年アンティオキアに入城した。その結果アルメニアは地中海沿いに南はシリアのダマスカスまで領有し、ユダヤと接していたのであり（図 6 を参照）、ポンペイウスは保護を求めてきたティグラネス大王の息子を支援し、各小国の旧領をほぼ回復させてローマの属国とした上でシリアをローマの直轄地とし、さらに南下してエルサレムに入っている（Chahin [2001] pp.197ff.を参照）。ローマの勢力圏内でエルサレム→ダマスカス→アンティオキア→アミダ→ティグラナケルト（アルメニアの首都）というルートに沿ってキリスト教のアルメニアへの伝播が起こったことは間違いなく、イエスや使徒の日常語はこの地域の共通語であったアラム語であり、ユダヤ人とアラム（シリア）人とアルメニア人、エルサレムとアミダとの距離感は現在とは全く違い、非常に近かったのである。したがって、アミダに遺骨などのあるトマスは、インドとアミダの両方を訪れた可能性が高いと言えよう。



Kingdom of Armenia at its greatest extent under the Artaxiad Dynasty after the conquests of Tigranes the Great, 80 BC.

図 6 紀元前 80 年ころのアルメニア王国

出所：図 http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5e/Armenian_empire.gif（「Amida ●」を付加）
 説明文 <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tigranakert>

トマスの安息の地がアミダの聖母マリア教会であったとすれば、死者の赴く西方の理想郷がアミダという都市名で呼ばれたとしても不思議ではない。ところがアミダは仏名に使われている。イエスとの双子説によればトマスはアミダの母の許を安息の地としたのであるから、「アミダ」という語は聖母マリアを意味する言葉と受け取られたのではなかろうか。

アミダのアラビア語名“Diarbekir”の意味は“Land of the Virgin”（Pétridès [1907]）、それに相当するアラム語“Dayr Bekir”の意味は、最初の教会あるいは処女（＝マリア）の教会で

ある (<http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Diyarbakır>を参照)¹⁰。このように聖母マリア教会は都市アミダを象徴する世界最古の教会とされていたから、都市名アミダを聖母マリアと等置するような意味付けは、古くから、つまりキリスト教以前に遡る寺院の女神信仰とマリア信仰が習合した当初からあったものと思われるし、イエスよりも聖母マリアを重視し、女神信仰とマリア信仰の連続性を強調すれば、問題なく世界最古の教会ということにもなる。

ティグリス河が山地から出てきたところに位置し、河川交通のターミナルであったアミダは、河の神の祭祀・信仰にとって特別な意味のある場所ということができ、人類最初の農耕都市文明である古代メソポタミア文明を育んだ水の神、インドのサラスヴァティーや仏教の弁財天のような豊穡と繁栄を司る女神が古くから祀られていたことは間違いあるまい。おそらく、アミダの聖母マリア教会はそのような由緒のある女神信仰を継承したものであったと思われる。女神から生まれた双子はティグリス・ユーフラテス両河を象徴したとも言えよう。そのような女神と双子への信仰も、キリスト教より前に遡るものかもしれない。

阿弥陀仏は髭を生やした男性の像姿に作られるので、アミダに祀られた聖母マリアが阿弥陀仏の起源であるとは考えにくいかもしれない。しかし、大乘仏教では女性が成仏する際男性に姿を変えろという変成男子が説かれるので、聖母マリアが成仏してアミダ仏になったとみなされれば、当然男性の姿とされたはずである。

岩本は、「スカーヴァティー」の“ヴァティー”は接尾辞“ヴァト”の女性形であり、その類義語で阿閼仏国土の名「アビラティ」も女性名詞であるが、この二つを除いて大乘仏典に見られる仏国土の名は全て男性名詞か中性名詞であるとも指摘し、「何故にこの仏国土が女性形の名詞で表現されるのか、判らない」（岩本〔1965〕111頁）としている。仏は身体的に三十二の特徴（三十二相）を備えているとされ、そのなかに「馬陰藏」という男性器の特徴も含まれているため、女性の仏はありえない（平川〔1989〕304頁を参照）ので、仏国土名も女性名詞を避けるよう配慮されて当然であり、そのうえ「其國中悉諸菩薩阿羅漢無有婦女。壽命極壽、壽亦無央數劫。女人往生者、則化生皆作男子」（『無量清淨平等覺經』）などのように、初期無量壽經が阿弥陀浄土には女性がいないとしている（岩本〔1965〕110頁）にもかかわらず、わざわざ女性形接尾辞を仏国土名につけるのには、女性形にしなければならない理由があるはずだが明らかにできなかったと岩本は言いたいのであろう。

¹⁰ ディヤルバクル(Diyarbakır)はDiyār と固有名詞Bakrに由来し、Bakrはササン朝時代にアミダのあたりに定住したアラブの部族名である (Strange [1905] p.86 を参照)、あるいは初代正統カリフ・アブー＝バクル (位 632-4) に因んで、アラブ人が 638 年ころアミダをわがものとした後名付けられた (Lipiński [2000] p.136 を参照) との説もある。しかし、部族名だとしても、Dayr Bekirのあたりを定住地としたからBekir族と呼ばれたのかもしれない。アブー＝バクルに因むとすると彼がアミダを征服したり、再開発したのならともかく、彼の死後征服された都市の名をなぜ彼に因まなければならないのかも、イスラム教徒がDiyarbakırではなくDi(y)arbakirと呼んだことも、説明できない。初期のイスラム教徒はキリスト教会をキリスト教徒と共同利用していたことと、Bekirは初代の意味たりえることから、イスラム化の初期にはBekirとはキリスト教徒にとって従来通り処女マリア、イスラム教徒にとって初代カリフと解されていたと考えられるのではなかろうか。しかし、後になって処女マリアを含意する地名を嫌って初代カリフの名Bakrに因むとする説が流布しはじめ、それに合わせる地名の音も試みられたが、処女＝最初＝初代を意味する古い音が根強く生き残ったのではなかろうか。なお、Bakırは銅であるが、現在の正式名Diyarbakır (銅の地) は最近のものである (Williams [1972] p.155 を参照)。

この問題に対して、阿弥陀仏信仰が形成された当初、偉大な女性であったがゆえに成仏したと考えられたため、成仏後は男性のはずだが成仏前（生前と言い換えてもよいだろう）は女性であったことを仏国土名によって示したのだと答えることができる。すなわち、「阿弥陀」は聖母マリアを意味するので、「スカーヴァティー」もアラム語の「エデン」の訳だが、聖母マリアに因んで仏国土名として女性形が採用されたと考えることができる¹¹。

また、阿閼仏は阿弥陀仏よりも古くから説かれたらしいが、仏国土名は「スカーヴァティー」に倣って女性形の類義語が選ばれたと想定することを妨げるものではない。つまり、「スカーヴァティー」と「アビラティ」はいずれも聖母マリアに因んで選ばれた「エデン」の女性形訳語であろう。

「スカーヴァティー」や「アミダ」が、インドへのキリスト教伝播に関連することは、『トマス行伝』におけるトマスの教えの要点としてミュグドニアが「この（地上の）命は益がなく、この（地上の）快樂はかりそめであり、この（地上の）所有は永続しない」「この命に背を向ける者は永遠の命を受け、昼夜の光を憎む者は勝たれることのない光を〈見〉、この財産を見棄てる者は、別の永遠の財産を見出すだろう」（『トマス行伝』130、傍点引用者）と述べていることによっても支持されよう。つまり、地上のかりそめの快樂と対比される「勝たれることのない光」が「スカーヴァティー」「Amitābha（無量光）」、地上の命と対比される「永遠の命」が「Amitāyus（無量寿）」と訳されたと思われる。「永遠の命」は『マタイ福音書』（19:16&29、25:46）、『マルコ福音書』（10:17&30）、『ルカ福音書』（10:25、18:18&30）『ヨハネ福音書』（3:15 ほか 14 箇所）などにある、『新約聖書』のキーワードである。「勝たれることのない光」は「この言^{ことば}において生じたのは命であり、その命は人々の光であった。光はやみの中に輝いている。そしてやみはこれに勝たなかった」（『ヨハネ福音書』1:4-5¹²）とつながる表現であり（日本聖書学研究所編〔1976〕488 頁訳注一三〇の31）、これによって命と光が密接な関係にあることが証され、阿弥陀仏名として「Amitābha（無量光）」「Amitāyus（無量寿）」が入れ換え可能であることも説明できる。

以上で触れた『新約聖書』の「命」はギリシア語（Byzantine majority text: <http://www.ellopos.net/elpenor/greek-texts/new-testament/default.asp>）では“zōē”であり、それだけでも終末的な永遠の命の意味がある（新約聖書翻訳委員会訳〔2004〕補注「いのち」の項を参照）ので、死者の赴く理想郷と結びつき得るし、エデンの園にある、その実を食

¹¹ 『創世記』2:15 原典について石川康輔ほか編〔1996〕は「《園》はもともと男性名詞なのに、ここでは女性名詞扱いになっているが、《エデン》という地名も《地》という単語も女性名詞であり、それらのイメージが強いのであろう」（29 頁）としている。しかし、月本訳〔1997〕は「神ヤハウエは人を連れて行き、〔彼を〕エデンの園に据えた。これに仕え、これを守るためである」と訳し、注一二で『これ』は原語では女性代名詞なので、『園』ではなく、『大地』（9 節）を指す」と解釈している（7-8 頁）。前者の出版を前提としていると思われる後者を優先してまとめれば、「エデン」という地名は女性名詞であるが、「園」は男性名詞であり、2:15 において女性名詞扱いされていると考える必要はない。仏国土名としての「スカーバティー」は「エデン」にあたるとすれば女性形、「エデンの園」にあたるとすれば男性形をとるのが妥当であることになるので、原語との関係から女性形をとるべきとは言えないと思われる。

¹² 『聖書』の訳文は、日本聖書学研究所編〔1976〕の訳語との対応から、基本的に日本聖書協会の新約 1954 年改訳、旧約 1955 年改訳によった。ただし『ヨハネ福音書』1 章 3-4 は本来連続しており、区切るのは四世紀末以降の伝統的な読み方によったものである（新約聖書翻訳委員会訳〔2004〕303 頁訳注三）との指摘をふまえるなど、新約旧約とも改めた箇所がある。

べれば永遠に生きるという命の木の「命」もギリシア語（70人訳：<http://www.ellopos.net/elpenor/physis/septuagint-genesis/default.asp>）では“zōē”である。さらに、「神は人を追い出し、エデンの園の東に、ケルビムと、揺れ動く剣の炎とを置いて、命の木の道を守らせられた」（『創世記』3:24）という記述からして、エデンの園は人間世界の西方にある。具体的に言えば、エデンの園はティグリス・ユーフラテス両河の源である（『創世記』2:10-4、中沢訳[1978] 61頁訳注13を参照）から、ティグリス遡航の終点西岸でユーフラテス河にも近いというアミダの位置は、エデンの園＝両河の源の入口にふさわしい。エデンは平原や砂漠を意味するアッシリア語のエディヌと同語源で、阿弥陀浄土と同様に砂漠のオアシスを象徴する（岩本[1965] 116頁を参照）が、最初の文明を育んだオアシスたるメソポタミアの水源が、エデンの園＝阿弥陀浄土なのである。ティグリス河遡航はそこまでと定められていたように、アミダの原義には、メソポタミアの文明人が妄りに立ち入ることを禁じるような、両河の聖なる源の入口に置かれた結界という意味合いがあり、ケルビムと揺れ動く剣の炎も結界守護を役割としているのであろう。これらのことは、アミダを入口とする両河源流がエデンの園にほかならないことを証している。

「命あるものすべての母となった」という理由で名付けられたアダムの妻の名「命」（『創世記』3:20）も、ギリシア語（70人訳）では“Zōē”であるから、「Amitāyus（無量寿）」は本来、アミダのイヴ＝永遠の命という意味であったと思われる。つまり、両河源流の女神を祀るエデンの園の入口アミダの地名が、ガンダーラ語では無限の意味であると知った人々は、イエスの贖罪死と復活によって人々に永遠の命が開かれたことの証をそこに見出したに違いなく、このことは瞬く間に西方の使徒たちにも伝えられたであろう。ちょうどそのころ聖母マリアが亡くなったはずであり、イエスの許でマリアが永遠の命を得た証とされ、被昇天のマリアと「アミダのイヴ」とが重ね合わせられたであろう。福音書の成立年代はマルコ60年代、マタイ・ルカ80年代、ヨハネ90年代と推定され（新約聖書翻訳委員会訳[2004] 915-8頁を参照）、キリスト教のインド伝播に対する反響が西方に伝わってしばらくしてからいずれも成立しているので、このようにして「永遠の命」が新約のキーワードになったと思われる。アミダに祀られた両河源流の母なる女神の旧約版がイヴ、新約版がマリアということができるだろう。

福音書のなかで成立の最も遅い『ヨハネ福音書』において「永遠の命」が最も強調され、冒頭に「言」^{ことば}「命」「光」をめぐって『創世記』を意識した序文（1:1-18）が置かれたのは、旧約における、命の木のあるエデンの園からの追放がイエスの贖罪死を信じる人にとっては解除されたと「アミダのイヴ」が証したことをふまえて、新約版『創世記』というべき序文を基礎に永遠の命を教理化したからであると言えよう。

このような筋書きが正しければ、『ヨハネ福音書』にはインド由来の思想が他にも見られたとしても不思議ではない。その冒頭「初めに言」^{ことば}「言」^{ことば}（logos）」は知恵や知恵の人格化ととれる（新約聖書翻訳委員会訳[2004] 補注「ことば」の項を参照）。このことは、言^{ことば}が仏教の智慧（般若）に対応する可能性を示唆している。「われわれは自分たちの内部にも周囲にもさまざまな関係しかもっていない。……関係[比]とは、われわれの闇のなかで垣間みられた神的な仲介なのである。／この同一性は、聖ヨハネがキリストに関係[比]つまり〈ロゴス〉という名を与えて表現したもの」（ヴェーユ[1968] 403頁）という『ヨハネ福音書』の解釈によれば、ロゴスは「関係[比]」やその人格化し

た「仲保者」(ヴェーユ [1967] 262 頁)と訳されることになり、「初めに関係(仲保者)があった。関係は神とともにあった。関係は神であった。この関係は初めに神と共にあった。すべてのものは、これを介して生じた。」という風に読んだ『ヨハネ福音書』冒頭部と般若波羅蜜とは本質において一致すると言えよう。六波羅蜜のなかでも智慧(般若)波羅蜜を重視する発想が大乘仏教確立にとって極めて重要だったことはすでに触れたが、このことと、「Amitābha(無量光)」「Amitāyus(無量寿)」のすべてが、『ヨハネ福音書』冒頭の思想を参照すれば、統一的に理解できる。「ロゴス」「命」「光」の強調は『ヨハネ福音書』にとりわけ顕著だが、同書と初期大乘經典の成立時期はいずれも1世紀末ころであり、キリスト教のインド伝播に伴い、相互に深い影響を及ぼし合っているといえる。

ミュグドニアが死後の世界について「男も女もなく」(『トマス行伝』129)としていることが阿弥陀浄土には女性がいないとする初期無量寿経に通じる点は、変成男子説がキリスト教より先に成立していたことや、ユダヤ・キリスト教では肉体ごと復活するとされているので性差がなくなることは想定されていないだろうことから、仏教からの影響とみるべきではなかろうか。

東方の賢者(占星学者)たちの来訪と礼拝の伝承(『マタイ福音書』2:1-12)は、キリスト教の深部にインドからの影響があることを示唆しているかもしれない。彼らの贈り物である香料¹³の産地はいずれもアラビア南部や東アフリカ東部だが、ローマ帝国期の主産地はアフリカ東部であり、紅海貿易で運ばれた(ドルビー [2004] 183-200 頁を参照)。紅海・アラビア海を通して地中海・近東とインドとを結ぶという、紀元1世紀に栄えた航路で、東方の賢者が訪れたことを、香料の贈り物は示唆している。この航路は『トマス行伝』において使徒トマスがインド伝道に向かった際のものにほかならず、トマスに入信したとされるインドの王ゴンドフェルネース(『トマス行伝』ギリシア語写本ではグンダフォロス、シリア語写本ではグンダファル)の名が東方の賢者のひとりGasparとして伝えられたとの説もある(Bussagli [1984] p.207 を参照)。

『トマス行伝』前半(1-61)によれば、トマスは、西北インド・ガンダーラにある、インド・パルティア王国の首都タキシラ¹⁴で、国王ゴンドフェルネースとその一族の帰依を得た。その史実性は、ゴンドフェルネースの治世がイエス贖罪死後の12使徒伝道の時期と重ならないという理由で疑われることもある。『トマス行伝』の訳注は「最近の研究では、この王の治世が前三〇―一五年であったことが報告されており、したがって、使徒トマスのインド伝道の史実性を裏付ける証拠とはならない」と記している(日本聖書学研究所編 [1976] 464 頁訳注二の8)。仏教学においては、平川 [1974] (292 頁)が紀元前後にゴンドフェルネース治世を置いた(平川 [1989] 193 頁でも訂正されていない)。また、Eliot [1921] (p.428)の説に従って阿弥陀仏のキリスト教起源説が成立する余地はないとも説かれた(藤田

¹³ 贈り物は黄金と乳香と没薬である(『マタイ福音書』2:11)が、黄金も実は没薬と同じくバルサムの香料であるという説もある(ワット&セラー [1998] 34 頁を参照)。

¹⁴ ギリシア語写本にある「アンドラポリス」を、日本聖書学研究所編 [1976] 464 頁訳注三の12は所在不明の都市とするが、前1世紀―後3世紀初・南西インドの王朝名「アーンドラ」にギリシア式城市を意味する「ポリス」を加えたもので、インドのギリシア式城市という意味を示唆することからも、ゴンドフェルネースが都を置いたギリシア式城市(高田 [1967] 176-7 頁を参照)であるタキシラ・シルカップ遺跡に同定されよう。

[1970] 266 頁注 1 を参照)。

しかし、タクト・イ・バハイ発見とされる石銘にGuduvhara (=ゴンドフェルネース) 26 年=103 年とあり、後者をアゼース=ヴィクラマ紀元として西暦 46 年がゴンドフェルネース治世 26 年となることに従って、ゴンドフェルネースは西暦 21 頃～46 頃在位したというのが金石文史料に裏付けられた通説であり(邦語文献としては高田 [1967] ¹⁵126-7 頁、歴史学研究会編 [2001]、山崎・辛島編 [2004] 84 頁を参照)、12 使徒の伝道時期と重なる。したがって、ゴンドフェルネース治下の西北インドにトマスが訪れたという『トマス行伝』の伝承はこの石銘の裏付けを得て多くの学者が事実に近いと見ている(高田 [1967] 119 頁を参照)。

2 世紀にパンタイノスがインドまで布教した際、インドでヘブライ語の『マタイ福音書』を見出したという、エウセビオス『教会史』の記述や交易の状況などから、南インドのマラバル地方には 2 世紀にすでにキリスト教が伝わっていたことはほぼ確実であるとされており(森安 [1978] 227-8 頁を参照)、ゴンドフェルネース王のもとにキリスト教が伝わったとする『トマス行伝』の伝承と合わせれば、1 世紀前半の西北インドにキリスト教が伝わっていたと考えるのが自然である。さらに、トマスがアルメニア伝道のために訪れたらしく、遺骨が葬られた都市の名を冠したアミダ仏が 1 世紀半ばころの西北インドで説かれるようになるとともに、自己犠牲的利他主義が流行しだしたことも、トマスが西紀 30～50 年ころ西北インドで伝道したことを裏付ける。

第 3 節 イエス・トマス双子説と阿弥陀三尊

トマスの西北インド伝道が史実であるとしても、阿弥陀仏は彼の遺骨がアミダの聖母マリア教会に安置されたことに因んだ仏名であるので聖母マリアを原イメージとするという推論を裏付けるには、なぜキリスト教の救い主であるイエス・キリストではなく聖母マリア=阿弥陀仏が救い主の地位に就いたのかを説明する必要がある。

「トマス」の名は双子を意味するアラム語に由来し、『トマス行伝』はトマスとイエス・キリストを双子としており、2 人は外見では区別できず、2 人が 1 組となって人々を救う(31, 39 など)。したがって、阿弥陀浄土教は本来、イエス・トマスという双子の兄弟とその母マリアを慕うインドのキリスト教徒たちが仏教と習合しつつ生み出し、阿弥陀如来と観世音・大勢至両脇侍菩薩の三尊も、聖母マリアとその双子の兄弟のイメージから生まれたと思われる。『トマス行伝』50 の聖餐においてトマスが呼びかけている女性単数形の対象は、「双子の若者を生む／聖なる鳩よ、／隠された母よ、来たりませ。」とあることから、イエスとトマスの母マリアである。この聖餐は聖母マリアが中心となり、双子がその脇に控えるような信仰形態を示しており、阿弥陀如来と両脇侍菩薩の三尊に通じる。聖餐における呼びかけの対象と阿弥陀仏国土名「スカークヴァティー」が共に女性形であることは、この聖餐と阿弥陀信仰とが同源であることを示唆する。さらに、『トマス行伝』において、イエスが「多くの姿を有するおかた」(48) とされるのは、『法華経普門品』が説く観世音菩薩の三十三身に通じる。

エルサレムから遠く離れたインド人にとって身近なトマスはイエスの象徴であるから、

¹⁵ インドの金石文の紀年から対応する西暦を導く研究については、高田 [1967] が周到に解説しているので、本論文では一々典拠を挙げない。

とりわけトマスの死後両者は混同されがちなはずであるし、トマス殉教説もその結果生じたのかもしれない。両者が双子であったと信じられたとすれば、それが事実か否かにかかわらず、両者の同格視が起こるのは当然であろう。聖母マリアの処女懐胎が双子であったとすれば、二人とも神の子とせざるをえないからである。『トマス行伝』における「神の聖子の共議者」「神の子と自分を等しくする」(44)というトマスの規定にもその傾向がみられ、しばしばグノーシス色が濃いとされる「真珠の歌」(『トマス行伝』108-113)ではイエスが第二子なのでトマスが第一子であり、真珠を持ち帰ることができればトマスはイエスと共に王国の世継ぎになるとされている。イエスは神の独り子・神人であり他の人間とは質的に異なるとする正統キリスト教と異なり、イエスとトマスが双子で本来同質であるがゆえに、トマスも真珠を手に入ればイエスと等しくなるという「真珠の歌」の論法において、真珠は、誰もが本来持っているがそのことを忘却してしまっており、再発見されるべきものを比喻しており、仏教の自性清浄心に相当する。つまり、イエス・トマス双子説と仏教の自性清浄心との融合が、双子の母をアミダ仏とする発想とともに、大乘仏教形成の方向性を定めたのではなかろうか。また、大乘仏教はグノーシス的な霊肉二元論と相容れない点では正統キリスト教の一元論に近いので、「真珠の歌」をグノーシス的とする通説はおかしいのではなかろうか。

『トマス行伝』50の聖餐における祈りに「男性との交わりよ、来たりませ」とあるように、ここでの双子の母マリアに対しては、処女性の崇拜は見られず、むしろ、女性が花嫁としてキリストと交わるのと同様、聖母と男性信者との交わりに性的な意味を込め、聖母を聖婚の対象と見ているようであり、その傾向を押し進めれば、父なる神の存在意義は薄まり、聖母とその双子の三位一体が父と子と聖霊の三位一体にとって代わりかねない。生まれてすぐに母を亡くし、村娘が捧げた乳粥で成道した釈迦の悟りには、大いなる母性との交わり・一体化という意味合いがあったと思われ、それが双子の聖母マリアへの信仰と合流して、阿弥陀如来と両脇侍菩薩の三尊信仰が形成されたのではなかろうか。

使徒トマスはイエスの釘跡に指を入れ、脇に手を入れてはじめて、イエスの肉体の復活を信じたとされ(『ヨハネ福音書』20:24-9)、復活・被昇天は肉体ごと起こることの証人とされている。『トマス行伝』は、葬られたトマスの遺骸がなくなった理由として、肉体の復活・被昇天を説くことができ、それが母と双子の聖家族にふさわしいはずであるにもかかわらず、遺骨が西方の地に送られたとしている。このことは、仏舎利信仰の影響かもしれない遺骨の神聖視とあわせて、肉体の復活という発想になじみのないインド人ないしインドの仏教徒にとって説得力を持つ説明であったことの傍証となるし、トマスの遺骨がアミダに安置されたことが浄土信仰における霊山霊地納骨の原点かもしれない。

三尊の両脇侍とされる菩薩は、成仏を目指して修行し、転生した未来世において成仏することを仏陀に授記(確約)されるという、菩薩がもともと持っていた性格を失い、永遠に菩薩の位にとどまる存在として信仰され、観音が阿弥陀の化仏を頭や宝冠などに有するように、仏陀ですらその一部であるかのような意味合いすら帯びる。このような仏陀に優るとも劣らぬ大菩薩という観念の成立は、仏教内在的な発展では不可能と思われるが、マリアを阿弥陀に、その双子のイエスとトマスを両脇侍菩薩によって表した帰結のひとつであるとすれば、無理なく説明できる。さらに、「其國中悉諸菩薩阿羅漢無有婦女。寿命極寿、寿亦無央数劫。」(『無量清浄平等覺經』)とあるように、阿弥陀仏や大菩薩だけでなく一般

の菩薩や阿羅漢も永遠の命を得ている世界が想定され、菩薩として死後転生して成仏すること、あるいは、阿羅漢となり死後転生しないことを目指して、有限な寿命のもとで修行する道場としての仏国土や、そこでの指導者としての仏陀という在来の意味は消え失せており、このように根本的な変化はキリスト教的救済観の影響抜きには説明できないと思われる。極楽に女性がいらないという明示的な記述が現存梵本『無量寿経』や『大無量寿経』以後なくなる（岩本〔1965〕110 頁）のは、仏教の枠に収まりきれないため後に削除されたからではなかろうか。

キリスト教に帰依したとされるゴンドフェルネースの死後、クシャーナ族（大月氏）が1世紀半ばころから西北インドを支配した¹⁶が、彼らがキリスト教を保護した形跡はない。1世紀後半の西北インドにおいてキリスト教勢力は外護者を失って弱体化し、排斥・迫害の動きも強まっただろうから、その地に残ったキリスト教徒たちのなかでも十方世界多仏説を唱える仏教徒との交流に積極的だった者たちは、仏教の外観のもとで存続を計ろうとしたのではなかろうか。このようにして、ゴンドフェルネース没後インド・パルティア王国の外護を失って逆境に置かれた西北インドのキリスト教は1世紀半ばころから仏教と融合しはじめ、キリスト教に由来する自己犠牲的利他主義やアミダ信仰を仏教の一派として唱えるようになり、大乘仏教という自己規定が紀元1世紀末ころに固まったのではなかろうか。

1世紀中葉からギリシア・ローマ世界とインドとの交易は季節風を利用してアラビア半島とインド半島部西岸とを直接結ぶ航路が主にギリシア人やギリシア系の人々によって急速に発展し（山崎・辛島〔2004〕109 頁を参照）、西北インドも、ローマ帝国領からパルティアを通る陸路・沿岸路ではなく、紅海―アラビア海を経てインダス河を遡り、ガンジス河流域や中央アジア内陸部を東西に走る古来の「絹の道」に至るような交易ルートに位置して栄えた（高田〔1967〕201-3 頁を参照）。インド・パルティア王国は西方文化を愛好し、西方からの輸入品であるヘレニスティックないしグレコ・ローマの金・銀製品が多数出土し、タキシラ・シルカップ遺跡のこの時代の層から出土した一銀器には所有者であるチュクサのクシャトラバ・ジホーニカの名と191年（旧シャカ紀元として西暦36年頃）が刻まれている（同、190, 153 頁を参照）。

このように、イエスの死後使徒が伝道をはじめたころ、衰退しつつあったアレクサンダー以来の西方文化の伝統とは別に、新航路の発展とともに新たに西方文物が西北インドに大量にもたらされた。大乘仏教形成への西方からの影響もそのなかに位置付けられなければならない。とりわけ、仏教建造物の階段の蹴込み(stair-riser)を飾る「飲酒」のようなヘレニスティックな彫刻が1世紀中葉ころから作られるようになっており（図7を参照）、最初期には西方工人が渡来して作ったと見られる（高田〔1967〕195-6 頁を参照）。トマスも「木では鋤かせ、枷か、天秤、滑車、舟、櫂、マストを、石では石柱、神殿、王宮を」造ると自己紹介して、ゴンドフェルネースの宮殿を造るよう命じられている（『トマス行伝』17）。したがって、トマスは、仏像を生み出すに至るような仏教革新の震源となった西方工人のひとつ

¹⁶ パンジタル石銘によれば122年にクシャーナ族の王がすでにガンダーラ地方の支配者となっており、通説によればアゼース=ヴィクラマ紀元とみて122年は西紀65年、クシャーナ族の王はクジュラー=カドピセース（丘就卻）である（高田〔1967〕130-1, 142 頁、山崎・辛島〔2004〕84 頁を参照）。

りだったのである。



図7 飲酒 階段蹴込み 1世紀中期
ペシャワール博物館蔵 出所：高田〔1967〕図版15



図8 祇園布施 階段蹴込み 1世紀末期
カラチ国立博物館蔵（高田〔1987〕92頁による）
出所：高田〔1967〕図版17

インド・パルティア王国に代わってクシャーナ族の王が西北インドを支配するようになると、キリスト教に帰依したとされるゴンドフェルネースの治世と比べてキリスト教の立場が悪化したと思われ、有力な聖職者がいなくなった西北インドに残されたキリスト教徒は、仏教との融合、さらには大乘仏教形成への積極的関与の道を選んだのではなかろうか。

ガンダーラでは、仏像が作られはじめる前から仏教建造物において西方的な題材が採用され、西方から渡来した工人など、仏教や従来の仏教美術に関する知識のない工人が階段

蹴込みなどの中に自由に西方的なものを導入できたのであり、最初期の仏像も、階段蹴込みの仏伝の「祇園布施」などの場面の中に他の人々と同じ身長と西方的顔立ちの人間として登場している（図8を参照）。図7「飲酒」と「祇園布施」の間には宗教的題材を扱った「献花供養」の階段蹴込み（高田〔1967〕図版16）もあるように、仏像が作られるまでの連続的な変化がたどれる。このように、西方からの異質な発想を仏教の中に取り入れることが1世紀中葉のガンダーラでは可能であり、仏像もそのおかげで創造されたのである。仏伝図は部派的傾向を指摘でき、実在論的な説一切有部の思想と密接に関連すると高田修は考えている（同、281頁を参照）。だとすれば、大乘仏教がトマスのキリスト教を取り入れ、聖母マリアを阿弥陀仏として信仰しだしたのとパラレルな文化交流現象として、部派的傾向の濃厚な仏像の創始を位置付けることができる。

従来、仏像製作開始に大乘仏教勃興が影響したとする論者が少なくなかった¹⁷が、両者は、西北インドにおいて最有力であった説一切有部などの部派と、大乘仏教を形成するような流れとの両方にそれぞれみられた、西方からの思想文化の流入が引き起こしたパラレルな革新ととらえるべきであろう。トマスが建築工人であったことは両者の平行性を象徴的に示している。

仏像へ的大乗仏教の影響はガンダーラでは2世紀後期にあらわれ、三尊像は3世紀前期に出現し（図9の左を参照）、5年という年記から3世紀中ごろとわかる三尊像の左脇侍菩薩は法冠の化仏から観音であり、ガンダーラ後末期の作と見受けられる主尊阿弥陀・左脇侍観音の銘のある像（図9の右）は右脇侍が失われているが阿弥陀三尊像らしい（高田




図9 ガンダーラの仏三尊像

左 サーリ・バロール出土 ペシヤワール博物館蔵

右 タキシラ個人蔵（所在不明） 銘文は “budhamitrāsa olo’iṣpare danamukhe budhamitrāsa amridaha...” 英訳は 《The Avalokeśvara of Buddhamitra, a sacred gift, the Amṛtābha of Buddhamitra...》 (Brough〔1980〕pp.66&67)

出所：左 高田〔1987〕126頁、右 Brough〔1980〕p.69

¹⁷ 高田〔1967〕以降のそのような見解が高田説を内在的に批判できていないことは、肥塚〔1985〕270-1頁を参照。

[1987] 125-9 頁を参照)。したがって、西北インドで阿弥陀三尊像が造られはじめたところには、阿弥陀三尊が聖母マリアと双子のイエス・トマスに由来するということは忘却されていたであろう。図9のように、主尊如来と両脇侍菩薩等の身長体格年齢は、遠近法の使用を考慮すれば大差ないように造られており、親子とはみなしがたい。

『トマス行伝』後半(62-170)の伝道と殉教は南インドでの出来事と解釈されることが多い(日本聖書学研究所編 [1976] 217 頁、森安 [1978] 226-7 頁を参照)が、根拠はない(Phillips [1903], Gillman and Klimkeit [1999] pp.161ff.を参照)。トマスを処刑したとされるミスダイ(シリア語写本ではマツダイ)王がインド・パルティア王国に代わって西北インドを支配したクシャーナ朝のヴァースデーヴァ(1世)である(Lévi [1904] pp.14f., Medlycott [1905] Appendix 34, pp.284ff., Web 版 p.6 を参照)という説に従えば、彼は太和3(230)年魏に入貢した大月氏王波調(『魏志』「明帝紀」)とされるので、殺されたのはトマスではなく3世紀前半のクシャーナ朝に伝道した者であることになる。すでに触れたように、220 年ころまでトマスは殉教者に加えられず、自然死したとされていたらしいので、トマス殉教説のもとになるような出来事が220年代以降に起こったと考えられ、ミスダイ=ヴァースデーヴァ説と符合する。

『トマス行伝』の伝える通りミスダイ=ヴァースデーヴァが結局はキリスト教に回心したとすれば、ササン朝との対立がその背景にあったと思われる。アルメニア王がササン朝ペルシア(226 年成立)と戦う際227 年から229 年にかけて同盟関係にあったというクシャーナ王 Vehsajan はヴァースデーヴァであり、彼はササン朝との対抗上アルメニアと結び、魏に入貢したと考えられる(Ghirshman [1946] pp.99ff., 高田 [1967] 164-5 頁を参照)。アルメニアは301 年に世界ではじめてキリスト教国となったので、3世紀にはかなりキリスト教が浸透しており、キリスト教の伝道師がアルメニア王とクシャーナ王を仲介したということが考えられよう。3世紀半ばまでという『トマス行伝』原作成立(日本聖書学研究所編 [1976] 226 頁を参照)、とりわけその後半が成立するきっかけとなったのは、キリスト教伝道者を介したアルメニア・クシャーナ間外交ではなかろうか。しかし、ヴァースデーヴァはササン朝との戦いに敗れ、クシャーナ帝国も崩壊したので、インド・パルティア王国衰亡後と同様、キリスト教はこのときも西北インドに定着しなかったのではなかろうか。また、西北インドにおいて3世紀前半にキリスト教が再び布教された際、すでに大乘仏教は自らのアイデンティティーを確立していたので、そのなかにキリスト教由来のものが隠されているなどということは忘却されていたであろうことも、三尊像の形態から読みとれよう。

おわりに

阿弥陀三尊がはじめは双子の聖母子であったことの痕跡が、思わぬ所に残っている可能性がある。インドから中国を経ずに直接百済に渡り、さらに日本に渡ったと伝承されるように、中国文明を介さないインドとの直接的な結びつきを示唆する、善光寺の秘仏一光三尊像である。秘仏を拝見して写したものとされる善光寺式一光三尊像は、他に類例のない特徴をいくつか有しており、その意味を探ってゆくと、1世紀の西北インドにおける阿弥陀仏誕生の事情にまで遡ると思われるのである。

善光寺式三尊像の東アジアにおける源流と思われる、東京国立博物館蔵法隆寺献納宝物

第143号の三尊像（図10の左を参照）においては、蓮台がないとしても菩薩の顔が如来の右手掌の高さにあるのと比べて、善光寺式三尊像（図10の中と右を参照）においては如来の右手掌より低く、143号（図10の左）の蓮台は脇侍のほうが高いのに対して御前立本尊（図10の右）の蓮台は如来のほうが高い。



図10 三尊像

左：東京国立博物館蔵・法隆寺献納宝物第143号

出所：<http://www.tnm.go.jp/gallery/material/film/> フィルム番号 c576

中：甲斐善光寺本尊 建久6（1195）年銘あり

出所：久野編〔1992〕146頁

右：善光寺御前立本尊 出所：善光寺事務局監修〔2000〕口絵

このように、善光寺式三尊像のほうが如来と菩薩の大小・高低が強調されているのも、それが双子の聖母子像に由来する可能性を示唆する。善光寺式三尊像における両脇侍の顔立ちや体格も、一般の菩薩のような青年像ではなく少年像のものではなかろうか。両脇侍が双子であることは、双子の僧善仲・善算が如来のお伴をしたとされる（『善光寺縁起』¹⁸ 巻第一）ことによっても示唆されよう。

法隆寺献納宝物第143号では、主尊は左手を垂下して第四・五指を曲げる印相で、同様の作例は中国最古といわれる永明元（483）年銘無量寿仏（阿弥陀仏）像をはじめ、朝鮮三国期の如来像にしばしば見られる（大西〔2002〕83-4, 104-7頁を参照）。それに対して、善光寺式阿弥陀三尊像の主尊阿弥陀如来は、左手を垂下して第一・四・五指を曲げており（図11を参照）、この印相は刀釵印と呼ばれる（『善光寺縁起』巻第一）¹⁹。親指＝母は母、薬指と小指は双子の兄弟を意味すると解釈すれば、善光寺式三尊像が主尊と脇侍の大小・高

¹⁸ 従来の縁起を集大成したいわゆる「応永縁起」（『続群書類従 巻第八百十四』所収）。

¹⁹ 建久6（1195）年の定尊秘仏拝見に基づく善光寺式阿弥陀三尊像の中尊左手は、第一指先を第四指にぴったり付けているが、『善光寺縁起』巻第四「浄蓮上人源延如来拝見事」によれば、承久3（1221）年に源延が見たところ、第一・四指は二分（約六ミリ）ばかり離れていたとある。源延は定尊仏の特徴を良く知った上で秘仏を拝見したと思われるので、この観察のほうが正確であろうが、第一指を曲げるという特徴までも否定せず、第一・四指の間にわずかの隙間があると指摘したと解せる。

低の差異を強調するように既存の三尊像に変更を加えたものであることと、主尊左手印相の変更とを一貫して意味付けることができる。



図 11 善光寺式三尊像主尊左手印相
甲斐善光寺本尊 建久 6 (1195) 年銘あり
出所：久野編 [1992] 146-7 頁

善光寺信仰は、白雉 5 (654) 年 4 月、日向に漂着したドゥヴァーラヴァティー（現在のタイ国チャオプラヤー川流域）の遣唐使一行のなかのインド人夫婦が日本に伝えた、インド南部を中心として広まっていたキリスト教に由来するものであり（平山 [2006] 第 2 章を参照）、彼らのキリスト教には、ネストリウス派がインド・キリスト教を指導するようになる以前から説かれていた、マリアとイエス・トマスの聖母双子信仰が何らかの形で保存されていたため、当時の東アジアにみられた一光三尊像の両脇侍を小型化・少年化し、主尊左手の印相を変えて、聖母双子像とした可能性がある。聖母マリアとイエス・トマス兄弟はちょうど斉明女帝と天智・天武兄弟に対応すること、斉明・天智・天武当時の善光寺如来信仰が阿弥陀三尊と聖母・双子とを重ねるようなものであったことの補強材料となろう。

本稿の検討に即して言い直せば、阿弥陀三尊像をマリア・イエス・トマスとみなす善光寺式一光三尊像は、仏教化の進展とともに忘却されてしまった阿弥陀三尊本来の意味を回復するものであり、日本最古の仏像、日本の本師如来どころか、紀元 1 世紀西北インドにおいて西方美術と仏教美術の融合の産物として世界最古の仏像が作られたころ、それとパラレルな文化現象としてキリスト教の聖母マリアとその双子への信仰が仏教と融合することによって生まれた阿弥陀三尊信仰の本来の姿を奇跡的に復元した、仏基両教にまたがる世界的な本師如来であると評することができる。

天智・天武のころ日本に知られたキリスト伝の影響を受けて、聖徳太子は母が厩の戸に当って生まれ（『日本書紀』推古天皇元年 4 月 10 日条）、救世観音の化身であるとされたなどと論ずる久米邦武 [1988] の説も、ドゥヴァーラヴァティーから漂着した人々が活躍した時期にキリスト教が日本に伝わったとする。聖徳太子信仰と善光寺信仰が密接な関係にあるのは、いずれもが彼らの伝えたキリスト教の流れを汲んでいるためであると説明できる。聖徳太子の磯長廟に合葬されている母間人大后・太子・膳夫人が、阿弥陀・観音・勢至三尊の化身とされたことも、聖母マリアとその双子イエス・トマスの三尊に対する信仰が 7 世紀インドのキリスト教に残っており、東南アジアを経て日本に伝わって、阿弥陀三尊と再び重ねられたとすれば、理解しやすくなる。

このように、本来、トマスがインドに伝えたキリスト教と一体化した仏教として生まれ

た大乘仏教が日本に伝わって間もない7世紀後半に、再び南インドを中心に広まっていたキリスト教が日本に伝わり、善光寺信仰や聖徳太子信仰の形成に深い影響を及ぼすという、二度にわたるキリスト教との融合によって、日本独自の仏教が形成されたことになる。

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